


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TIME AND MODES OF BEING

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
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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

IN 1946/47, MY TWO-VOLUME WORK, *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* (*Spór o istnienie świata*, Vol. I, 297 pages, Vol. II, 848 pages) was published under the imprint of the Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters.

The present volume contains the English translation of parts selected from Volume I of this work: the Introduction, Chapter III (with its introduction), Chapter VI, and Section 31 from Chapter VII.

This selection covers my most important ontological analyses of modes of being and of time, as it is involved with these, which lead to the establishment of fundamental concepts of modes of existence. These investigations constitute the existential-ontological preparation for Volume II, which contains formal-ontological studies clarifying a number of basic formal concepts that are indispensable to an adumbration of prospective possible solutions of the controversy between idealism and realism. Volume III is in preparation.

Both of the extant volumes of *The Controversy* will soon be published in a German edition of my composition and an English translation made by Mrs. Helen Michejda will be issued some time after the publication of this present volume.

I wish to express my great and sincere appreciation to Mrs. Michejda for her careful preparation of this excellent translation, which completely satisfies every demand of the author. I am equally indebted to Professor Marvin Farber for electing to include the present volume in his series of American Lectures in Philosophy, and to Mr. Charles C Thomas for giving this book the prestige of his imprint. Finally, I am grateful to the State Scientific Publishers (Warsaw) for giving their consent to the publication by Mr. Thomas of this translation.

R. I.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

NOT WITHOUT reason has *The Controversy over the Existence of the World*, of which the present book is an important part, been characterized as one of the most significant works of our time¹—an accolade to which was added, however, a note of regret and even of censure that it had been written in Polish, a minor language which philosophers could not be expected to master.

Although, prior to the Second World War, much of the author's work was published in French and German,² he wrote his major work in Polish during the German occupation (needless to add, in the midst of the greatest physical and spiritual desolation a people has ever known) as a proof that "the Polish spirit of resistance" lived also in the field of philosophical research. The same fortitude that sustained him in the writing of this work is reflected in the unflinching attack he makes on the problems he confronts.

Virtually all of the author's earlier writings converge, without notable retractions or revisions, in this work whose aim is to break through the epistemological barriers raised by empirical relativism, which have served to dam the mainstream of the philosophical enterprise, diverting it from its concern with ontology and metaphysics, and leaving only a runoff of small rivulets powerless to cut new channels. The author, moreover, dissatisfied with Husserl's transcendental idealism, nevertheless employs the phenomenological epoché as his tool with which to carve his concepts stone by stone out of the bedrock of the indubitable, and so to reconstruct the nature of reality.

¹ By I. M. Bochenski, in *Contemporary European Philosophy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956, Note, p. 130.

² A bibliography of these will be found in Roman Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 2nd edition, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1960, pp. 429-30.

The scope, rigor, and independence of his thought and his pertinacious refusal to accept the concept of philosophy that dismisses problems hitherto unsolved on the assumption that they cannot be solved, open new avenues to their resolution that constitute a challenge to all philosophers. For not only has he developed a new conception of ontology, free from presuppositions, but also demonstrated its indispensability as the apodictic foundation for the reconstruction of philosophy as a universal science by means of which the foundations of all the other sciences can be clarified.

It has therefore been with a keen sense of the privilege and responsibility vested in me by the author in confiding the translation of this work to me, that I have attempted to reproduce his thought faithfully. It has been my special concern to avoid introducing any connotations or implications not intended by him, and so I have often followed the original almost literally, although I realize that the resultant English phrasing at times may seem unnatural. In part, too, this is due to the difficulties encountered in expressing novel ideas for which no language has an adequate vocabulary. When grammatical or linguistic differences have made them necessary for clarity, I have added a word or two in the text; likewise, when an explanation of a concept not elaborated in the present book seemed indicated, this has been included in a footnote. Both the phrases and the notes are enclosed in brackets to distinguish them from parenthetical remarks in the original. The English translations of quotations from foreign works are mine unless otherwise noted (necessarily so, since in many cases there are no extant English translations). *The Controversy over the Existence of the World*, from which this book has been excerpted, is cited merely as *The Controversy*.

To the author, who has read and graciously approved the greater part of this translation, and answered many questions, I owe no small part of whatever success I have had with it. I am similarly indebted to his colleague on the philosophical faculty of the Jagiellonian University, Dr. Daniela Gromska, who has generously given of her time to check my work and so spared me many inadvertent errors. But the responsibility for any errors that remain is, of course, mine.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the kindness of Dr. Egon Bittner in giving me access to phenomenological literature not readily available, and the cooperation (and patience) of the editor of this series, Professor Marvin Farber. It is my hope that this translation is deserving of the assistance given me, and that it will be adequate to its task of introducing Professor Ingarden's philosophical achievement to English and American readers.

H. R. M.

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Author's Preface</i>	v
<i>Translator's Preface</i>	vii
<i>Chapter</i>	
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS	3
Introduction	3
The Foundations and the Tentative Formulation of the Question at Issue	8
Different Groups of Problems Requiring Delimitation.....	17
II. INTRODUCTION	22
Three Main Groups of Ontological Problems.....	22
III. BASIC EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTS	28
The Problem of the Possibility of Analyzing Existence.....	28
Modes of Being and Moments of Existence	32
Autonomy and Heteronomy	43
Existential Originality and Existential Derivation	52
Existential Separateness and Inseparateness	82
Existential Self-Dependence and Existential Contingency...	89
Absolute Being - Relative Being	92
IV. TIME AND MODES OF BEING	99
Preliminary Observations Regarding Concrete Time	99
The Mode of Being of Events	102
The Mode of Being of Processes	107
The Mode of Being of Objects Enduring in Time	124
V. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD WHEN TIME IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.....	157
New Concepts of Modes of Being	157
<i>Name Index</i>	165
<i>Subject Index</i>	167

TIME AND MODES OF BEING

Chapter I

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

IN THE ANNALS of philosophy, "idealism" has referred, as is generally known, to many different meanings, although on the whole these have neither been clearly differentiated nor precisely defined. In consequence of this, various views are taken to be the opposite of idealism; for example, this may either be what is called materialism, or it may be realism, so-called—moreover, of still other types. This is associated with (among other things) the ambiguity that has attached to the term "idea" in the course of philosophy's history.

As we know, this term was originally used by Plato to denote what then came to be called universals or timeless ideal qualities. Its scope is not even clearly univocal, for at times it appears that Plato includes both mathematical ideas and the so-called universals in this term, and, at others, that he does not do so. However, this usage of the term "idea" denotes *one* type of "idealism": an idealist in this sense is one who accepts the existence of "ideas" *alongside* or *apart from* the existence of the real world (of individual things). Plato himself was an "idealist," therefore, in this sense. But, at the same time, it has become common in some circles to call Plato a "realist." However, this refers, not to that special *domain* of objects whose existence Plato recognized, but to the *mode of existence* which he attributed to ideas. In this connection, some regard Plato as a "realist" because, in the latter part of his life, he ascribed to ideas the power of acting upon individual things and worked them back into the sphere of individual things to some extent; but others do so because he attributed the most complete, perfect being to ideas, and such being—so his interpreters believe, not Plato!—has to pertain to "real, individual" objects. Here, therefore, the opposition ideal-

ism—realism denotes a contrast between two *modes of existence*, and *not* the *sphere* of that whose existence is acknowledged. So “realism” in this sense is not (at least, it does not have to be) the opposite of “idealism” in the first meaning.

We come upon entirely different, historically familiar meanings of the term “idealism” when we take it in the meaning which it first acquired with Descartes and later—with certain modifications in different writers—from the English empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Since the time of Descartes, “idea” has assumed more and more the meaning of a certain conscious experience through splitting the content of this concept to refer at one time to an object, at another, to a concept, and a third, to the corresponding act of consciousness. With Berkeley there appeared, on the basis of what one might call the subjectivistic meaning of the term “idea,” the view that a material thing is a “group” of ideas or a “complex idea” whose *esse* = *percipi*. The notion that a thing is a “complex idea” had already made its appearance, it is true, with Locke, but only with Berkeley was the assertion made that a material thing is nothing but this kind of idea or combination of ideas, which can exist in no other way but *esse* = *percipi*. This view was given the name “idealism,” and it became common from that time on to speak of idealism whenever not only matter (the physical world), but also the real world as a whole (the world of individual things) is conceived either simply as a certain *collection* of experiences—either of conscious contents or as a selection of such combinations of experiences—or as their particular *product*. Thus, in both of these cases, the mode of existence of the world is taken into account and degraded in relation to the mode of existence of consciousness. Actually, *there is no* real world in the meaning of *absolute* existence, and only consciousness exists (now either as universal consciousness, so-called, or as the individual consciousness of separate monads, or finally, as the consciousness of an absolute spirit [God]); but the world also exists in a measure, in some weaker, relative sense, such as that *esse* = *percipi*. As the opposite of “idealism” so understood is taken “realism” (of one type or another), according to which the existence of the real world is acknowledged *alongside* that of consciousness—“independent,”

as it is usually said, of consciousness. In this case, the controversy between "idealism" and "realism" is a controversy over the *existence of the real world*, and in particular, about the special character of its existence and the existential connections of the world with consciousness, which here is usually called pure consciousness, the absolute "I" and the like.

In connection with the acquisition by the term "idea," in modern philosophy, of the meaning of conscious experience, the word "idealism" has come to stand for the view that the principal factor in being (real), a substance of some sort, is something conscious, spiritual, irrespective whether this is regarded as divine consciousness or as that of individual (finite) psychic subjects. "Idealism" in this aspect is therefore identified with *spiritualism*—monistic, dualistic, or pluralistic—and is taken as the opposite of *materialism*, either radical or moderate. Then the controversy is actually about the real world (of individual things), but not so much with respect to its existence (which in this case is usually accepted without important reservations) as with respect to its *nature*—as to whether it is material or spiritual, or both the one and the other (or eventually yet some third kind), and as to which of these elements fulfills a dominant, a fundamental, or possibly a creative role in the world.

When spiritual questions are linked with questions of value, especially of moral values, as "idealists" are often taken those who are inclined to accept the (autonomous) existence of (moral) values and to ascribe to them at least an important, if not a dominant and guiding, role in the life of man and in the affairs of the real world in general. This is called axiological idealism. When Plato's recognition of a certain supreme value, *kalokagathia* (καλοκαγαθία the noble and good) is taken into account, it is easy to find a way to return from axiological idealism to the Platonic idealism of universals.

All these "idealisms" and their opposites are likewise metaphysical idealisms (realisms)—that is, they are always concerned with whether there is a certain world (of individual things or of universals) and with what it "really" is in its essence. With these are often confused the so-called *epistemological* "idealisms" and "realisms," which are of still other types. As we know, it was the

arguments of Descartes in his *Meditationes de prima philosophia* which primarily contributed to the creation of the controversy between idealism and realism in modern philosophy respecting the *existence* of the real world. He proposed to doubt whether the real world (and the material world in particular) actually exists by questioning the *veracity and certainty of our cognition* of real objects. As is generally known, Descartes contrasted this uncertainty and doubt with the *absolute certainty and indubitability of his knowing* his own *cogitationes*, and therefore also with the *existence* of those *cogitationes* and of his own *ego*. Since his time, through Berkeley, Hume, Kant and the post-Kantian idealists to the so-called transcendental idealists of our own day, the view has become more and more firmly established that the problem of *the existence* and of *the nature* of the real world not only is *derivative* in relation to epistemological considerations, but that, further, it is itself an epistemological problem. As a result of this, it is thought that every statement about the world, its existence or nonexistence, or about how the world exists in a given instance, what its *form* is and what its *properties* are, should be (a) formulated exclusively in terms drawn from epistemological analyses of consciousness, and especially from the analysis of the conscious acts through which the world and the things belonging to it are known, and (b) accepted exclusively on the *basis* of the statements that can be made about this cognition. The only being that is accepted absolutely in this case is that of the "I" of the philosophizing subject and of his *cogitationes*, apprehended in immanent perception (so-called pure consciousness). This acknowledgement constitutes the ultimate point of departure and the basis, as well as the indispensable *minimum* existential foundation, of such inquiries; and the entire endeavor of the investigation is directed toward somehow *deducing* from the existence of the ego and its *cogitationes*, by means of epistemological analysis, the existence of anything whatever that may be, and of the real world in particular. This is the so-called *transcendental* method of considering the problem of the existence of the world. The solutions thus obtained—idealistic or realistic—are ordinarily regarded, not as metaphysical positions (which they are *de facto*), but as epistemological determinations.

It is also thought that only the transcendental point of view is methodologically correct and that it guarantees the maximum certainty of the results obtained. It is characteristic that attempts to resolve the controversy over the existence of the real world on this basis almost regularly terminate in idealism of one form or another. This form of "transcendental" idealism constitutes a certain kind of hybrid border case between metaphysical and epistemological idealism, in the strict meaning of the [latter] term, in which the sole concern is with epistemological problems that merely *parallel* a certain thesis of metaphysical idealism.

In the investigations to which I shall devote this book, I shall be engaged exclusively with the *controversy over the existence of the real world*¹ that is given to us in direct experience, and which encompasses material objects as well as psychophysical individuals. This controversy has the role of the central problem of modern philosophy. The most distinguished minds of European philosophy have labored over its solution. Nevertheless, it has remained unsolved to this day, though many interesting and profound attempts to resolve it have been undertaken. There continue to be two main divisions among scholars who are in sharp conflict and—what is worse—not infrequently do not understand each other. More accurately speaking, there are even more camps in mutual opposition, for there are many varieties of the so-called "idealistic" or "realistic" positions. Thus, in the course of the debates, instead of simplification and clarification, we are given increasingly complicated theories and problems that become more and more confused. This situation has even inclined some investigators to reject the problem itself as being without any meaning at all.² This decision is premature. Nevertheless, the fact that up to this time it has not been possible to make any real progress in resolving this controversy is evidence, so it seems, that somewhere in the very inception of such divergent views, some fundamental errors must have been made, which prevent any solution. And what can constitute a beginning

¹ Consequently, hereafter, when I speak of "idealism," it will be in this restricted meaning.

²Cf. Rudolf Carnap, *Scheinprobleme der Philosophie* (*Pseudo Problems of Philosophy*), Berlin, 1928.

as well as the question itself? For it seems that in the very way in which the problem is posed must inhere some obscurity or confounding of the issues. A thorough and unbiased survey, furthermore, of the various philosophical systems also shows more and more clearly that behind the controversy over "idealism" is concealed a number of problems that are basically dissimilar and that have never been unambiguously defined, and whose relationships and connections likewise have not been scrutinized. In this situation, it seems completely purposeless to seek a new solution until the problems themselves are scrupulously clarified as to their essential contents and various ramifications. All this persuades me to set myself, first of all, the task of *systematically* developing the *problems* of the controversy between idealism and realism. Only on this foundation will it be possible to delineate the guiding principles for the conduct of an investigation of the whole question that will be cognizant of its assumptions and adapted to its objectives. It will then become evident that an accurate grasp of the problem itself requires the solution of many basic questions, and therefore that the attainment of a solution of the central problem necessitates many difficult and fundamental preliminary investigations. And these investigations can themselves contain new sources of error. Consequently, I do not delude myself that it will not be necessary in the future to correct, to revise, or to probe more deeply into more than one aspect of my elaboration of the problems of the controversy. Perhaps, however, at least some of the guiding principles of my explication will prove to be correct and will serve to move the whole problem forward.

THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE TENTATIVE FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION AT ISSUE

Every inquiry, even when conducted in the most radical way, is actually only an interim phase in the development of the investigation. Consequently, its findings are always provisional and its point of departure depends upon the theoretical situation to which it refers. Hence, although we attempt to free ourselves completely from all historical influences and to be governed by purely objective considerations in our discussions, we are nevertheless obliged, in the initial, preliminary phase of our inquiry,

to relate it to some extant theoretical solution from the past, in order to grasp the problem for the moment in a *provisional* way, which can be replaced by another, final formulation only in the course of our deliberations. However, if I refer here especially to certain assertions and determinations that have been made in this field by Edmund Husserl, I do so because, in my estimation, Husserlian transcendental idealism is one of the most profound and significant attempts to solve the controversy between idealism and realism in contemporary philosophy. To avoid misunderstanding, I must immediately note here that it seems very improbable to me that the solution propounded by Husserl is correct. However, I do not intend to present Husserl's views *in extenso* here, and I shall limit myself to his most important affirmations.

As does every question, ours, too, issues from a number of assumptions. It will be useful to list them here in the form in which they are presented in the body of Husserl's investigations.³ They are the following:

At least two regions of individual objects should be distinguished: (a) the domain of "pure consciousness" and (b) the realm of "the real world."

By "pure" consciousness in Husserl's meaning should be understood all the experiences and complexes of consciousness which lie within the scope of a possible "immanent perception,"⁴

³ Of Husserl's writings, the following works are taken into account here: (1) *Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology** (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*), 1913; (2) *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (*Formale und transzendente Logik*), 1929; and (3) *Cartesian Meditations* (*Méditations Cartésiennes*), 1929. However, I shall limit myself in the following discussions to the views presented by Husserl in his *Ideas*, because the development of the problems in this work is still relatively simpler and clearer than in his later works, although his position is still undecided and not as radical as, for example, in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. I shall not always keep to Husserl's exact formulations, but I shall try to adhere to his thought.

* [Hereafter, for brevity, this will be cited only as *Ideas*. — Tr.]

⁴ Cf. E. Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson, 1931, p. 124: "In the case of an *immanent perception* . . ., *perception and perceived essentially constitute an unmediated unity, that of a single concrete cogitatio*. The perceiving here so conceals its object in itself that it can be separated from it only through abstraction, and as something *essentially incapable of subsisting alone*." Immanent perception should not be identified with inner perception, in which our psychic states and characteristics are given us. This distinction was already made, for that matter, by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

and which should be taken in the exact form in which they appear in this perception after every apprehension foreign to it has been eliminated (and therefore, any that are not derived from this perception). When immanence is strictly adhered to, these apprehensions simply remain beyond the range of an immanent perception, and, because of this, fall away themselves.⁵ These are various. Of these, the following should be noted as the most important:

(a) The apprehension of consciousness as a *symptomatic* phenomenon. It is then conceived as a manifestation of the existence and life of a certain determinate, real, psychophysical individual. This individuum properly is not a part (component) of pure consciousness, but is only manifested and externalized in it.

(b) The apprehension of consciousness as a *real process* which belongs to the world existing contemporaneously with it, and, in particular, as a certain *psychic* process, which is the outlet for the life and attributes of a given person, and which, at the same time, is conditioned by processes occurring in the physical world, especially in the body of the given person. This conception is closely connected with the conception described above. The real process, which now passes as consciousness, is incorporated as a component within the entirety of the world through various real connections with other psychic and material processes.

In both these apprehensions, conscious experience can be given to us in "inner" perception, which is usually utilized for the purposes of empirical psychology.⁶ Owing to the fact that it

⁵ However, it is not so easy to achieve a pure immanent perception. For this reason, it is important to be aware of these apprehensions.

⁶ In the strict meaning of the term, "inner" perception refers primarily, not to experiences, but only to what of one's own psyche is "manifested" in experiences, as, for example, a strong conviction, emotional excitement (the shock of love or of hate), or a determinate property of the character of one's own personality. Only on the basis of this psyche can "inner" perception be "directed"—if it may be expressed thus—toward conscious experiences, which then naturally well up from inside the person and must be apprehended as his acts that "externalize" him. Experience can be liberated from this apprehension only when perception is held strictly within the frame of immanence, and, when the phenomenological epoché* is strictly observed, no decision of any kind should be made as to the validity or invalidity of this apprehension. Whoever, like Husserl,† regards it as

is possible to set aside or at least to neutralize these apprehensions by an act of immanent perception, they do not belong, according to Husserl, to the essence peculiar to conscious experience. Consequently, if we want to deal with conscious experience in its entirely "pure" form, we must take it exactly as it is given in immanent perception. When the apprehensions indicated are set aside, pure consciousness constitutes in its own essence an individual entity that is radically different from all other real being. This is why Husserl calls pure conscious experience "irreal" (cf., *Ideas*, Introduction). In this way, immanent perception leads us to a sharp and radical contrast between the two regions of being: the real world and pure consciousness.

The radical dissimilarity of these two regions of being⁷ naturally does not preclude the existence of wholly determinate

the intentional product of inner perception, thereby enters upon the road to idealism of a certain type with reference to the existence of one's own person. On the other hand, whoever decides this question in the sense of an objectively valid cognition by that person, has already—at least at this point—accepted a realistic solution of a definite type. I am pointing this out in order to emphasize at once that the controversy between "idealism" and "realism" is concerned not only with the "external" world (especially the material), but also with the "inner" world (the psychic—particularly one's own psyche), although in doing so, I am not thereby concluding that there must be some necessary connection between these two "worlds."

* The concept of the epoché (ἐποχή) will be introduced later. See p. 16.

† However, this is a point in which Husserl himself—in his *Ideas* as well as later—was not faithful to his principle of the epoché. For he treated this apprehension from the outset as something which can be set aside and as dependent upon inner perception, and, therefore, as an apprehension which *should not* be taken into consideration in definitive research having as its aim the discovery of what possesses absolute validity. In principle, of course, it may be that this is how it is, but this could only be determined as the final result of a critical study. Husserl, however, does not give us such an inquiry—at least, not in his published writings. It may be that among the manuscripts which Husserl left will be found a study of this subject. As yet, we have not come across an investigation of this kind in the manuscripts that have been published in recent years.

⁷ The reader will kindly keep in mind that when I am taking the views of others into consideration, I must often make statements which I shall later question in my own positive examination. An example of such statements is this affirmation of the thesis regarding the radical dissimilarity of the two regions of being, of the world and pure consciousness.* This [affirmation] constitutes the point of departure of the whole transcendental treatment of the problems involved in the controversy over the existence of the world.

* [This thesis is subjected to critical scrutiny in Vol. II of *The Controversy*.]

connections between them, which should be elucidated. On the contrary, one of the tasks which attaches to the controversy between idealism and realism is just this one of scrupulously clarifying these. This task can be undertaken, however, only after a number of other questions have been considered. At the moment, it is clear that these connections must, in any event, be of an entirely different nature than all the connections and relations which can occur within the compass of the real world among its components, or within the sphere of pure consciousness among its elements.

In the opposition of the "real world" to pure consciousness, by the latter can be understood either the stream of conscious experience which possesses one and only one "I"—the one that is actually philosophizing—or an undetermined number of streams of experience of different subjects ("I"). For many reasons, it is of the first importance which of these possibilities we elect. It is especially important in epistemological research. Therefore, at this moment, neither of these should be excluded. However, the way in which I made a demarcation a moment ago between the real world and pure consciousness—namely, by referring to immanent perception and by crediting to pure consciousness everything which lies within the range of its possible bearing—compels us to limit the scope of pure consciousness for the time being to a *single* stream: to the experience of only the pure philosophizing subject. Also arguing for this is the consideration that in the course of transcendental investigations, which I shall discuss later and which many, among them Husserl, regard as the only rational method of studying the problem of idealism and realism, there must be a phase in which one and only one stream of experience should be admitted—that of the experience of the philosophizing subject (of "my" experience) only, and everything else only in so far as it can be related in a certain way to the subject's conscious experience. But, when we have passed through that phase, the problem of admitting other subjects (Husserl speaks of the "*alter ego*") will arise, and this presents special difficulties. The theoretical troubles which Husserl tries to overcome in his *Cartesian Meditations* are evidence of this. Never-

theless, only by this procedure is it possible to attain to the most radical method of conducting transcendental investigations.

Real objects belonging to the "real world" are distinguished by the fact that they can be, at least in principle, given originally⁸ to the cognizing subject. This subject knows them through a number of conscious acts of a determinate kind, namely through acts of "experiencing," so-called, when what has been termed the "natural attitude" is taken—i.e., that which is always ours in everyday, practical affairs. Real objects are given in experience as existing and as characterized in one way or another. Acts of experiencing are acts of pure consciousness. "Experience" is not to be understood in this connection as only what is called "sensory" experience, but we make allowance in advance for the fact that there can be many different kinds of experience. "Experience" is therefore *every* conscious experience in which an individual (transcendent) object is self-given "in the original" to the subject performing the act.

Real objects, as well as all of the real world, are "transcendent" in relation to the pure conscious experience in which they are given. This has only one meaning here: that no component of the real world—whether a thing or any of its properties, or an event or a process—constitutes an actual part of the conscious experience in which it is given; and, conversely, no element of that experience constitutes an actual part of that which is given in it as an object to the experiencing subject.⁹

⁸ Husserl uses the term "originär." [The word "originarily," used by Marvin Farber in his exposition of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, has been adopted to reproduce this term here, because it preserves the distinctive meaning in which it is employed in phenomenological literature. Cf. his *Foundation of Phenomenology*, Cambridge, 1943, or New York, 1962.—Tr.]

⁹ Husserl himself does not give us a more precisely defined concept of the "transcendence" of an object. However, I believe that this definition corresponds with his intention. As will shortly be seen, it is necessary to add one more condition, not mentioned here, in order to arrive at a completely precise definition of *one* of the concepts of transcendence. According to H. Conrad-Martius, to this concept also belongs [the thought] that an act of consciousness performed by a knowing subject, and particularly an act of objective inference, cannot break into the course of the real world's destiny (cf., "Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. III, 1916). Conrad-Martius calls transcendence of this kind "real

For certain specific reasons, which cannot be cited here, the existence of pure consciousness is fundamentally beyond any possible doubt. On the other hand, the existence of the real world or of its members (things, processes, etc.) can in principle be subjected to question—a possibility that is not precluded by the circumstance that the world (or its members) is given originally in acts of experience as self-presented. However, the existence of the world is “subject to doubt,” not in the sense that there would be *positive* reasons (arguments) which would be evidence against admitting its existence, and which, at the same time, would be insufficient to deny it, but only in the meaning that the nonexistence of the real world is not precluded in principle when we maintain the existence of all the activities of pure consciousness which actually occur.

When these assumptions are accepted,¹⁰ the controversy between idealism and realism at first glance appears to be very simple: it pertains to the existence or the nonexistence of the real world, but it results from the difference between the fundamental dubitability of the real world and the indubitability of pure consciousness, or from the transcendence of the real world and its components in relation to pure conscious experience. If it could be demonstrated that *no real world exists* in fact, although the actual course of all the conscious experiences in which that world and its components are given remained unchanged, there would

transcendence.” By implication this statement ascribes a certain specific impotence to pure consciousness in relation to what is real. But we may not make this assumption at the beginning of an elaboration of the problems involved in the controversy between idealism and realism. That is why I do not include the moment noted by Conrad-Martius in the concept of the “transcendence” of the object. None of the other moments which we frequently encounter in the history of philosophy—such as that often used by exponents of Kant’s moment of unknowability—should be credited to the contents of this concept. The concept of a “transcendent” object, in the meaning established here, therefore in principle has nothing in common with the Kantian notion of the “thing-in-itself.” Later, I shall define a number of different concepts of transcendence more precisely.

¹⁰ Of course, these are not all the foundations of Husserl’s transcendental idealism (or of other writers’). Yet this idealism is already a definite *solution* of the controversy. Only those assumptions have been selected here which underlie the *problem* that is the subject of the controversy. They do not indicate what type its solution will be.

be only *one* domain of being—that of conscious experience. The so-called “idealists” would then be right. However, this is, as we shall see, a very special way of understanding idealism.

Contrasting both of these regions of being, and discovering concurrently that one of them—so-called pure consciousness—is given in immanent perception, which guarantees its existence completely beyond doubt, also points to the method by which, in view of many contemporary investigators (among them also Husserl, who devoted many penetrating researches to the elaboration of a method to deal with this problem) the whole question should be considered, namely, the so-called “transcendental” method of inquiry. Once a realm of indubitable existence has been attained—in the wake of Descartes’ first attempt to do so—in the form of the “pure” conscious experience of a philosophizing subject, and, therefore, a domain of cognitive products not subject to any doubt, it is necessary to try to base the controversy over the existence of the real world on this foundation of indubitability alone, and to resolve it in a way equally indubitable. An inquiry called “transcendental” is so in the sense that it does not resolve the question of the existence of the world through its being directed towards the characteristics of the world, but in that it takes this domain of pure experience as its point of departure, and attempts, as if by an indirect route, to find the cognitive foundation for the admission of the existence of every object—of the real world in particular—in the actual state and in the essence of the course and activities of pure consciousness. By this procedure, it has to derive the ultimate justification (ground, validation)—capable of being seized directly—of the cognitive product that establishes the existence of a nonimmanent object. But equally, it may result in demonstrating one or another deficiency in this justification. Every principle of the validity of cognitive products, both the disclosure of each phase in the cognition of a given object and the evaluation of the degree and type of its validity, ought to be based on this “absolute” foundation, and will have scientific value for the transcendentalist only if this has been carried out fully and successfully. An appeal to the existence or properties of any nonimmanent object whatever, which would

purport to prove the existence of the real world or to validate knowledge of it, would be incompatible with the transcendental method of investigation, and as such would be regarded by a transcendentalist as a basic error—a regression into the dogmatism of traditional metaphysics. Relevant to this is the subtle and complicated method of transcendental inquiry elaborated by Husserl. To this method belongs, among other things, the so-called phenomenological epoché, also called the “phenomenological reduction.”¹¹ According to Husserl, this is the indispensable prerequisite for the correct conduct of transcendental investigations, and relies primarily on the neutralization of the conviction which we constantly entertain in the natural attitude that the real world exists. And indeed, if the ultimate purpose of all these operations is for Husserl the deduction by a faultless method, of the existence of the real world from the existence and essence of pure consciousness, then this deduction should be made without admitting the existence of the world at any point in the process—that is, by performing the epoché. Further consideration shows, however, that the epoché is a certain system of combining operations that fulfill different functions. Under these circumstances, the road leading to the goal seems to be difficult and complicated, but the goal itself—the ascertainment of the existence or the nonexistence of the real world—seems simple and easy to understand. Closer examination reveals, however, that this goal, too, is basically not so easy to foresee, since it is necessary to reckon with a much larger number of possible solutions than there would seem to be at first glance. Let us come to this in due course.

¹¹ Husserl first published his discussions on this subject in his *Ideas*. But throughout almost all the nearly quarter of a century of work that remained to him after the publication of the *Ideas*, Husserl was engaged in elaborating his method of phenomenological “reduction” and in perfecting his transcendental method. He did not publish the results of these investigations. I know of their existence from conversations with Husserl. In Husserl’s lectures from the year 1907, published in 1950 under the title, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, the idea of the “phenomenological reduction” seems to have been crystallized for the first time. But its formulation presented in the *Ideas* (1913) appears to be considerably more developed.

DIFFERENT GROUPS OF PROBLEMS REQUIRING DELIMITATION

As I have already indicated, the apparent simplicity of the question at issue disappears on closer examination. And this for the following reasons:

Basic doubt of the real world's existence arises from the character of the immediate "experiencing" of the objects belonging to it, and especially from the character of "sensory" and of "inner" perception, which in scientific cognition ultimately substantiate the validity of our knowledge of the real world. Sense perception—to restrict ourselves to it—has these characteristics: (1) the object given in it "in its own person" (of itself)—a thing especially—is transcendent in relation to it; (2) this object does not form a unified whole with it or any whole at all;¹² and (3) the only way in which an object is given in [this] perception—and this of necessity—is through the perceiving subject's experiencing determinate "phenomena" ("appearances"). These phenomena, differing from each other in content, always comprise a certain ordered manifold. These manifolds of "phenomena" differ and their order varies according to the kind of object and its endowment. It is true that their individual components, owing to their structure, effect the immediate self-presentation of the object to the perceiving subject (and in many different perceptions this is always the same object), but, at the same time, they can never cause it to be given to him adequately and on all sides. In every sensory perception, certain sides and parts of the thing perceived (e.g., its reverse side, its interior) are concealed from the mental and physical gaze of the perceiver. Nevertheless, they are co-inferred in a perception and ascribed to the given thing intuitively, although they are not filled with concrete qualities. Of course, these sides or parts of the perceived thing could also be given strictly "in person," but only in *other* prior or subsequent perceptions. But again, other sides of the same thing thereby become concealed and are only co-inferred by the perceiving subject. Thus, it is in principle possible that the perceived thing

¹² In this inheres that supplementary moment which, as I mentioned previously, must be included in the concept of the object's transcendence with respect to experience.

meanwhile has undergone changes of one sort or another. These changes can be such that, at the time of the present perception, the thing no longer has this side or part (or property) which we once attributed to it, although this is not evident now. It can also change in such a way that while, in a future perception in which a certain part or side of the thing appears in strictly visual givenness, it will have this part or side, it does not yet have it at the time of the present perception, although this [side, part] is now (delusively) co-ascribed to it intuitively. Therefore, there is always in principle a possibility that the object perceived is endowed with other characteristics or parts than appear on the ground of the actual perception, and there is even a possibility that it does not exist at all, although the perception referring to it continues to take place without change. Conversely, it is also possible, but not, at the same time, necessary, that in the further course of the pertinent experience, this variant determination or the nonexistence of the perceived object is revealed, and that, *nevertheless, it will exist* (together with the whole real world). Because none of these possibilities is accidental, but spring from the essence of the structure of a sense perception,¹³ this is consequently the source of the *fundamental* possibility of doubting both the real existence and the actual endowment of real objects, or, more generally, those of the real world. Similar considerations apply to inner perception. The result is that the existence and

¹³ Both Husserl and his followers attempted to show this in numerous analyses of sense perception. It must be said, however, that the examination of these possibilities by phenomenologists took into account only the circumstances constituting them, which are discoverable when the inquiry is restricted to *immanent* analysis of external perception, and did not ask at all about the conditions of the *origin* of these perceptions—especially those conditions which occur in states of affairs that are transcendent in relation to the stream of pure consciousness. With the performance of the phenomenological epoché, such a procedure seemed only correct, since it would seem to violate the principle of the epoché if any transcendent conditions were taken into consideration. Nonetheless, here a decisive step toward an idealistic solution has already been surreptitiously taken . . . It will be necessary to return to this matter in my positive epistemological deliberations. There it will be necessary to find a way out which, at the same time, will not violate the principle of the epoché and will not omit the question of the conditions for the genesis of determinate external perceptions. Perhaps then it will be shown that some of the possibilities discussed in the text above will have to be eliminated. But we have far to go to that.

the endowment of all that which is given in it can be doubted in principle, and, therefore, also the so-called mind and spirit of the perceiving subject as well as the facts that occur in them.

Consequently, not only the facts themselves are basically uncertain, but also the concept of the real world and of its reality as a certain special mode of being—a concept obtained, to be sure, on the basis of experience. Hence, the delimitation, too, between the two realms of being—the real world and pure consciousness—itself becomes uncertain: [a delimitation] which belongs to the foundations of the question that is the subject of our controversy. Namely, if the real world or its components can have other properties entirely than legitimately appear on the basis of external or inner experience so far, then one of the members of the opposition, the real world—pure consciousness, has not been definitely determined with respect to its properties. It may therefore be asked whether the delimitation already made between the two realms of being does not rely by chance upon actually given properties of the real world, whose very pertinence is doubtful. It will consequently be necessary to subject this delimitation to a fresh critical inspection. And the concepts of the real world, of a real object, and the like, as well as of the reality of the world itself, which we have created for ourselves directly on the basis of experience, cannot simply be accepted in our new examination, but their validity will have to be checked or they will have to be revised. Obviously, by some other procedure.

A further consequence of this state of affairs is that the very way in which the controversy between idealism and realism has been grasped appears to be, in principle, itself subject to question, which gives rise to the task of determining anew, in a way that is consistent with the actual state of affairs, what meaning the basic question of our controversy has. To achieve this end, a separate introductory inquiry will be necessary. We shall undertake this here.

There are other reasons, too, that induce us to review critically the entire group of problems involved. The sharp and diametric opposition of the two possible, mutually exclusive solutions of the problem of the existence of the real world, which initially suggest themselves, loses its simplicity as soon as we ask

about the *mode* of existence of the real world that eventually must be accepted, and also about its *existential relation* to pure consciousness. That a simple and radical opposition of the existence of the world to its nonexistence will not suffice, and that it is necessary to demand a further differentiation of possible cases, is evident already in the fact alone that many distinguished representatives of so-called idealism decidedly reject the charge that they deny that the real world exists. This is usually done by distinguishing between the real world's *dependence upon* or *independence of* pure consciousness. When this distinction is introduced, there are not two, but at least three, possible solutions to the main problem. However, the word "dependent"—as Max Scheler has already correctly observed¹⁴—is ambiguous enough existentially to throw the whole discussion into extreme confusion. A more thorough examination of the possible modes of being and of existential moments will also show—as we shall ascertain in Chapter III of this book—that the number of possible solutions to the problem of the "existence" of the real world is much greater than three. In this connection, all the problems of the controversy must undergo corresponding differentiation.

Our controversy arises, as I have already indicated, from the basic uncertainty¹⁵—presently recognized by all the conflicting positions—of the existence of the real world: an uncertainty which has its source in the determinate characteristics of the empirical mode of cognizing that world. It therefore appears that reasons of an exclusively *epistemological* nature lead to the question regarding the existence of the real world, which—as I shall try to show—is intrinsically a *metaphysical* problem. In consequence, the solution to the problem too often has been sought through epistemological research. However, what leads to the basic uncertainty regarding the world's existence is, in its essence, a certain *ontological* state of affairs, namely, that real objects are *transcendent* in relation to the conscious experiences in which they are known. Under these circumstances, the complex of

¹⁴ See M. Scheler, "Idealismus-Realismus," *Philosophischer Anzeiger*, Vol. II, 1927.

¹⁵ I speak of the basic uncertainty of the existence of an object where there is a basic possibility of doubting its existence or endowment.

problems appears even more complicated. For, in order to settle a metaphysical problem, it will be necessary to consider, in addition to epistemological issues, other problems and states of affairs that are purely ontological. These ontological problems must play an important role in the complex of problems relating to the controversy for the further reason that it will be necessary to clarify and to establish anew the concepts on which the delimitation of the real world and pure consciousness is based, which—as I pointed out above—become questionable from the moment that we become aware of the instability of their empirical ground. The variety of reasons and questions which lead to the controversial issue and affect the method of solving it, produces a corresponding variety of problems to be considered. It will, therefore, be necessary to break down the *one* fundamental question into *many* questions, and even, it may be, into many *groups* of questions. Thus, the kind of question to which we are directed by a certain objective situation is not a matter of indifference. For example, if the question is a metaphysical, then the kind of cognition and the method leading to its solution must also be metaphysical. On the other hand, if the question is epistemological, then methods of cognition entirely different from those used in the first case and other procedures must be utilized for its solution. For a strict order obtains between the nature of a domain of problems and the cognitive media through which the given domain can be mastered. Therefore, in order that the course of our inquiry may be clear and valid, we must not only determine the contents of the several questions, but also know which domain they pertain to—what their general character is. And this second, general question must even be clarified first, before the contents of the particular questions are formulated. For this reason, too, there is a need for a preliminary survey which will permit us to delimit the problems involved and to characterize their nature.

Chapter II

INTRODUCTION

THREE MAIN GROUPS OF ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

FIRST OF ALL, a general delimitation of the different basic groups of ontological questions must be made. There are three of these: (1) *existential-ontological* questions,¹ (2) *formal-ontological* questions, and (3) *material-ontological* questions. For the time being, their delimitation must of necessity be only preliminary, since only exact concepts of existence and of form and matter, which we shall obtain in the further course of our deductions, will permit us to grasp its ultimate significance and foundation.

In general, every object must be considered from three different points of view, or, in other words, with regard to three aspects pertinent to it: (1) as to its *existence* and *mode of existence*, (2) as to its *form*, and (3), as to its *material* endowment.

ad 1. In existential matters, two different questions should be distinguished in principle: (a) does a certain object exist *in fact* (in any way whatsoever), and (b) what is the *mode of ex-*

¹ To avoid misunderstanding, I must point out at once that existential-ontological research as I conceive it does not have anything in common with M. Heidegger's "existential philosophy." I first explicated the meaning of these problems in my treatise, "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus" ("Remarks on the Problem of Idealism-Realism") in the *Festschrift* for Husserl, 1929, which, as I have already mentioned, serves as the general guide in the present investigations. N. Hartmann calls existential-ontological research "modal analysis." (Cf. Volume II of his *Ontology*, entitled *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit* [*Potentiality and Actuality*], 1938.) Existential-ontological considerations have nothing in common with French "Existentialism," with which I was able to become acquainted only after I had written this book. French Existentialism—for that matter, there are several varieties—is overwhelmingly under Heidegger's influence, and is primarily a form of metaphysics concerned with the essence of man and with his destiny in the world; but it is *not* concerned with the problem of the existence or of the modes [of being] of whatever may exist. This will become evident from the investigations that will be carried out here.

istence of the object *X* that is designated by the idea of it (or by its essence) as basically *admissible* for it, irrespective of whether or not it exists? The first question is either one which, in respect to the object *X*, is posed by a special science, especially one of the sciences about facts, or it is a question raised by metaphysics. The second, on the other hand, is a specifically ontological question (so formulated, however, that the answer to it will have the character of an *applied* judgment, and not that of a judgment of the contents of the idea). Its answer requires an ontological analysis of the contents of the idea of the object *X*. However, if we are to attribute, with complete understanding, a certain mode of existence to the object *X* possible for it, then an analysis of the contents of the idea of anything whatever in general, and the idea of the several modes of existence, is also necessary.

ad 2. When we deal with the form of a certain object *X*, we are faced with a question of the kind, for example, as "Is the object *X* a thing (has it the form of a thing?) or is it a process, or a relation, and so on?" This question can be asked in a metaphysical sense; but, in order to pose this kind of question with complete intelligibility, it is necessary first to see clearly what the form of a thing is in general, on what it depends, what peculiarly characteristic moments can be distinguished in it, etc. And similarly, with respect to other forms or structures. Nothing can instruct us about such matters but an analysis of the contents of formal ideas, and particularly of the idea of the form of a thing, or of the idea of the form of a process, etc.

ad 3. The third respect in which an object *X* can be considered is that of the entire complex of "*material*" moments determining it ("qualitative"—Husserl uses the term "*sachhaltig*"). Every form of something is, in its essence, the form of some object that is materially determined in a certain way. Without this material "fullness," without qualitative determination—in the most general meaning of this expression—it would be only an artificially created abstraction which could not exist of itself. And conversely, a qualitative determination, too, cannot be without form. There is an essential union of the form and the material endowment of an object. It is therefore indispensable, when cognizing an object from all sides, to clarify its material endowment

too. Moreover, it is this, in the object, which first strikes the eye. Thus, a third domain of problems opens up before us, which can be grasped either metaphysically or ontologically.² And here ontological investigations again take precedence, having as their task the explanation of what variables and constants appear in the correlative ideas. Let us take into consideration only those which are significant in the conflict between idealism and realism.

To be exhaustive, the cognition of a given object must be carried out both metaphysically and ontologically in *all* three directions. For the total being of an object is constituted by its form, its material endowment, and its existence in a certain determinate mode. It should not be supposed that these three "sides" play equal roles in the object. Even to speak of three "sides" is only a certain gross approximation that must be discarded as soon as we succeed in penetrating into each of these so-called sides of an object thoroughly. For the moment, this manner of expression permits us to make only the preliminary assertion that ontological analyses break down into existential, formal, and material.

So that certain erroneous views—even today still almost universally accepted—will not impede the progress of our inquiry, it is necessary to make certain reservations in advance which, however, we shall be able to justify only later. Contrary to the usual view, not everything that can be distinguished in an object is its "property" ("characteristic"). With respect to the existence of an object, this has already been enunciated by Kant in his famous statement: "Existenz is kein reales Prädikat" ["existence is not a real predicate"]. But he provided this declaration with an explanation which gave rise to new misconceptions. Namely, he said: "Thus the real contains no more than the possible."³ This is entirely correct if the "more" which—according to the view Kant rejected—would have to be contained in those hundred "real" thalers, in contrast with the thalers that are only possible, is taken to be a certain *property* of theirs. Actually, the "real" thalers are not distinguished from the thalers that are only possible by any *property*. But Kant's statement is frequently inter-

² The special empirical sciences concern themselves primarily with the material endowment of the objects they examine.

³ [*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. by J. M. P. Meiklejohn, 1943, p. 335.]

preted in a quite different way. It may be that the following statement, which he also made, contributed to this: "From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its existence."⁴ In connection with this statement, it is said—thus investing Kant's statement with a meaning that seems foreign to it—that existence is not something which can be differentiated in an object, and that *this is why* it cannot be grasped "conceptually." But from this it would follow that (1) objectively, there is *no difference* between an existent and a nonexistent object, and (2) the question of the existence of a given object is wholly incapable of solution and even of adequate formulation—and this would have to be true for a cognizing subject who could attain to complete and exhaustive knowledge [of the object]. Consequently, it is ab-

⁴ [*Ibid.*, p. 146.] The interpretation that should be given to this statement of Kant's, acceptable as the correct one, will develop from our analysis of the existential contents and variables in the contents of an idea. (Cf. Sec. 44.*) See also Sec. 15 of my book, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, 1931. On the basis of the analysis made there, this statement of Kant's can be reformulated in the following way: "In the material content of the name of a thing,† neither the meaning-determination of its mode of being nor the moment of its existential position (*Setzung*‡) will be found." ("In dem materialen Inhalt des Namens eines Dinges kann weder die Sinnbestimmung seiner Seinsweise, noch das Moment der existential *Setzung* angetroffen werden.") But if we were to take it that in the *full* meaning of a name, there is *no* intentional moment referring to the existence of the object named, this would have to be regarded as a mistake. Before Kant, Hume dealt with the question of an "idea" or "impression" of existence (cf. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Pt. II, Sec. 6). Hume's denial that there is such an impression, consistent with his position, is also understandable. For Hume from the outset sensualized the content of immediate experience (of impressions), and therefore treated it as only an element in it that can be apprehended as a (sense) impression. The thesis that the existence of something is not an "impression" is only a natural one from Hume's point of view. But it does not follow from this at all that existence generally would not be distinguishable in an object.

* [Sec. 44 is not included in this edition.]

† ["Name" is the term adopted by the author in *Das literarische Kunstwerk* to designate words that have what he calls "nominal meanings." These (such as "table," "red," etc.) he differentiates from the "functional" (e.g., "is," "or," etc.). "Material content" refers to the qualitative endowment of the object, and is to be taken in the broadest sense.—Tr.]

‡ ["*Setzung*" has a special meaning in phenomenological literature. Cf. Husserl, *Ideas*, index refs. to *Position*, and p. 302 esp. In Sec. 15 of *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, the author employs *Position* rather than *Setzung* in explaining that an object's "existential position" differs from its "existential character" in that while the latter refers to *how* it exists (its mode) *if* it exists, the former refers to the fact that it *actually* exists.—Tr.]

solutely necessary (1) to restrict the Kantian statement about those hundred thalers to their properties only, as I have just proposed, and (2) to concede that not everything which can in general be distinguished in an object is a property. Specifically, we can distinguish in an object both its existence (more accurately, its existence in a determinate mode) and its form, but neither the one nor the other is a property ("characteristic").⁵

And one additional observation: Being or a mode of being is always the existence or the mode of existence of something, never something separate in itself. The "idea of existence," therefore, or the "idea of a certain mode of being" likewise cannot be understood to mean that only a *single* element appears in the contents of these ideas, namely, "existence" (or "mode of existence"). There is no such idea as existence or mode of existence. There is only the idea of the existence of *something* (in one way or another)—in particular, the idea of the existence of *something really existing*. Diverse elements appear in its contents, but all the formal and material elements appear as *variables*.⁶ Only the existential components appear to be constant; in the contents of the idea of the existence of anything *in general*, some of the existential elements are variable. The idea of reality (of realness) is an idea of the existence of something real, which is—at least within certain limits—*optional* both as to its form and as to its material constitution. However, there arises in this connection

⁵ [In Sec. 38—not included in this edition—this statement is fully substantiated.] The first to protest, as far as I know, against this mistaken interpretation of Kant in this matter was Otto Selz, in his treatise, "Existenz als Gegenstandsbestimmtheit" ("Existence as the Determination of an Object") *Müncher Philosophische Abhandlungen*, Leipzig, 1911. However, Selz regards existence (*Dasein*) as the principle of individuation (*principium individuationis*) in the existent. And this does not seem right.

⁶ At least so it seems when the idea of a mode of existence is first contrasted with material and formal ideas. And actually this is reasonable when the idea of an *optional* mode of existence is involved. However, when we come to the ideas of individual (possible) modes of existence, a certain caution is indicated. For, on closer examination, it is seen that the form of an object is strictly related to its mode of existence, and that consequently not all the formal elements in the contents of the idea of a certain determinate mode of being are absolutely variable, and that either their variability is limited or some of them are constants. All these are matters, however, which will become clear only after we have completed detailed formal and existential ontological analyses.

the very difficult problem of how to delineate the limits of the variability of the form and of the material endowment of something real. This is one of the principal tasks of the material and formal ontology of the real world.

After these preliminary considerations, we can proceed to detailed discussion immediately related to the controversy about idealism.

Chapter III

BASIC EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTS

THE PROBLEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANALYZING EXISTENCE

ACCORDING TO OUR provisional formulation of our main problem, the question we must consider is whether the real world should be regarded as “existentially independent” of pure consciousness, as “existentially dependent” upon it, or whether its existence should be denied *altogether*. On one hand, then, it will be necessary to elucidate the content of the idea of reality (the real) as a specific mode of existence, and, on the other, to consider the various meanings in which it is correct to speak of existential independence or dependence. Only when we have clarified these matters can we take up the question whether, and in what sense, the “real” world (or, in general, any “real” object whatever) can be existentially “dependent upon” or “independent of” pure consciousness. To this end, it will also be necessary to analyze the idea of the mode of existence of pure consciousness, provided there is such an idea. But an analysis of the ideas of *all other* modes of existence is likewise indispensable. For transcendental idealism, consistently and radically pursued, is prone to reduce not only the real world, but also all other regions of being to pure consciousness.¹

The objection may be raised that it is impossible to explain or to define the content of the idea of reality (of being real) conceptually. For “to be real” is something absolutely simple and peculiar. Therefore it cannot be reduced to something still simpler of which it would be “composed.” Yet it seems that such a reduction would be required in order to define the existence of something conceptually. In the meantime, all we can succeed in

¹ Cf., for example, E. Husserl's *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929).

doing is, at best, "to see" something's existence "intuitively." It is even possible that the result of such "seeing" cannot be faithfully expressed in words.

In answer to this, the following should be said:

It cannot be stated with certainty that the reality of something is "composed" of elements or moments. But not everything that is not a "composite" is therefore absolutely simple and such that nothing more primal can be discerned in it or differentiated by abstraction as distinct. For example, the color of orange is certainly not "composed" of redness and yellowness, and, moreover, is something entirely peculiar; nevertheless, it is possible to "catch sight of" and to distinguish both of these qualitative, dependent² moments in it, owing to which it is, on one hand, similar to the color red, and, on the other, to yellow. Something of this sort may also be [the case] with the reality of something. In any event, we cannot assume at the start that the real existence of anything is absolutely simple, and thus at once close off the road to explaining the idea of it. It is also entirely natural that the reality of something has to be "seen" in its peculiarity. But it is this very "seeing" that can compel us to distinguish the more primary, dependent moments in it and thus to understand it better, discovering, at the same time, its relationship to other modes of existence. The indispensability of an intuitive perception of the reality of something does not in itself preclude either a conceptual grasp of it or intersubjective communication of the result of this perception. To be sure, it cannot be denied that here we shall encounter difficulties that should not be discounted, but we can surmount them at least to some extent.

Let us assume, then, that simpler moments in the content of the idea of the reality of something can be discerned. These could be only *existential* moments (moments of "being," if it may be put this way). Similarly, also, the reality of something (in the sense of "being" real) is itself merely *one* mode of existence which can be contrasted with others—for example, with the mode of existence of pure consciousness, of possibility (as "being" possible), of ideal being, and the like, according to the most

² ["Dependent" in the sense of "inseparable," in the terminology adopted by the author. This term is explained later in the chapter. See p. 82.—Tr.]

common idealistic view. If we succeeded in grasping moments of existence or modes of being in direct perception, this alone would still be an inadequate result of scientific research; in order to communicate it to others, it would be further necessary to express the results of our intuitive examination in appropriately formulated statements. However, if *many* modes of being actually should be differentiated—and we shall try to demonstrate that this is the case—then all verbs and all such words as “is,” “exists,” etc., in particular, acquire many meanings when we use them as predicates. But this is not the accidental consequence of an investigator’s carelessness or lack of precision in expressing himself; it is thus because it cannot be otherwise. As a matter of fact, four meanings or functions of the word “is” in a proposition have already been distinguished, but these do not exhaust the multiplicity of meanings that are our concern. The following have been differentiated: (1) The meaning which the word “is” possesses when it fulfills the function of an “assertion” in a categorial proposition,³ which Bertrand Russell expresses by means of the so-called assertion sign (2) The meaning which it has when it fulfills the so-called “predicative function” in a proposition.⁴ Further, in a categorial proposition, this function can be of two different kinds: (a) the function of defining some characteristic of the object denoted by the subject of the proposition (e.g., “sulphur is yellow”), and (b) the function of “subsuming,” and therefore either the function of simple subordination of the object denoted by the subject of the proposition to a certain class of objects (inclusion in it), or of grasping the object as an example of a certain genus or species (e.g., “the eagle is a bird”). (3) Associated with the word “this,” as in “this is,” it has the function of identifying (e.g., as in so-called definitions). (4) An existential meaning, in which “is” means the same as “exists.” When various concepts of modes of being and of moments of existence are introduced, the word “is” develops many meanings, principally in an existential sense. But its multivocal character is

³ Cf. the so-called “assertion function” in Alexander Pfänder’s *Logik*, 1921, p. 180ff.

⁴ Cf. Pfänder’s so-called “predicative function” in two forms, the positive and the negative. *Ibid.*, p. 182f.

not without consequences, too, for all the other functions of the word "is," of which there are perhaps more, for that matter, than those just listed. Furthermore, the word "is" often fulfills several functions simultaneously in one and the same use in a proposition. This is even usually the case.

This multivocal character of the word "is"—and perhaps of all verbs indirectly—will cause much trouble for us in existential-ontological investigations. But it might be said that surely this could be eliminated by differentiating the various meanings of the word "is" through the employment of other terms. And that is what I shall try to do by introducing different terms that more precisely define the function, or meaning, of the word "is" in the sense in which we are using it. Yet the difficulty inheres in the very necessity of introducing or of somehow defining new terms; the only way this can be done verbally is by employing sentences which themselves contain the word "is (or a corresponding verb)" with all its many meanings. Furthermore, an attempt to eliminate it by selecting appropriate examples cannot be entirely successful. For the role of an example is limited. The divers examples which the Scholastics employed to explain the various meanings of *esse* taught us this. For the moments which need distinguishing are often such that they always make their appearance together. Then it is out of the question to give an example in which a moment *A* would appear without the moment *B*. This makes a direct grasp of these moments essentially more difficult, for one does not know unequivocally what to call attention to in the cited examples. Moreover, in scientific treatises there is no other way in which to present examples than by means of words or sentences. In the totality of the exemplifying situation, one must point out that very moment with which we are concerned, whose direct grasp alone would permit the reader to comprehend the meaning of a certain word accurately, whether it is one already extant in the language or one that has just been newly introduced. How is it possible to indicate such a moment by means of a word which has just been introduced into the language and itself is not yet understood by the reader? Of course, it is not out of the question that the reader might actually be able to grasp the moment involved, although the example is a generalization. On

this account, there is in principle a possibility of achieving agreement among different psychic principals even in situations of the greatest complexity and subtlety. But a fortunate accident is not what we aim to achieve when we employ systematic procedures. Even assuming that the reader possesses adequate competence and skill to make subtle visual distinctions in the material supplied him by the example, and to attain to an intuitive perception of these distinctions, he is still not *compelled* by an example expressed in words or by a purely conceptual definition to follow the differentiations offered him. To be sure, there still remains the possibility of pointing out the moments differentiated by the aid of words that only *indirectly* indicate those moments, or of using approximate phrases, descriptions, and the like. All of these, however, are only methods of *facilitating* an understanding of what is involved, but they are not infallible measures that of necessity lead to an unambiguous comprehension.

The difficulty described is involved in all basic research relating to primary moments or to the simplest connections between them. Because existential-ontological inquiry is only one of the many cases with which we deal in philosophical research, we should not be discouraged in advance by this, and so cut ourselves off from the avenue to any progress in our investigations. We should not merely set excessively high standards for ourselves, but rather be satisfied that the little which—considering all the complexities—can be achieved in basic research nevertheless plays a decisive role in the advancement of human knowledge. Therefore, while I do not pretend to supply entirely univocal and exhaustive definitions, and I desire only to *assist* the reader in performing acts of intuitive perception of these particular moments which I have succeeded—so it seems to me—in distinguishing and identifying, I must emphasize the importance of these preliminary existential distinctions.

MODES OF BEING AND MOMENTS OF EXISTENCE

First of all, I want to contrast *modes of being* with *moments of existence*.

The “reality” (realness, real existence) of something, the

ideal existence of something, the possibility⁵ of something: these are some of the modes of existence. On the other hand, non-existence (nonbeing) is not a *mode*, but *the absence of any being*. Whenever we deal with objects that exist in one way or another, we have to deal also with their existence. Admittedly, this is not entirely accurate, for we “deal with something” in the strict sense of this phrase only when we give special attention to it. But when I am dealing with a certain object (with some thing—e.g., the typewriter on which I am writing these words), I do not pay particular attention to its existence. Yet existence is not something *separate* from an existing object. When I deal with an object, by that fact its existence is within the frame of my experience. Therefore, in order to realize clearly what the mode of being of an object is (existing in one way or another), it would seem sufficient simply to intend it carefully. And this is certainly true. However, since the existence of something is *specifically* and *radically* different from all the material determination and from the form of whatsoever exists, and, at the same time, seems in a strange way to infuse everything whatever that is existent, we consequently meet with marked difficulties, and only by means of a certain mental experiment can we become aware of what has been designated here as the “mode of being” of something. An existing object can never be given to us in experience *without* its mode of being, nor a mode of being *without* a corresponding existing object.⁶ However, in order to contrast the

⁵ Whether the possibility of something should be given equal status with something real or with an ideal existent, is a question which must be considered separately. For the moment, at the beginning of our existential investigations, it would seem that the possibility of something is a mode of being.

⁶ This may be one of the reasons why Hume rejected the separate existence of an “impression” of existence.

Among qualitative moments, we often come across such a close connection between two moments, *A* and *B*, that one cannot exist without the other. We shall have occasion to give attention to this repeatedly. But for all the closeness of this connection, when it occurs between two qualitative (“material”) moments, they usually remain *apart from each other*, even when they modify each other reciprocally, and therefore when—as I shall describe this later—there is a functional unity between them. But this which is between anything whatever that exists and its existence is something entirely *exceptional*. Here it is as if what

one with the other, let us attempt to shift our thought from a given object, which exists, to its mode of existence. For example, I perceive a lamp which is standing at this moment on my desk. It is individually and univocally determinate, and is endowed with certain established properties. Let us imagine that it is not there, that in this instant it somehow ceased to exist at all. Then—taking it exactly as it is in this moment—it does not have *to change into something else*, but the lamp itself must, with all its properties, in general simply *vanish, annihilate itself*.

This radical transition from being to nonbeing is, in its ultimate essence, incomprehensible to us. We understand only—at least so it seems to us—the *transformation* of one thing into another or a given thing's *changing* with respect to some of its properties. But even in the case of a complete *transformation* in which a thing *A* changes into the thing *B* (a table is made from a block of wood, a butterfly emerges from a chrysalis), the thing *A* *does not exist any more* in the instant when this transformation is effected; it is gone, and there is only the thing *B*. And in this case something happens which is difficult to comprehend or perhaps, in its ultimate quintessence, is even incomprehensible.⁷ It is just as if what “was” still that thing “only a moment ago”—a lamp, a chrysalis, a block of wood—now, turned for instance by burning into ashes or dross, existed still; but here the last phase of the “transformation” occurs and it is in it that suddenly *there is no lamp*. And it is not there later either, when everything is over. What remains is a piece of melted bronze, particles of fused glass, and the like: all this is no longer a “lamp” at all. It has dis-

exists “absorbs” its existence into itself, or conversely, its existence is wholly infused in it—as I have already described this—and is not something *alongside* it that has only a connection (even the closest) with it. It may also be said that the existence of something and the existent itself are not two “equivalent” moments which only exist at the same time. Existence, and therefore a mode of being as well as what I call a moment of existence, is not something of which it might properly be said that, on its part, it “exists,” or “does not exist.” In other words, a “category” of being cannot be applied to existence. It can be applied only to what exists.

⁷ This is why we are rather inclined to think that something of its chrysalis remains in a butterfly, that there is still something of a block of wood in a table, etc. I shall return to this matter when I consider the identity of an object. Cf. Chap. xv. [None of the material cited by the author here or in any other notes will be found in the present edition if the reference is to any chapter beyond Chap. vii or to a section beyond No. 31.—Tr.]

appeared with the *whole stock* of properties that it still “possessed” a moment ago. At some point in this process of destructive change, there occurred a radical *break* in its existence, a radical *leap* from a lamp to *nothing*, from being to nonbeing, no matter how arduous it would be for us to seize accurately upon the “point” of discontinuity, of the leap, or how difficult it would be to comprehend the meaning of that “transition” from being, existence, to nonexistence.

To surmount this difficulty, at least in some measure, we can make two experiments. First, we shall mentally establish the properties and form of a certain nonexistent lamp and contrast it with a lamp having *exactly the same* properties and details of form, but that is already in existence. We are then usually confronted with the question: What must be “added,” as it were, to the nonexistent lamp in order that it would exist; what distinguishes it from an existing lamp? One answer to this was that given by Kant, and, strictly speaking, by Hume before him. *No new property* is added to the nonexistent “lamp,” nor also any new formal moment; yet *everything that the lamp is*, which characterizes or forms it, signifies somehow, in some indescribable way, that it exists—and this is just what distinguishes it from the nonexistent lamp. All this which differentiates it in this way from the nonexistent “lamp,”⁸ I call its *mode of being*.

It is also possible, however, to perform this experiment in reverse and to start with a certain fully determined, existing lamp (or any other existing object whatever), and to try to contrast its *entire complement* of properties and formal moments—i.e., everything in general which “constitutes” it—with what would “remain” *of it itself* if it ceased to exist. As an existing lamp, in what respect would it be different from that “nothing” with which we should have to deal after its annihilation?

The answer is that it would differ in *everything* in general that constitutes it. Not only every formal moment, every property, all the connections of its properties and the mutual relations of its parts, but also its relations to other things, its con-

⁸ I am using quotation marks here, since this nonexistent (supposed) “lamp” is not a lamp at all, for it is *nothing* at all. Only of an “imagined” lamp may one still say, in a certain altered sense, that it is, that it “exists.” I shall return to this question when I discuss intentional objects.

tingent characteristics resulting from these, and so forth: *All this, by its existence*, divides it from that "nothing." It is as if existence permeates *everything* in an object, but itself is *nothing new*—not a part, a property, or a formal moment of the object. The most radical "metamorphosis" which *everything* in an object undergoes—each of its properties, every formal moment, and the like—upon the "transition" from the existing object to pure "nothing," is that mysterious "snapping off" of the existing object when the entire *plenitude* of its *being* is annihilated. But when this happens, nothing is detached from the object—neither any property nor any detail of its form. The *object itself* simply "ceases" to exist.

It is also incorrect, strictly speaking, to say that there is a "transition" from existence to nonexistence. For in a "transition," in any "change" whatever, it is always *one and the same* object before and after the change takes place; it is equally existent in both phases, and is altered only with respect to some state or property. Nothing like this can be said about something that has ceased to exist. Here there is a radical break, that "snapping off" of existence, and, therefore, of the thing itself. It is not as though it continued to exist as it was, or in some new state (e.g., in some other mode of being); *there is simply nothing at all*. That is why, if we are to be able even to come near to making a comparison of something that exists with its complete absence, we are compelled to represent the nonexistent lamp to ourselves merely artificially, mentally, or in our imaginations, and to persuade ourselves at the same time that there is no lamp. For we can grasp its absence only in contrast with what existed previously. And we are wholly unable to picture to ourselves the utter "emptiness" which "remains"—which is only a very crude and imperfect way of expressing it—after the annihilation of a certain thing, such as a lamp.⁹

⁹ Cf. K. Twardowski's reasoning in his treatise, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung* (*Toward a Theory of the Content and the Object of a Presentation*), Vienna, 1894. Bergson likewise, in his *Évolution créatrice* (*Creative Evolution*), 1907, does not recognize absolute nonbeing. One is reminded here of the Eleatic view that "there is only being; there is no nonbeing and therefore it cannot be conceived at all." I shall return later to the problem of "nonbeing" when I discuss so-called negative states of affairs. [This discussion is not included in the present edition.]

Furthermore, an object does not "pass"—strictly speaking—from one mode of being into another. *One and the same thing* cannot exist first in one mode of being, and then in another. Or, stated differently, *the identity of an object precludes diversity in its mode of existence*. An imagined lamp, as only a *possible* one, and a *real* lamp, all of whose properties and formal moments are exactly alike, are *two* objects, and the first cannot be transformed into the second and preserve its identity, or vice versa. It is true that we do speak at times as if such a transformation occurs. For example, we say that "*such and such case* which heretofore had merely been a possibility, has become an actuality." However, this is only a certain manner of speaking that should not be taken literally. What we actually mean by this is that something has come into being, the totality of whose *properties* is exactly the *same* as ("equal to") that of a certain, heretofore only possible, case. Whoever would speak in a *literal* sense of the transformation of a possible case into a real one would be expressing an absurdity. It is the peculiar, specific characteristic of every mode of being that for every object existing in a certain mode is possible at most a radical "jump," a positive "break," from the given mode into "nothingness," but never a continuous passage into a different mode of *being*. Only in *thought* do we pass from one mode to another, and this passage to some extent obliterates the object's radical intransmutability from one mode of being into another, or into nonexistence.

When we come upon the idea of the mode of the existence of something for the first time at the beginning of our study of existential-ontological problems, one other feature seems to us to be characteristic of the mode of being of an object. Namely, it seems, according to this, that every object can exist in only *one mode*, and that *everything* whatever which can be distinguished in it exists in the *same* mode as it does.¹⁰ The case is different with respect to existential *moments*, as we shall shortly see. Consequently, it appears that by this approach we can make a con-

¹⁰ This definition leads to certain difficulties in the case of the mode of real existence, but this question will be clarified in our discussion of individual existential moments and of the idea of the real being of something in connection with our formal-ontological differentiation of various types of characteristics of an object. Cf. Chaps. vii and xiii, *The Controversy*.

venient distinction between the mode of being (*modus existentiae*) of something and an existential moment (*momentum existentiale*). However, the statement we made above raises certain doubts which dictate caution and compel us ultimately to narrow it down. But before I can give detailed attention to this matter, we should take cognizance at this time of the meaning of that statement and of the difficulties it involves. Namely, so far as a mode of being is concerned, such as, for example, the reality of something, the ideal existence of something, and the like, it is actually impossible that anything real (actual) would have any parts or characteristics that would exist in it ideally. If something is real, then *everything* in it is real. This seems so completely obvious as to be trivial.¹¹ Nevertheless, there are certain complications here. For example, at first it seems that "reality" and "possibility" are two different modes of the existence of something. Consequently, if the statement we have just made is true, it is necessary to concede that a real object is real *in every respect* and *in all its parts*. In this case, nothing in it could be merely "possible" in the sense of empirical possibility, which I have already made some attempt to elucidate.¹² I made the statement then that whatever has become real can no longer be merely "possible" in that sense. But now something more would be involved. I have made the statement that an empirically possible

¹¹ *Nota bene*, everything which is primary and, in the nature of things, necessary, is also trivial, although it is only very rarely that we take the primary and the necessary into account.

¹² [Previously (*The Controversy*, Sec. 5, not a part of this book), the author distinguished "empirical" possibilities from the "pure" possibilities with which ontology is concerned.

"Empirical" possibilities are always contingent upon certain actual states of affairs in the real world, which are their sufficient and indispensable condition, and lead to the realization of the possibilities providing no other conditions occur to preclude this. Once an empirical possibility is realized, it is no longer "possible," since it is now a real fact, although it may still be admissible as a "pure" possibility. Empirical possibility is thus one of degrees, depending on the states of affairs intervening between such a possibility indicated by given prior conditions and its ultimate realization in fact.

In contrast, there are no degrees of "pure" possibility, since it is not contingent upon any actual facts in the real world. It has its source in the necessary connections obtaining among pure ideal qualities, and is thus wholly *a priori*.—Tr.]

state of affairs cannot at the same time be real, that empirical possibility precludes the actual reality of "the same" state of affairs. Now we are confronted with the fact that since all the characteristics (properties) or parts, and all the states of affairs or relations obtaining within the *compass* of the same individual *object*, exist in the *same mode as the object itself*, it is out of the question that the mode of being of *two different* characteristics or of two different states of affairs of the same object would be disparate, and that therefore one of them would be, for example, real, while another would be only empirically possible.

Yet this seems to be contradicted by the fact that in everyday life and in scientific inquiry we often assume that individual objects have, for example, such and such "possible" characteristics, that such and such situations or states of affairs in which they participate are possible, etc. For example, we say that a certain friend of ours is fifty years old at this time, but, since he is well and has never been seriously ill, it is possible that he will live to an old age. His reaching "an old age" is, therefore, so it seems, a possible property which clearly differs in its mode of being from that of the property on which his actual age (fifty years) depends. Similarly, one can point out many other possible properties which a given person does not possess *realiter*, but only "can" possess in the future under existing conditions. And, given the concept of empirical possibility already accepted, can it be otherwise? Can it be that real objects would possess no properties that are only possible, when *every* system of actual conditions points to a certain system of *possible* states of affairs? Since every object (every real object especially) entails a certain system of actual conditions through its complex of properties, then a certain system of empirically possible states of affairs also pertains to every real object—and, among these, a certain system of its empirically possible properties. Therefore, either the statement previously made, that every object can exist in only one mode of existence throughout its being, is not true, or "empirical possibility" is a mode of being that is not different from that of reality (actuality). To resolve this, it will first be necessary to discuss the question of existential moments (of being), and, at

the same time, to come to a better understanding of the essence of reality and of empirical possibility. For the moment, only one point seems clear: that "to be possible" in an empirical sense is not the same as "to be real." One and the same thing cannot exist simultaneously in both meanings, since only that can be possible which will be actual in a future in relation to a certain present moment; yet it seems that only that which takes place in the present is actual ("real"). Only a few empirical possibilities, out of a great many, become actual fact. The universe of empirically possible states of affairs is considerably richer than the real world.

However, it may be that the statement under consideration respecting the single mode of being of an object in general does obtain strictly, but that it is incorrect to regard empirical possibility as a mode of existence. Again it may be that the reality (actuality) of something is a mode of being which embraces, in one sense, what we have in mind when we speak of the "actual" reality of the *present*, and, in another, of the empirically possible, which, while not yet "realized," gravitates toward realization. Or, stated differently, perhaps the passing from a state of empirical possibility into a state of "actual reality," and later into a state when this has already happened and is past, is the mode of being of "reality," of "being real," that we are seeking. "To be really possible" would then be—if it may be put in this way—a "partial" mode of existence that always embraces only *some* properties or sides of a "real" object, whose other properties would likewise have to be "actually real" if it is to be real and exist at all, and yet possess these properties that are only empirically possible. Thus, the "real" world would be, so to speak, *interwoven* with the empirically possible: individual groups of empirically possible states of affairs would be distributed among actually real individual objects and states of affairs, which not only would designate them, but also would serve as their existential ground.

However, again it may be that the statement regarding the *single* mode of being of the *totality* of an object is true only in respect to *some* pairs of modes of being, and that reality and empirical possibility do not comprise such a pair. But if we take, in-

stead, a pair of modes of being like reality and ideality, it is not possible that some of the characteristics of a real object would be real and others, ideal; or conversely, that a certain ideal object (e.g., a geometrical square, the number "two," and the like) would have some real characteristics and others that were ideal. In this case, *entire realms* of being (e.g. of the real and of the ideal) would remain *external* to one another.

We are not able at this point to determine which of these concepts of reality which suggest themselves is correct, and even less, to justify such a decision. We are only beginning to realize that what seems so "simple" and "clearly understandable" in everyday life and even in the domain of the exact sciences—namely, that we know what the "reality" of a certain real thing is, or likewise, what the "ideality" of the existence of a certain mathematical object is—is precisely what is not clear at all. On the contrary, it is immeasurably difficult to account for "reality," or "possibility" (either pure or empirical), or "ideal being," and so on. Therefore, for the time being let us leave unsettled the question whether *every* object can exist in only one mode throughout its being, and let us turn to another matter, namely to the differentiation of existential moments from modes of being.

We contrast *moments of existence* with *modes of being* as what we distinguish by abstraction in particular modes of being, but which in their essence cannot be separated from the mode of being in which they are singled out. A certain existential moment distinguished in the mode of being of something is an abstraction of the second order. For the mode of being of a given object cannot be separated from that object, and vice versa. Either of these is an absurdity, and would compel us to accept such inherently contradictory statements as that the mode of being of something exists by itself without that something whose existence it is,¹³ or that a given object exists without its existence. An existential moment, however, is characterized by an inseparability of a higher degree. We can also describe this by saying

¹³ It consequently seems absurd to take literally the assertion of existentialists that "existence" precedes "essence." However, it is difficult to say what this statement is intended to mean in a metaphorical sense.

that an existential moment alone is insufficient for an object to exist in some mode of being. Only modes of being are, *respectively*, mutually "independent,"¹⁴ which means that they do not require supplementation either by other modes of being or by some additional existential moments that do not, in their essence, already appear in them. I mean by this that if we make a survey of individual objects having various modes of being and consider them with respect to their existence, we shall always find that modes of being constitute their "existential side." But existential moments appear only within the *compass* of individual modes of being. *Many* different existential moments can be distinguished intuitively in *each mode of being of something*. But the "existence" *in general* of anything is only a certain universal *idea*, of which the modes of being of individual objects are its several particularizations.

Within the compass of one and the same object, with respect to existential moments—in contrast with modes of being—it appears possible for some of its moments (properties) to exist in one existential moment while others exist in another. But this question, too, we shall not be able to consider in detail until much later. At this time, we must return to our analysis of individual existential moments. I shall discuss them in turn in connection with the various problems of the controversy about idealism.

It is frequently said that the real world is existentially dependent upon pure consciousness. The expression "existential dependence," however, is multivocal; we must therefore distinguish the four following pairs of opposite existential moments:

- | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| (1) Existential Autonomy | — | Existential Heteronomy |
| (2) Existential Originality | — | Existential Derivation |
| (3) Existential Separateness | — | Existential Inseparateness |
| (4) Existential Self-Dependence | — | Existential Contingency ¹⁵ |

We proceed now to a discussion of these several oppositions.

¹⁴ [Precisely, this means "independent" in the special sense that the author terms "separate." See p.82.—Tr.]

¹⁵ I have already made this distinction in my treatise, "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus," published in the *Festschrift* for Husserl in 1929. In the present work, I am attempting to go deeper into the matter and to deduce its consequences.

AUTONOMY AND HETERONOMY

Something¹⁶ is self-existent (is existentially autonomous) if it has its existential foundation *in itself*.¹⁷ It has such a foundation if it is *immanently determined in itself*. But something is not self-existent (it is existentially heteronomous) if the foundation of its being is not in itself, but in something else.

To clarify this definition, let us note the following:

First of all, the self-existence of something, in the meaning I want to establish here, should not be identified with what H. Conrad-Martius calls *Daseinsautonomie* and regards as the mode of being of the real world.¹⁸ For she has in mind here either a *mode of existence*—"the reality of something" in general—or that existential moment which, in my later discussions, I call "existential self-dependence." The self-existence of something in *my* meaning is more akin to some of the moments of reality which H. Conrad-Martius points out in her "Realontologie."¹⁹

Primarily, it must be emphasized that the basic difference between my study and H. Conrad-Martius' inferences is in the way in which the problems are posed. She initiates her inquiry on the basis of the pre-established phenomenon of reality (which is a *mode of being* according to my definition), and attempts to discover simpler existential moments in it, not making any distinction, moreover, between a moment of existence and the concept of a mode of being. Thus she decides in advance that the reality of something "contains" such moments in itself. But I proceed in

¹⁶ I use the word "something" here in the broadest admissible meaning of "anything at all." It is doubtful whether it is possible to construct a concept of "anything whatever" (of an "object") so broad that it would embrace *everything* whatever that exists in any way. For often the danger of antinomies is involved. In any event, however, we need here some term which could be applied alike to individual objects and to their properties, to states of affairs and relations, etc., and to ideas and ideal qualities. The word "something" should consequently be regarded as a convenient term without prejudging whether it is possible to construct such a comprehensive homogeneous concept.

¹⁷ I make a terminological distinction between "existential foundation" and "existential basis." The reasons for this distinction will be explained later.

¹⁸ Cf. her "Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Aussenwelt" ("Toward an Ontology and a Theory of the Appearance of the Real External World"), *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. III.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 159 ff.

exactly the opposite way: I refrain for the time from analyzing the phenomenon of reality and undertake first to examine the primary moments of being, in order only later to pose the *question* whether and in what way it is possible to define the reality of something by means of appropriately selected existential moments. This definition is to be verified by seizing the concrete phenomenon of reality in direct perception.

Conrad-Martius distinguishes four moments in the phenomenon of "reality": (1) "*die Selbstträgerschaft*," which could be expressed by saying that something is its *own subject*, its own bearer;²⁰ (2) "*die Eigenposition*," which can be translated as something which has its own existential basis in itself (it is as if it could afford to be founded in itself); (3) "*die prinzipielle Tangierbarkeit*," and, therefore, the circumstance that something in itself can be in principle accessible to something else, and its properties are susceptible to encroachment; (4) "*die Leibhaftigkeit*," which can be rendered as "corporeality" or by "corporeal plenitude." This "corporeality," according to H. Conrad-Martius, is the "general character of reality," and something which "is constituted within and by the individual moments of configuration as its ontic sum-total, as it were."²¹

If I understand this correctly, self-existence according to my definition is closely related to what Conrad-Martius has in mind when speaking of "*Eigenposition*" and "*Leibhaftigkeit*." Or, better expressed, it seems that what Conrad-Martius has in mind, when she analyzes *both* of these concepts *separately*, actually is a *single* simple and primary existential moment, which I designate as "self-existence" (existential autonomy). Indeed, this appears also in cases in which Conrad-Martius would deny that moments of "corporeality" and "auto-position" (*Eigenposition*) appear, but this applies only to the question of what is the range of the appearance of self-existence and does not affect my conviction as to what it actually is. Every pure ideal quality such as "redness in itself" is self-existent. "Redness in itself" has its ex-

²⁰ As we shall see, this is rather a certain moment of the *form* of an object. See Chap. ix, *The Controversy*.

²¹ In the original: "Sich in und mit ihnen als das ontische Gesamtergebnis gewissermassen dieser einzelnen Gestaltungsmomente konstituiert."

istential foundation in itself in the sense that it is *complete in just what it is*, that it is wholly determined by something “contained” in itself—because by something which is simply *itself*. A pure quality is complete in itself and is nothing more. But it cannot be said that any pure quality is “real” in the meaning that we are trying to elucidate. According to H. Conrad-Martius, it therefore could not exist in full corporeality. The expression “corporeality” (*Leibhaftigkeit*) which Conrad-Martius employs, is very ambiguous in this connection. Ordinarily, it is used in a more restricted meaning and also with a different orientation. As we know, E. Husserl introduced it to denote a certain determinate moment of what is given in *perception*. A real object, when it is only imagined (not perceived) cannot be present before us “bodily” [“in person”], according to Husserl. It thus was originally a phenomenological-*epistemological* concept, not an ontological one. But now Conrad-Martius has applied it in ontological analysis. It is true that she attempts to establish its meaning by presenting appropriate examples and descriptions, but, at the same time, she invests it with a broader meaning than it originally had. Nevertheless, it is burdened with a certain ambiguity which cannot be considered more fully at this juncture. I shall endeavor to free myself from these conceptual constructions and to clarify my concept of “self-existence” independently, congruent with the approximate definition already made.

Likewise, an individual object would also be “self-existent” if it were “red”²² in the sense that it *contains in itself the concretion* of “redness” (and, in every case, a concretion of a determinate kind), and at the same time would completely contain this same kind of concretion²³ of other ideal qualities *in all its properties*. The moment of redness, like everything in general in respect to which an object would be self-existent, would have to be wholly *immanent* in it alone, and would have to *structure* it in the

²² I use the conditional tense here, because I am not prejudging now whether any red objects really exist, nor, correlatively, whether “redness” can be wholly immanent in any object whatever.

²³ By a “concretion” of an ideal quality, I understand here the existentially conditioned form in which a pure quality makes its appearance in one particular *individual* mode of existence. The *realization* of an ideal quality is a special case of concretion.

strict primal meaning of this term. *This complete immanence of the moments determining a certain object is the essential condition of its self-existence*: the moments determining an object and wholly immanent in it constitute its own existential foundation—they structure it. In other words, the genuine, complete immanence of the moments that determine an object invests it with self-existence. It is as if autonomy were the external existential manifestation of this immanence. When it is lacking, an object—provided it exists at all—cannot be autonomous, and therefore exists heteronomously.

Autonomy seems to be one of the existential moments that can be discovered in the reality of something, although it is not characteristic of it exclusively. It also seems that there is no difference in this regard between a pure ideal quality (redness in itself) and a real thing which contains a concretion of redness and is for this reason red. Consequently, if, in spite of this, there is an essential *existential* difference between these two “objects”—and of this there is no doubt!—it must be contingent upon other existential moments, disregarding the fact that red, in the pure ideal quality, “redness in itself,” plays a quite different *formal, constitutive role* than it does in a “red” object. In the latter, concretized red appears only as a *qualitative determination* of one of its *properties*, and in this form and constitution only *serves* it²⁴ (as, for example, in a “red dress”), while, on the other hand, red is simply *redness itself* and constitutes itself. Only of a pure ideal quality may one say that it is *completely and exclusively* itself without anything else whatever *participating* in its being and in that which it is, or its participating itself in anything else whatsoever. This is the essential meaning of its “purity,” which should be affirmed wholly without prejudging whether a pure ideal quality is only an “abstraction”—and therefore, as is often said, the “product of our abstracting,” which, when concretized, exists only *in concreto*, and is then “participating” in something else, as Aristotle thought—or whether,

²⁴ This is not formulated with complete precision, for the qualitative determination of a certain property does not pertain to an object, but the property itself does.

on the contrary, it exists in itself and for itself "apart" and "solitary" as Plato once declared. But this is a metaphysical question which, moreover, is tied in with certain *formal-ontological* problems which I shall thoroughly consider later. Here, however, I shall consider only the eventual *mode* of being of a pure quality *as if* it exists wholly in itself.

It could be supposed that immanence of the "material" moments determining something is a necessary condition for the existence of *all* being in general. But, curiously enough, this is *not* so. The existence of an object and nonimmanence of its determination are not mutually exclusive at all. We can even cite individual determinate cases of entities that are existentially heteronomous (not self-existent). To begin with, *purely intentional objects* are not self-existent. They are objects which derive their existence and their entire endowment from an intending²⁵ experience of consciousness (an "act") that is laden with a determinate, uniformly structured content. They would not exist *at all* but for the performance of acts of this kind; yet, because such acts are performed, these objects do exist, but not autonomously.

A purely intentional object²⁶ should be strictly differentiated from objects which are frequently called "intentional" only because they are *chanced upon* by an intention of an act of consciousness, but for which the circumstance that they are thus come upon by chance is entirely *accidental*. In making this distinction, I am by no means assuming that any objects to which this accident would occur *actually* exist. If I were to do so, I should by this fact resolve the controversy between idealism and realism in favor of a realism of a certain type. At this juncture I do not yet have the right to do so. Therefore, I am only asserting that if this kind of object were to exist at all, this accidentalness could have its source only in its being permitted by the mode of existence of such objects, in that they are characterized by a

²⁵ This means "containing an intention." [For a brief explanation of the author's concept of "intending," see Note 52, Chap. iv.—Tr.]

²⁶ Purely intentional objects, and their form especially, are discussed in Chap. x [of *The Controversy*]. See also Roman Ingarden, *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (*The Literary Work of Art*), Halle, 1931; second edition, Tübingen, 1960.

peculiar independence of being chanced upon by the intention of a certain act of consciousness, and therefore that they are what they are without it—i.e., they are existentially autonomous. Only a precise distinction between objects which are only the accidental objects of the intention of a certain conscious act—and, for this reason, *secondarily* intentional—and objects that are primarily *purely* intentional will permit us to disclose the existential heteronomy of the latter.

As the opposite of our position, *existential monism* can be professed. It acknowledges existence in one and *only one* meaning, and tends as a rule to do this in the meaning of existential *autonomy*, but without availing itself of this concept and therefore without clarifying it at all. Whoever from the outset takes the position of an existential monist must regard all existentially heteronomous objects as nonexistent, since this obviously is simply the tautological consequence of this point of view, once it is accepted. However, despite its *general* denial of the existence of heteronomous objects, existential monism by a curious coincidence usually does not deny their existence *in particular cases*, but only revises the definition of purely intentional objects radically, so that, as a result, they can pass as self-existent objects. This is usually done by denying them their characteristic attributes. Despite all their theories, so insistently do they [existential monists] importune us with particular purely intentional objects, such as individual literary works, musical compositions, objects in societal or governmental structures, positive law, etc., that in individual cases scholars are inclined not to deny their existence, but usually psychologize them in order to salvage it. An object is psychologized when the general essence of a psychic state of a conscious experience psychologically conceived is erroneously ascribed to it, even though this is not congruent with its own concrete individual properties. There was a time in the last *quarter* of the nineteenth century when, under the pressure of positivistic scepticism, various purely intentional objects of many basic varieties, and even some attributes of existentially autonomous objects, were psychologized. The products of logic were the first to be psychologized. I have no intention of taking issue here with divers psychological theories. This has already

been done repeatedly.²⁷ The rank nonsense and errors of fact to which the psychologistic conception of the objects mentioned led, is the best evidence that the errors in all these conceptions have a common source—and that is existential monism. This monism is merely a strongly entrenched prejudice held by scholars. Its consistent advocacy must lead not only to the complete extinction of all cultural creations, but also to the incapacitation of science.

Furthermore, purely intentional objects are not the complete nothing they would have to be if existential monism were right. However, they do not possess an *essence of their own* as Husserl maintained in his *Ideas*.²⁸ An inherent essence (Husserl's *Eigenwesen*) is a particular combination of qualifications immanently contained in the object which possesses it. Consequently, only self-existent objects have it. Naturally, such immanent qualifications do not make an appearance in the contents of purely intentional objects. All their material determination, formal moments, and even their existential moments, which appear in their contents, are in some way only *ascribed* to purely intentional objects, but they are not *embodied* in them, in the strict meaning of this word. For example, if, in a poetic vein, we invent some character who is supposed to have such and such properties, to live here or there and to do thus and so, we pretend that this is, among other things, an object that "really exists," and we ascribe reality to it. But all these properties, this manner of behaving, this reality, etc., are only *fancied*, or invested in this [character] by the text. This strong young man, poetically conceived, is *not really* (in the sense of being existentially autonomous) young, really strong—he is not "actually" a man. He is only "represented" to be. We attribute something to him which he cannot *himself* do (if this may be said in this way), for he does not contain *any immanent competence*. His "reality" is also only ascribed to him, and is ultimately conferred by an act of will and of poetic imagi-

²⁷ As is generally known, Frege and Husserl did this with respect to logical problems. In my book, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, I attempted to do it with respect to the literary work of art and to literary works in general. In relation to other works of art, I undertook to do this in Vol. II of my *Studia z Estetyki* (*Studies in Aesthetics*), Warsaw, 1958.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, (Gibson trans.), p. 154.

nation. Creative imagination has only the effect of *investing* an intentional object with a certain kind of *habitus* of reality and of *evoking an illusion of it*, and likewise with respect to his youth, strength, manhood, etc. A creative conscious act cannot give rise to anything else or to anything more than merely an *assumed, imagined youthfulness*, an assumed reality, and the like. Immanence of the qualifications ascribed to it cannot be imposed upon an object so created—and that even when, as sometimes happens, this very same immanence of qualifications is *explicite* intentionally ascribed to the imagined object. In other words, a creative poetic act cannot create a self-existent object.²⁹ It is “impotently creative”: what it creates lives by its grace and its support, and cannot become something “spontaneous,” “independent,” “autonomous.”³⁰ If it may be so expressed, it cannot “rebel” against the acts of consciousness that produced it, it can-

²⁹ Apparently, H. Conrad-Martius holds a different opinion in this matter when she asserts, for example, that Hamlet cannot be destroyed (cf. her *Real-ontologie*,” *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. VI, p. 182). However, this would require a more thorough discussion. On the other hand, it appears that she has an acute grasp—at least in one instance—of what we designate here as the “existential heteronomy” of a purely intentional object. This instance is the case of a phantom in a hallucination (“*das Halluzinierte*”). She writes of this (*ibid.*, p. 183f.): “And in this respect a phantom in a hallucination is also of necessity accessible and palpable in its being. It does not participate in the primal isolation of the only ideally existent. But, of course, this is not the immediate palpability of authentic reality: the lions in a hallucination, a dreamed city, are indeed manifest to the hallucinated person, but the *complete ‘nothingness’* and the corresponding *immanent selflessness of their being* make it in principle impossible to encounter them as such ‘somehow or somewhere.’ For *they are nothing in themselves*. God himself could deprive them of their existence only through intervening in the dreaming, hallucinated mind of the affected person, or in the physiological foundation of that mind. But here, too, they are consequently accessible. On the other hand, a triangle or the poetical Hamlet from ‘nowhere . . .’ And further: “Both the authentically real and the ideally existent differ in principle from a hallucination in their formal structure of objectivity and independence of being (*‘Daseinsautonomie’*), whereas one can point to the ‘immanent frailty’ of a phantom in a hallucination, *since it does not come into existence or disappear on the basis of its own being, but only on that of another* (the hallucinated mind).” (*Ibid.*, p. 184. Italics mine.)

³⁰ In saying this, I am not contending that *every* conscious act is impotently creative in this way. I am only maintaining that this kind of act is possible in accord with its correlative idea. The conjecture may also be advanced that conscious acts performed by people are characterized by such impotence.

not have any other properties in its contents, any other destiny, arbitrarily chosen, *but those* which have been ascribed to it. It does not have its own existential foundation in itself. Its existential foundation is in the conscious act that produced it intentionally, or, more exactly, in the psychic subject who performed the act.

However, not every purely intentional object has its *immediate* existential foundation in a certain conscious act, or, more generally speaking, in a self-existent object. In particular, there are purely intentional objects that are *derivative*, whose immediate existential foundation is in another existentially heteronomous object. For example, the meaning of sentences in a certain literary work is an intentional product which has its source in a peculiarly characterized sentence-creating operation of a subject. Yet the meaning of a sentence determines, *on its part*, the objects represented in the given sentence (people, things, animals, events, etc., depending on the contents of the sentence), which are also purely intentional. The *immediate* foundation of their existence and qualifications inheres in the corresponding sentence-meaning which, on its part, points to yet *another* existential foundation. Most frequently, that is a certain self-existent object: the sentence-creating operation or the subject producing the sentence. There are, however, sentences which are spoken by a person represented in a literary work; this person, as represented in the work, is a purely intentional object determined in other sentences belonging to the text of the given work.³¹ But an existential-ontological law obtains to the effect that every object that is not self-existent points *ultimately*—sometimes quite deviously—to a certain self-existent object in which the foundation of its being lies. Thus, for example, an object represented in a literary work and created by the meaning of a certain sentence or sentences, ultimately points to the creative acts of the poet from which the given work came into being, and which are self-existent.

Whether there can be heteronomous objects—always considered on the basis of their correlative ideas—which do not belong to the class of purely intentional objects, is a question I do

³¹ I have analyzed these matters more extensively in my book, *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. [See Footnote 26.]

not intend to resolve now, since it requires a more extensive examination that cannot be undertaken at this point. With respect to purely intentional objects, I have been able to refer to other investigations, some of which are my own. With regard to other types of objects that are not autonomous, such investigations are, on the whole, lacking. Therefore, it can only be noted here that *empirically possible* future objects and states of affairs, indicated in each instance by actual complexes of states of affairs in the compass of the real world—if such exists in fact—are not autonomous as long as they are not realized.

EXISTENTIAL ORIGINALITY AND EXISTENTIAL DERIVATION

An object is *existentially original* if, in its essence, it cannot be produced by any other object. If it exists at all, this is only because *in its essence it cannot not be*, provided there is such an “essence” at all, and, more exactly, such a selection of ideal qualities as would so determine it. The definition of existential originality alone does not determine whether there is such an object. But if there is, it is compelled by its own essence to exist, and thus it contains in itself the guarantee, so to speak, of its existence. Hence, if it exists, it cannot be destroyed by any other object—i.e., existentially it is *permanent*. On the other hand, an object is *existentially derivative* if, in its essence, it is such that it can exist only when it is produced by another object. This is absolute existential derivation, issuing from the object’s own essence. This should not be taken as identical with *accidental* empirical derivation. The opposite of existential derivation can either be existential nonderivation in relation to a determinate object *X*, or existential originality. The second still does not follow from the first.

Taking this as only a provisional explanation,³² I add the following observations:

³² I well understand that it is possible to doubt whether one can succeed in grasping the existential originality of an object in an intuition, and therefore to question likewise whether there is an idea of this existential moment. But it is characteristic that the concept of existential originality runs through various European philosophical systems in a more or less precise formulation, and that the less clearly it is recognized and distinguished from other existential concepts, the more

An object that is existentially primordial must likewise be self-existent. But an existentially derivative object may either be autonomous or heteronomous. The creation of a self-existent object must be of a totally different kind than the creation of an object that is not self-existent—a purely intentional object especially.

In connection with this opposition of the existential moments under consideration, the reader will no doubt recall the well-known Scholastic distinction between *esse a se* (to be of itself) and *esse ab alio* (to be from another), or *natura naturans* (nature as creator) and *natura naturata* (nature created), upon which he will naturally assume that the first member of these oppositions would correspond to existential primordiality, and the second, to existential derivation. Some readers will perhaps remember likewise the concept of “substance,” which played such an important role in the beginning of modern rationalism—in Spinoza especially—and which one would certainly be inclined to identify with an existentially original object. I cannot decide here how this matter actually stands. To confront and eventually to identify these concepts with ours, it would be necessary to carry out extensive interpretative historical studies, which would take up too much space here. And in all probability, by so doing, we should deter-

frequently it has influenced final metaphysical solutions. Most often, it is implicated in concepts such as, for example, *causa sui* (self-causing), *substantia* (substance), and the like. For instance, we read in Spinoza's First Definition (in his *Ethics**) : “By that which is *self-caused*, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.” or in Proposition VII: “Existence belongs to the nature of substance.” Therefore, it is impossible to dispense with this concept wherever all the existential moments that eventually arise and the concepts that are involved in existential judgments ought to be taken into account. This all the more, because the concept of primordial being inevitably arises in association with one of the basic metaphysical questions: Why should anything exist at all, rather than the reverse, that there would be nothing? Obviously, we can doubt whether it will ever be given to man to answer this question, but it cannot be denied that this question exists. In any event, in so far as the concept *causa sui* seems to be contradictory (I shall discuss this further in this section), to this extent the concept of existential originality, as a certain existential moment, is not burdened by contradictoriness, and as a certain limited case must be made clearly precise. Therefore, may any reader who is inclined to be sceptical, be willing to entertain this concept at least as a purely intellectual possibility.

* [*The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, trans. by R. H. M. Elwes (London: 1898), Vol. II, p. 45.]

mine only that the similarities and differences between the concepts involved would prove to be greater or smaller, depending on the philosophical system in which the historically familiar concepts appear. But, in any event, we should not succeed in completely identifying these concepts that are familiar to us in the annals of philosophy, with our purely existential concepts. For the former always contain various moments that are the product of their diverse connections with the web of other concepts from older systems and theories. Regardless of how closely the contents of our existential concepts may be related to the concepts that are our historical heritage, it is nevertheless essential to point to the following *basic* differences between them. Disregard of these differences would expose our conclusions to misapprehension by the reader.

1. The Scholastic concepts of *esse a se* and *esse ab alio* are *metaphysical* concepts. Whoever utilizes them employs them in propositions which *assert the factual* existence of this kind of object. But our concepts are purely *ontological*: they are obtained exclusively on the basis of seizing the content of the corresponding ideas, and their employment *does not imply* at all the *factual* existence of either existentially primordial or existentially derivative objects (similarly, as previously, with respect to objects that are or are not self-existent). On the basis of a purely ontological attitude, I do not intend to decide here whether objects of this kind ever existed in fact, or whether they exist now or will exist. Furthermore, from a purely ontological point of view, their existence in fact or their nonexistence is *equally possible*, and an existential-ontological *proof pro* or *contra* their factual existence cannot be given. Within the scope of *existential-ontological* deductions, it cannot be demonstrated that there exists some such *material* determination of any object whatsoever, which could compel it to exist. Only material ontology could supply certain indications.

2. The Scholastic concepts under consideration are also metaphysical in another sense: namely, in Scholasticism, the concept *esse a se* stands in the closest possible relation with the concept of God. Whether the concept of God is made more precise, or whether this concept is left indeterminate, God is always con-

ceived as existing *a se*,³³ and likewise as constituting the *only* being *a se*. And just on this account, conversely, *esse a se* acquires the character of divine being exclusively. On the other hand, *esse ab alio* by the same token becomes identified with the world created by God. But existential primordially in our purely existential-ontological meaning has nothing in common as yet with divine essence or existence. It [this primordially] is apprehended, not from the aspect, so to speak, of *what* exists or can exist, but only as a certain existential moment that can be distinguished in itself alone.

3. Other corruptions can undermine our concept of existential originality, or of derivation, if we consider them in the light of the opposing concepts, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* (*creatura*). There is the danger that when one of two objects is existentially original and the other, derivative, they will be regarded *immediately* as members of a *causal relationship*. This would be a complete mistake. That the concept of *ens a se*, or of *natura naturans*, is often treated in this aspect of a causal relationship (usually closely interlinked with the notions of God and of "substance"), is best shown by the creation of the concept *causa sui* (Spinoza), which is closely related to this *ens a se*. Thus a purely existential distinction immediately takes on the character of a material-ontological or of a metaphysical distinction, which is just what I want to avoid at this point. Of course, I do not mean to deny (1) that the existential difference between existential originality and existential derivation *can*, or even must, entail a material-ontological contradiction, and (2) that there *can* be a causal connection between an original being and a derivative one, although it is doubtful. However, these are additional questions which themselves imply the disparateness of original and derivative being. But one should grasp the existential opposition between them above all in itself, without being influenced by material-ontological vacillations or by one or another metaphysical conclusion. Then it will be seen that it does not contain anything that would link it with the concept of a causal connection. To convince ourselves of this, we must take cogni-

³³ I am disregarding, of course, Greek anthropomorphism. I am considering only those metaphysical theories which utilize the notion of *esse a se*.

zance—if only in a preliminary way—of some of the features characteristic of a causal connection. This will also be desirable in view of our later formal-ontological discussions.

A causal relation is frequently identified with the relation between what conditions the existence of something and what is existentially conditioned by the first. It is not made clear what kind of conditioning this is, and, as a rule, it is made more precise only in the sense of meaning a sufficient condition. As a result, the causal relationship is apprehended much more broadly than is permissible. Strictly speaking, a causal relation occurs between a certain *C* and a certain *E* if and only if:

1. *C* and *E* are diverse;
2. *C* actually conditions *E*, but *E* does not condition *C* in the same way;
3. With respect to their form, both *C* and *E* are *events* or *processes* (or eventually *phases* of processes);
4. The occurrence of *E* is *simultaneous* with that of *C*.
5. Both *C* and *E* are *real* (actual).

Naturally, these five points do not suffice for us to apprehend the most characteristic moments of a causal connection, because they do not give us the specific *kind* of the conditioning of the “effect” *E* by the “cause” *C*. Usually it is said that a cause “produces” an effect, but it is not easy to explain what this means. The problem of the so-called necessary connection between a cause and an effect is also involved in the essence of this conditioning. What kind of “necessity” this must be and whether it pertains to a causal relation is a problem which has been the subject of heated controversy since the time of Hume’s analyses. But no actual progress in resolving it has been made since his day. The reason for this is, perhaps, that the *kind* of necessity was never made the crux of the controversy, and at the same time the fact was overlooked that Hume—denying, in a final reckoning, necessity in a causal relation—had in mind the quite special necessity that, it may be assumed, occurs, according to him, only in what he called “relations of ideas.” Usually, only its *occurrence* has been debated, and then most often [discussion] has passed on at once to other problems, as, for example, the epistemological, as with Kant, or the metaphysical, such as the controversy over

the universality of the causal principle and the possibility of so-called free will. But I shall also not be able to give attention to this problem here. It requires separate extensive consideration and theoretical preparation, and I am touching upon the question of causal relation here³⁴ only in order to accentuate, in contrast with it, existential originality and derivation as existential moments. However, if the five propositions that have been listed are accepted, the concept of cause, or of a causal relationship, undergoes an essential *reduction* in respect to the concept of a sufficient condition, and by their means it will be possible to purge this concept of certain erroneous notions which we meet even today in philosophical literature.³⁵ The following remarks must be added in explanation:

ad 1. The diversity of *C* and *E* is indispensable to a causal connection. The traditional, special, Spinozistic notion, *causa sui* (cause of itself), is for this reason without meaning. However, this diversity does not preclude *the occurrence of C and E within the compass of one and the same object, of one whole*. In connection with my remarks on the remaining points, I shall undertake to clarify both the way in which *E* and *C* occur in a certain whole, and the possibility of that.

ad 2. Both *C* and *E* must be taken in the sense of *individual* terms if condition (2) is to be fulfilled. If *C* and *E* were universal terms, it would not always be true that only *C* conditions *E*, and that *E* never conditions *C* in the same way. The occurrence of *E*₂ of the *kind E*, of which the individual case *E*₁ is the effect of *C*₁,

³⁴ At the time that I am making the second edition of this book ready for publication, I have already completed extensive research on this subject. I am leaving the text of the first edition at this point without any material change although I realize how very inadequate it is. The views presented here comprised the contents of my address before the International Philosophical Congress in Rome (1946), which later was published in an abridgement (in French) in the Acts of that Congress, while the full text of the present argument was published in *Studia Philosophica*, Vol. III, under the title "Quelques remarques sur la relation de causalité." In 1959, Mario Bunge's work, *Causality*, appeared in the United States (Harvard University Press). It contains a number of statements on the subject of causal relationship that are very similar to the position I take here.

³⁵ This literature is enormous, as we know. I can neither discuss it here, nor even cite it. Polish works that should be mentioned are those of Wartenberg, Łukasiewicz, Zawirski, Metallmann, Gawecki, and Kreutz.

can in another case be the cause of the event C_2 , of the same kind as C_1 . For example: The motion of a dynamo is in one case the cause of the generation and flow of an electric current in an attached conductor; in another case, on the other hand, the electrical current, even in the same conductor, is the cause of the motion—its effect—of the given dynamo. However, it is not identically the same current as it was in the first case, but, different as an individuum, another in relation to the first, it is only a process or an event of the same *kind* as the first. On the other hand, a certain event or process, univocally determined as to its individuality, which causally produces an equally individual process or event, cannot itself be causally produced by the same process or event, and therefore cannot be the result of its own effect.

A causal relationship is asymmetrical, although in some cases it can be reversible—if this can be said in this way—with respect to the *kind* comprised by its members.

ad c. Both a cause and an effect are in their *essence* (speaking purely ontologically: according to the idea of each) a process or an event, and therefore they are *temporal* objects.³⁶ This is very frequently overlooked in philosophical discussions although not in the practice of the special sciences. Furthermore, in philosophical literature statements can be found which contradict this point in our concept of a causal relationship. It is frequently asserted that a cause or an effect is a certain thing, “substance,” which has been attributed to God particularly, as the “cause” of the world (by the Scholastics as well as by Spinoza). In everyday speech also it is often said that an architect is the “cause” of his work (e.g., a certain Gothic cathedral), that a leader is the cause of a victory, and the like. Now this last example shows that in spite of the view just cited—at least in so far as an effect is concerned—it does not always have to be a thing, a “substance,” but frequently depends—and in my judgment, always—on the occurrence of a certain state of affairs, and

³⁶ Hume definitely thought so, although speaking more than once of “things” as members of a causal relationship, he did not emphasize it. Later, among others, Wilhelm Wundt enunciated this (cf. *Logik*, 2d ed., Stuttgart, 1908, p. 596): “Change, referring not to things, but to events, is consequently the meaning of causality.” See Chap. iv, following, for a precise definition of “temporal” objects.

therefore upon an event or upon the occurrence of a certain process. Not the architect, but his creative *activity*, in which he designs the plan of the cathedral, and then other *activity*, in which he *realizes* the plan, constitute the cause (indirect) of the cathedral's *coming into being*, and not of the cathedral itself. There is undoubtedly a problem (which I do not intend to resolve at this time) whether the process that is the cause of something (or of a certain event) *always* requires—and this because of its essential formal structure—a certain thing, a certain—as is said—"substance," as the indispensable condition of its occurrence; and whether, therefore, it occurs *only* if that thing, from which the process issues, also exists and therefore participates in it. There is no doubt that this problem is important, and even crucial, in all forms of Heracliteanism, and in contemporary microphysics among these. However, an optional solution of this [problem] cannot have any influence on the way in which we answer the question: What is the essence of cause (what belongs to the idea of it)?³⁷ At all events, it [our answer] cannot lead to the view that a cause is a "thing," a "substance." At the furthest, a positive solution raises a *new problem*, namely, *what kind of connection* occurs between a process and a thing which would be its basis—which would be, as is usually said, the "bearer" of the process. It is certain, however, that *this* connection is not a causal one.

But, if we already agree that it is not the creator of a work that is its "cause," but that his *action* is the cause of the work's *coming into being*, a necessary conceptual distinction that will permit us to define the concept of "cause" more precisely suggests itself. The activity of the architect-creator, which "contributed"—as we often aptly say—to the origination of the cathedral, is, like the activity of the workers who took part in its building, quite various and composed not only of many separate phases, but also of different *discrete* acts. Thus, in a series of mental acts of imagination, it was first necessary to conceive the so-called over-all plan of the cathedral, projected without much specific "detail." This project, now conceived and imagined, would have

³⁷ Obviously, I am not concerned with a matter of terminology, but with a purely substantive solution.

to be prepared (ground plans, elevations, perspectives, etc.). to be "executed" in the sense that appropriate designs would have This embraces a second series of acts, quite different from the first, although closely related to them and perhaps even inter-linked with them in a certain way, as when the "drawing" of the plans involves the perfecting of the original creative idea, or changes in it, and the like, but which are, nevertheless, distinct from them. These require certain operations, frequently executed in *concreto* entirely by someone other than the artist who produced the "idea" for the cathedral (by draftsmen). Next comes the phase of working out the project "in detail," in which various "particulars" of the whole are precisely projected on the basis of the general plan—activity which often takes place even during "building." All these acts which have as their purpose the creation of the project itself must be contrasted with the complicated system of acts "realizing" the plan, and therefore with the "construction" of the cathedral itself, only with which it comes into existence. Each of these three systems of acts, (a) the conception of the plan, (b) the preparation of the general or detailed plans of the project, and (c) the realization of the plan in a construction in the concrete, leads to the emergence of a certain "product," which is a single thing ordered by a certain number of acts. In the first case, it is a project that has only come to mind or been imagined; in the second, it is a plan that has been designed; and in the third, it is the cathedral itself. Each of these developments is brought forth through a succession of separate steps, events or processes, but all of them constitute the components of a certain whole: the production of a certain work. Objectively, a second composite whole corresponds to it: the emergence itself of one and the same product. Thus it is that in everyday practice, and even in the pursuit of the special sciences, we are prone to express ourselves in two different ways (which correspond to the two ways of conceiving "cause" and "effect"): namely, either (a) we say that the entirety of the *first system of acts* (conceiving the plan) is the cause of the "origination" of the project—in the sense of a "whole" composed of separate phases, a whole whose origin we take to be the "result" of that cause—and, analogically, [we say this] of the other two cases [systems];

or (b) we regard the *individual acts* involved in the conceiving of the project as the cause of the occurrence of the *individual events* of which the origination of the project, as only conceived and imagined, is composed. In practice, both ways of expressing or apprehending "cause" and "effect" are permissible, provided only that in each instance we are clearly aware of what we have in mind in the given case, and do not confuse the one with the other. Not only must we be aware of the difference in these two ways of conceiving cause and effect, and, therefore, in the causal relation, but also we must remember that the relation which occurs between a so-called cause and an effect according to the *first* way of apprehending it, occurs in fact only if there is a connection between the "cause" and the "effect" according to the *second* way of apprehending the causal relation. Only of the *individual acts* of conceiving a project in relation to the corresponding *matching* phases of the conceived project's coming into being can it strictly be said that the first "occasion" and the second "produce" it. Only through the agency of this strict *existential conjunction* of a "cause" and an "effect"—without which there is no causal relation—does it come about that there is a *relation*, that there is a whole *system of mutually appurtenant acts* which we have called the "conceiving" of the project, and a *system* of events and processes, which we have called the "origination" of the conceived project (as only thought of). This combination of a number of processes and events in a system and the ordering of this system with another system of processes and events is a *derivative phenomenon* which inevitably occurs in reality, provided *two* conditions hold: (a) if a series of existential connections between correspondingly matched pairs of "cause" and "effect" comes into play, and (b) if among the "causes" (in the meaning of the *individual acts* of conceiving the project), a certain special, *factual appurtenance* prevails which makes it possible to apprehend them as *members of the same* system of acts, and if, correspondingly, there occurs a similar factual appurtenance among the "effects" which makes it possible to apprehend them as phases of the *one genesis* of the project. This actual appurtenance in itself is not in general an existential relation of the elements among which it prevails. Consequently, it is even pos-

sible when these members are completely *separate* (temporally, existentially, "materially")—hence, when they do not constitute a single, original whole.³⁸ But again, it can occur when the members are closely conjoined, and the whole is an original whole—an "organic" whole especially. Thus, factual appurtenance does not have to occur in every series of discrete acts, and not every series of acts has to form a *single system*. Consequently, this *derivatively* causal relationship does not have to occur in every case where a certain number of acts constitutes a succession of "causes" in the strict, primary meaning of a certain succession of events and processes. However, when both conditions (a) and (b) are fulfilled, a derivatively causal relationship comes into being. Its genesis has an existential connection with the occurrence of both of these conditions. However, not every existential connection is a causal relation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the generation of a derivatively causal relation is itself the effect of the occurrence of the conjunction of the conditions (a) and (b). In other words, there is no causal relation between a primary causal relation and a derivatively causal relation.

The foregoing considerations permit me to *narrow* the circulatory concept of a causal relation to merely an *originally causal existential relation*. Hereafter, for brevity, I shall designate this only as a "causal relation," and its members as "cause" and "effect." Only with respect to it are the statements valid which I made in the five points [above].

ad. 4. In connection with the statement regarding the *simultaneity* of a cause and its effect, it is necessary first of all to discriminate between a "*direct*" and an "*indirect*" cause or effect. If between the occurrence (taking effect) of a certain *E* and the occurrence of a certain *C*, there lies a finite "segment" (period) of time in which *C* no longer exists, but *E* has not yet occurred, then *E* is not the result of *C*, but at most is the effect of some other *C'*, which on its part is the effect of *C* or of some other *C''*, which on its part is the effect of *C* or of some other *C'''*, and so on. In this case, we say that *E* is the indirect cause of *C*. In the opposite case, however, when therefore, there is no [intervening]

³⁸ This is certainly so when, for example, planning of a cathedral takes a long time.

period of time, and other conditions of a causal relation are fulfilled, we speak of a *direct* cause or of a *direct* effect, or simply, in short, of cause and effect. For only a direct cause and its direct effect have the existential connection which I have designated as an originally causal relationship.

But is it correct to say that a cause and an effect occur *simultaneously*?³⁹ For most commonly it is said that a cause *precedes* its effect, and even that it must precede it—as we read, for instance, in Hume. Moreover, following Hume, this time sequence has been regarded as the only empirically given connection between a cause and its effect, its apparent⁴⁰ necessity being inferred from the regular repetition of pairs of exactly the same events having the same temporal order. For instance, one says that it is necessary first to turn on the electric current before the lamp will light. This is obviously correct if one understands by “turning on the current” a motion of the hand moving the “switch” and the motion of that switch. But the cause—in the strict meaning of the word, and therefore, the direct cause—of the lamp’s lighting up is not in this case these movements, but at most only the contact of the appropriate parts of the switch produced by these movements, provided that likewise a certain determinate state of the given electrical apparatus obtains at that instant. For its part, this apparatus was in existence before the effect—that is, before the lamp was lit. However, it existed in a state in which it was “impossible” for the lamp to light (this means, this was “possible” as an empirical possibility: it could happen in the *future*, but it could not happen in the present just because of the lack of “contact” in the switch). It is only when contact is made in the switch that the state of the electrical apparatus is supplemented in such a way that this new state is—as is generally believed—the cause of the flow of electrons in the

³⁹ The earliest text known to me that takes up the question of what temporal relation occurs between cause and effect is that of Sextus Empiricus in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Dr. I. Dąmbska called my attention to it. Hume, as we know, likewise takes simultaneity into consideration at a certain point in his analyses, but rejected that eventuality, not knowing how to deal with the difficulties to which it leads.

⁴⁰ Apparent—according to Hume. I cannot undertake a discussion of Hume’s views here. I shall do so elsewhere.

electrical conductors. This motion—the so-called electrical current—causes the temperature of the metal wire in the light bulb to rise, and a certain phase of this temperature increase causes the process which we call the “lighting” of the lamp. If we say that the lamp lit up because of the contact made in the switch, we are thinking of an *indirect* cause. In the case under consideration, we have in mind either the *entire* state of the electrical apparatus, which is the sufficient condition of the effect, or only the occurrence of a certain state of affairs, which *supplements* a certain state of the electrical apparatus, bringing it to a state that is a sufficient condition for the effect (in our case: making contact in the switch without taking into consideration the relatively “permanent” conditions obtaining in the given electrical apparatus). Therefore, in accordance with this way of conceiving it, a “cause” would be the “*complement*” of the sufficient condition for an effect.⁴¹ And correlatively: the effect is not a *wholly* new state of the electrical apparatus (generally: of a certain order of things) arising in the moment the cause occurs, but in that state is only the element in respect to which the new state differs from the state in effect in the given electrical apparatus *before* the cause occurred.

If by “cause” we understand an indirect cause, then some “causes” are antecedent and the “effects” are posterior. However, this concept of causality, which contains the element of temporal difference between cause and effect, *implies* the notion of a *direct* cause, and therefore of a cause that is *contemporaneous* with its effect, according to our concept. For if a cause actually is the complement to the *sufficient* condition of its effect, the question arises: In what way would it be possible for it to exist *for some period without* producing its effect, and therefore to take place some time before its effect occurred? In this case, there must be some special reason why the effect came about only some time after the “cause” took place—a reason that would not be identical with the existing cause. But *then, it could not be the complement to the sufficient condition for the effect, and*

⁴¹ This seems to be the meaning of the term, *causa efficiens*, as it has been used. My position differs from the traditional, it appears, only in that, acknowledging *causa efficiens*, (1) I attempt to make this concept more precise, and (2) reject speaking of “cause” in other, traditionally employed, meanings.

therefore could not be a cause at all. For, in this case, something entirely different would be the cause: specifically, it would be that special reason for the occurrence of the effect in a certain instant—a reason which thus would have to be concurrent with the effect. Consequently, simultaneity (of a “direct”) cause with its effect must be admitted at all events.⁴² A direct cause is likewise a cause understood as “primary.” And conversely: A cause as a member of a primary causal relation is the “direct” cause of a certain effect. However, the indirect cause of a certain effect *E* is an *ulterior* member of a sequence of “direct” causes, but itself is not the original cause of the effect *E*: *it does not produce this effect itself*, but that is done by something else which may have been produced by it.

Acceptance of the simultaneity of a direct cause and “its” effect leads, however, to considerable difficulties. For there is also a danger that in all causal relationships, even in *indirect* ones only, the time difference between cause (indirect) and effect

⁴² Basically, Chr. Sigwart takes this position (cf. *Logik*, Vol II, Sec. 73, p. 137f.), except that he denotes as “cause” something other than I do here. What I call “cause,” Sigwart terms “the operation of a cause” (“*das Wirken der Ursache*” or “*Aktion der Ursache*”); what I call an effect, he designates as “the arising of an effect” (“*Entstehung des Effekts*”). Sigwart also says: “The operation of a cause and the origination of its effect are, in the strictest sense, simultaneous” (*ibid.*, p. 157). And Sigwart’s positive definition of “cause” is not quite clear. At first it seems that by “cause” Sigwart understands a thing from which proceeds an action on some other thing (e.g., the rebound of balls struck by a ball), and again it seems to be the generality of conditions upon which depend the effect’s taking place and its properties (a lasting effect?). The cause in the first instance would be a certain thing; in the second, the sufficient condition for the effect. Therefore, in both cases, Sigwart’s concept of cause is basically different from the concept I am attempting to establish here. In any event, Sigwart is one of the exponents of the view which connects the concept of cause closely with the concept of a “thing” or substance, and clearly opposes Wundt on this point. However, Sigwart likewise undoubtedly sees the existential connection which I regard as essential to the causal relation, but calls it by another name. Cf. also M. Wartenberg’s conclusions with this. And Kant’s position in this matter is no different. He distinguishes “*Kausalität der Ursache*” (“the causality of the cause”) from the cause itself: “The greater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect *first* arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause, because if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, 2d, ed., trans. by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, New York, 1943, Bk. II, Chap. II, Sec. 3, 3B, p. 134).

will disappear. For how is an effect to arise *later than its indirect* cause if there is simultaneity of cause and effect among all the intermediate members.⁴³ This unpleasant difficulty would be easily disposed of if one could accept the idea that one instant *directly follows* another. However, we know that this is impossible if we accept the continuity of time, for the concept of adjacent points in a continuum obviously contradicts its essence. Consequently, another way must be found to surmount this difficulty. And it seems that there is a real possibility of eliminating it. However, this leads to an apprehension of causality and of cause itself, which—as I have already indicated—is considerably different from the generally accepted view on this matter, and on this account will certainly meet with opposition on the part of readers.

The affirmation of the simultaneity of a direct cause and its effect leads, namely, to the thesis—advanced a moment ago—that causes and indirect effects are simultaneous only if at the same time certain *supplementary* affirmations are accepted, which at the moment have nothing in common with the essence of causality, although their recognition has a decisive influence on the concept of the causal relation. This is to admit as self-evident that: (1) a causal relation is an *instantaneous* event, and, therefore, does not require any *period* of time for its occurrence; (2) when two events *A* and *B*, of which *A* is the *indirect* cause of *B* and is separated from *B* by a certain plurality of temporally ordered intermediate events Z_n , the whole period of time $t_A \dots t_B$ is densely filled throughout by events, causally connected⁴⁴ with each other, and belonging to Z_n ; and therefore Z_n has the force of a continuum. In other words, in the whole period of time (*A, B*) or (t_A, t_B), *there is no such state S*, which would *endure unchanging* throughout a certain *period* of time. If we are dealing

⁴³ Even Hume was aware of this difficulty (see *A Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, London, 1898, Pt. III, Sec. 2, p. 378), and not knowing how to overcome it, finally decided to accept the statement that a cause is *antecedent* to its effect. *Nota bene*: Concurrently he declared that there is a relation of temporal and spatial *contiguity* between cause and effect, being unaware of the unpleasant consequences of this decision.

⁴⁴ This means that for each of the events of the given plurality there exists in this plurality another event which is the indirect cause of the first—and at the same time is in another moment than it.

with the change of state *A* into state *B*—which are only indirectly connected, and therefore show a time difference—this change is continuous. When we accept the directness of the connection between a cause and an effect, and their simultaneity, it follows from the assumptions just adduced that *A* and *B* would also have to be *simultaneous*, and that, in consequence of this, *every change*, regardless of how remote the indirect connection between the extreme states *A* and *B* would be, *would have to take place instantaneously* (in a single moment). If, likewise, we accept the Heraclitean or, if one prefers, the Bergsonian view, that the real world is continuously changing throughout, we thus must come to admit that the whole process of change in the world is timeless or instantaneous.

Perhaps we are now beginning to sense the source of the difficulty we have encountered, and [to see] adumbrations of the way to overcome it as well. The difficulty arises from the confusion of two directions of thought: the definition of causality, which, in its essence, belongs to formal ontology, and as such should not be considered until later, and *metaphysical* assumptions about the *factual essence of the real world*. Thus the material (physical) world is taken into account before everything else, but not exclusively, and serves to some extent as an example and gauge of all other real being (whether correctly is another matter, to which I shall yet return when considering material-ontological questions). And these metaphysical assumptions, for their part, are grounded on certain material-ontological propositions concerning the material essence of what is causally related and occupies the positions of members of that relation. All these propositions are interlinked with the conception of time as a one-dimensional continuum, in which moments are *points* in time, and therefore “positions” in a time continuum. All mathematical concepts and propositions relating to a one-dimensional spatial continuum are thereby applied to time, and in consequence of this, to what fills time—hence, to the occurrence of something taking place in time. The one and the other undergo geometrization, as Bergson correctly observed. All occurrences, particularly in the physical world, are treated as continuous, and the plurality of events as dense throughout the world. Neither time nor any process in the world is discontinuous.

The question arises: Which of these various propositions must and, at the same time, can be discarded, in order to escape the difficulty indicated, and thus to avoid having to affirm the instantaneousness of every process, whose very essence is—as we shall yet see—that it takes place or “extends” in time? Is it actually necessary to give up the proposition that a direct cause and its effect are simultaneous? For here the following idea suggests itself: If a direct cause is prior to its effect, and therefore $t_c < t_e$, there will *also* be a time difference between the two events *A* and *B*, of which *A* will be the indirect cause of *B*, and, likewise, $t_A < t_B$. Even were we to concede the other propositions listed, pertaining to occurrences in the world, we should not be compelled to admit the paradoxical consequence of the instantaneous of the whole world process. If—likewise in conformance with the remaining propositions—we accept the instantaneousness (temporal punctuality) of a cause, we eliminate the objection that, because of its being in a different time than its effect, it would not have to be the complement of its [the effect’s] sufficient condition. For if a cause takes place in a temporally punctual event, and an effect follows *directly* after it, then it is veritably its [the effect’s] sufficient condition, producing its occurrence.

Unfortunately, this attempt is equivalent to relinquishing the concept of a direct causal relation. For it definitely acknowledges the existence of two adjacent, “contacting” points in time, X_1 and X_2 , in which the cause and the effect would be collocated in immediate succession. To accept this would be to contradict the basic propositions of the theory of the continuum.

But, in this event, must we reject the concept of a direct causal nexus and recognize causation *only* in the case of an *indirect* cause?⁴⁵ We could do this if it were merely a matter of terminological convention. But not much would be gained if we did, for it would then be necessary to explicate the essence of the

⁴⁵ This would imply the existence of a temporal *distance* (division) between a cause and an effect, and would, therefore, be equivalent to the acceptance of a certain kind of *actio in distans*. This struck me as so impossible at the time I wrote this book that it seemed out of the question that anyone could entertain this view seriously. But it developed that I was mistaken. In 1956, I read the work of E. Dupréel, entitled *La cause et l'intervalle en ordre et probabilité* (Brussels, 1933), which takes this very position—that a certain “interval,” and, therefore, a temporal division, occurs between cause and effect. Mentioning it, I note that I cannot discuss this subject here. I shall do so elsewhere.

nexus which we are now treating as the connection between a direct cause and its effect, and which certainly would not drop from sight and would only have to be given another name. However, the idea of relinquishing the proposition regarding the *continuousness* of causal connections seems more promising. Then it would be necessary, first of all, to discriminate between two entirely different facts within the compass of real being:⁴⁶ *persistence* in a certain state, if by a process, and *transition* from one state into another. We should be dealing with persistence principally in things which do not undergo change—at least in a certain respect—during a certain period of time. But not just with these. For if we take the uniform rectilinear motion of some material point in empty space, which is not a field of force (such as a gravitational field), we are dealing with persistence in a certain state—namely, in a state of uniform motion. The so-called “principle of inertia” in physics merely states that cases of persistence in the same state are possible in the sphere of material reality, and makes the possibility of transition from one case of persistence in a certain state into another dependent upon a special factor, which is called a “force” or impulse. By virtue of this, the diversity of “persistence” in a certain state and of “transition” from one state to another is recognized as two basic, individual forms of being. This permits us to frame a new concept of cause. Cause, in this meaning, would occur in being when, and only when, there is a *transition* from one state of being to another: *the occurrence of this transition must have a “basis,” a “cause”*—which is just what inheres in the advent of a “complement” to the sufficient condition for the new state. This complement, supplementing a certain state of the sufficient condition for that state, by that fact “induces” or “produces” the new state within the compass of which the “effect” is found. In these cases, physicists introduce an “operating force” as the cause of this transition, this change. However, persistence in a certain state does not require any new “cause,” but only the *preservation* of the conditions in which the new state came into being. And the preservation of these conditions does not require any new cause. In both instances, persistence in a certain state and the

⁴⁶ Stated more precisely: being thought of as real, but whose actuality is not yet acknowledged.

preservation of its conditions, we are dealing with something which belongs to the *primordial structure of being*—at least of material being—and to what can be called the inertia of being. *Earlier phases of endurance* in a certain state (of a thing or of a process) *are not the causes of the later phases* of persistence in that state. In other words, if a certain thing *X* in a system that is isolated—at least in some respect—remains in a certain state for a period of time, no separate conservative “force” is required within the compass of that system. It simply maintains itself. This is that *primordial “inertia”*—as I described it—of the existent, which is expressed in the fact that something simply *remains* in a certain state as long as some external factor does not dislodge it. “Transitions” (“changes”) come about only because the isolation (in some respect) of the system is destroyed by some disturbing external factor, which unbalances the equilibrium of the system in some respect and shifts it into another state of equilibrium (in some other respect) in which the given system can “remain” until some other new disturbing factor breaks into its field. This disturbing factor is nothing but just what must be called a “cause.” If it makes its appearance, if it penetrates a certain system which, isolated in some respect for a certain period of time, was therefore “enduring” (“remaining in a certain state”), the equilibrium of the system is destroyed; then the “effect” also takes place “immediately”—that is, “simultaneously.” And the “effect” can be nothing—according to what we have said—but *the totality of facts that distinguish the new state from the previous, now destroyed, antecedent state*—and, therefore, not the *entire new* state of the system. Likewise, the entirety of the antecedent system, now destroyed, should not be regarded as the cause. However, strictly speaking, an effect is the *occurrence* (taking place, coming into being) of all those facts which distinguish the new state from the past, and which are themselves different from the cause.⁴⁷

But here we should not repeat the old mistakes. For the idea

⁴⁷ Bertrand Russell undertakes quite differently to overcome these difficulties while maintaining the traditional concept of cause, in his *Analysis of Mind*, London and New York, 1921. See Chap. v, entitled “Psychological and Physical Laws.” I cannot discuss it here.

suggests itself that an "effect" is *contingent* with respect to its *properties* not only upon the kind of "factor" and its properties which "disturbed" the equilibrium of the system, but also upon the *totality* of the properties of the given state of the system that was destroyed by the appearance of the new "active factor" and, therefore, by a "cause" in the meaning just introduced. *This dependent relation should not be confused with the relation between the cause and the effect.* This confusion leads to a repetition of the errors in the old concept of cause. For, under the influence of this confusion, it is said that the "cause" of a certain occurrence is simply *the entire state of affairs of a system which precedes its entire present state* that is its effect. A further consequence of this view is that not only a certain state preceding a given change (a transition from one state to another) is regarded as the cause, but also *every anterior state in general of a certain system* of states of affairs; or, in other words, the possibility of persistence, of enduring in the same state, is denied—and thus we find ourselves in the same position as when we started, that leads to insurmountable difficulties.⁴⁸

The essential point of the concept of *cause* I have introduced, *as the intrusion by a disturbing factor into a system of states of affairs isolated in a certain respect*, and persisting in equilibrium up to the given moment, and of an *effect as the occurrence of states of affairs in a given system that distinguish its new state, produced by a cause, from its previous state*, inheres in the fact that (a) the causal relation should not be identified merely with a relation of sufficient condition, and (b) that the concept of members of a causal relation requires a *twofold discontinuity of being*: α) *the discontinuity of simultaneous existents*, and β) *the discontinuity of a succession*.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ The view cited is also not congruent with the actual state of affairs occurring in these cases: i.e., a "cause," as the disturbing factor, does *not* destroy *all* the current state of a system, but usually only a certain element in it; and, second, all the remainder of the antecedent state of the system by no means has to be involved in the *determination* of its new state, but only some of the components contained in it are involved, and the assortment of these components, in this connection, can vary in accordance with the "cause" which occurs.

⁴⁹ We shall see later that this does not conform with certain formal-ontological deductions on the subject of the existential region and form of the world. (Cf. Chap. xvi, *The Controversy*.)

ad. a) In my definition, a cause alone is not the sufficient condition for an effect. On the one hand, it is something *less* than that condition, being only a factor that *supplements* a certain state of a system for the sufficient condition of the occurrence of an effect. On the other hand, it is something *more* than the sufficient condition, since it is the factor disturbing the equilibrium of a certain system of states of affairs, and likewise a factor that is in some measure productive: it produces, gives rise to, the effect.⁵⁰ In other words, it is an *active* factor, which not only is the discharge of a certain force, but also contains a moment of *activity* when it takes effect as the cause of an event or the development of a certain process. But a sufficient condition does not need to be something that produces or “acts”; it occurs also in existential domains in which “transitions” from one state to another are out of the question, as, for example, in the domain of individual ideal entities—in the realm of mathematical being especially. The final step in our theory of causality, which we cannot take here, would depend on the explanation of the essence of [the] “production” [of an effect]—of that “productive” moment contained in a cause.

But we can point out here one more moment of a cause. Our term for it is *indirect efficacy*. Namely, a cause that is the complement of a sufficient condition for an effect is not all that “acts.” It “activates” (if it may be said in this way) *all* the re-

⁵⁰ As we know, Hume criticized the definition of a cause as “producing” or “giving rise to” an effect (see *A Treatise on Human Nature*, ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose [London, 1898] Vol. I, Pt. III, Sec. 2, p. 379), declaring that such a statement does not explain anything, for it either means the same as being a cause, or it is something else, which should be clarified separately. Later positivists have usually interpreted this to mean that, in connection with a “cause,” one should not speak of “producing” [an effect], since nothing of the sort is given in experience, and therefore it does not occur in a causal relation at all. But Hume did not say this by any means. On the contrary, he recognized the occurrence in every instance of the “production” of an effect by a cause, to the extent that he *identified* “cause” with “the production of an effect.” He objected only to treating the “production” [of an effect] as a moment *defining* cause, but did not deny that this moment appears in that which is a cause, or which fulfills the function of a cause. Hence, this cannot be *disregarded* in connection with an explanation of what a cause is, although one must agree with Hume that it is extremely difficult to *clarify* the concept of “producing” [an effect].

maintaining conditions that partly make up the sufficient condition of the effect,⁵¹ for all these *more exactly determine* the properties of the effect. The conditions which existed in a configuration of states of affairs before the cause arose did not “act” or “produce” an effect by themselves; the effect is not entirely dependent on them: as soon as the cause occurs, the latent forces in the partial conditions seem to quicken, so that the *entire* complex of *these*—i.e., therefore, the *entire* sufficient condition—prescribes what sort of effect occurs. However, its occurrence is decided by the occurrence of the cause, as I conceive it. Hence, it also follows that all those who concern themselves with so-called causal laws, and, therefore, with the problem of *what sort* of properties of an effect are determined by *what* complex of states of affairs constituting a sufficient condition, tend to think of causality as meaning the relation of dependence upon a sufficient condition by that which is conditioned by it, overlooking, on the other hand, this special role of cause in our understanding—the role of *bringing out* an effect and of determining it by activating the whole complex of “factors” making up the sufficient condition for the effect.

It is evident that the question of what a sufficient condition is, constitutes a separate problem. This matter is not adequately clarified in the extant literature. *Nota bene*, some believe that a cause is also the indispensable condition of its effect. But all these are questions which I cannot discuss more fully here.

ad. b. The first discontinuity inheres, as I have said, in the contemporaneous existence of *systems* of states of affairs, in the sense that they are *relatively* isolated in some respect from their environment: one system that remains in equilibrium for some time and is later dislodged from it by a certain cause, and a second system, to which that “force” belongs—more accurately, that factor which encroaches upon the first system. Both of these systems must be “separated” from each other by something if, for a time, they are not to “collide”—if, therefore, this “force” is not to become “operative” and change into a “cause.” Naturally, this “separation” does not necessarily have to be a spatial division, but a spatial division can be involved here.

⁵¹ Which by no means signifies that these have to be *all* the moments composing the *complete* state of the given system.

The second discontinuity appears in a succession. It depends on *phases of enduring*, *phases of persisting* in the same state, that separate the instants of *passage* from one state to another. Such a transition, if there is only one, takes place indeed in one instant, but *between* two transitions there is an interval of change that is filled with *endurance in the same state*. Each transition, "lasting some time," as we usually say, is composed of a differentiated plurality of transitions taking place as if they were jumps.

We now come to a conclusion that appears to be inconsistent with the traditional [view] of European natural science of recent centuries. Since the time of Newton at least, we have learned to treat all processes occurring in nature as *continuous* developments (in a mathematical sense). Yet, according to the concept we are advancing, some processes—e.g., the motion of a body in a curve or circle—would not be continuous in the meaning that they *constantly* change direction. The motion itself would be uninterrupted, but it would not take place exactly in a circular course, but would take effect in a system of *jumps in the change of direction*. Likewise, an accelerated motion would increase its speed in jumps, and a so-called uniformly accelerated motion would be one whose speed would increase by jumps that would be constantly the same, and the like. Obviously, in this connection a uniform motion cannot be regarded as a "change" of position in space, but must be taken as a state of constantly passing [by] points in space. There is no doubt that this position leads to an entirely different picture than that to which we are accustomed. However, on the other hand, the thought suggests itself that this conclusion may be closely connected with the *quantum* concept of material processes in contemporary physics. All these matters require amplification, and we shall have to give attention to them in our later discussions. In any event, it can for the moment be said that it does not by any means follow from the position I have outlined that continuous processes are out of the question. However, if they are indeed strictly continuous and persist for some time, then they are not "transitions." A uniform rectilinear motion—once it is taking place—is not a changing, not a passage from one state to another, but is a *continuation* in an unchanging

state of motion, of uniform passage in space. However, it is a fact—which is without significance in the sphere of ontological investigations—that in reality it is practically very difficult to achieve an absolutely uniform motion. If this is actually the case, it would only mean that the material world given us in experience is exactly such—provided this experience is reliable—that it contains systems whose mutual isolation is relatively slight. This would be an empirical fact to which we cannot appeal, and which itself would not affect our definition of the nexus between cause and effect. But its eventual occurrence would also indicate that the occurrence of a causal relation—i.e., that eventually it does occur and what members appear in a given nexus—is contingent upon the precise endowment of the existent. So it is meaningful to speak of causation, of causes and effects, only as within the *compass* of a world already existing and qualified in a determinate way. This is connected with the final point in our definition of causality: namely, that both cause and effect must be *real*. However, before I come to this, I should like to justify in still another way the statement that causality occurs only within the *compass* of the real world.

This statement is strictly connected with our concept of cause as a factor which is the complement to a certain assortment of conditions (states of affairs) obtaining in a certain state of a system of things or of processes, as a sufficient condition for the occurrence of an effect, and thus “produces” an effect. It can be said that as long as the cause *C* does not occur, the effect *E* still belongs to the future and is an empirical possibility. Namely, it is empirically possible in the instant of time *t* *before* the occurrence of the cause *C*, because of that assortment of conditions indispensable to the occurrence of *E*, but insufficient for it. Likewise, if the cause *C* of the effect *E* is to take effect, its condition is that this state of a certain system, through the disturbance of whose equilibrium by *C* is to bring *E* into being, can contain no state of affairs that *excludes* the occurrence of *E* in the future,⁵² and, therefore, a state incongruent with or contradictory to *E* or *C*. Or, [stated] differently: the cause *C* is a factor which changes

⁵² More accurately: that what in this state is not affected by the occurrence of *C*, does not contain any state of affairs that precludes the occurrence of *E*.

a certain *possible E* into an actual state of affairs, into the actual occurrence of the event that is the effect *E*. In other words, a cause is the *producer* of an effect that was only empirically possible before it [the cause] occurred.⁵³ It is also something which implies the existence of two systems (arrangements of things and states of affairs), *relatively* isolated in some respect, which can eventually "collide." In particular, it implies an order of conditions existing in one of these systems to which it [*C*] is the complement of the sufficient condition for the occurrence of the effect *E*. Consequently, it "finds," so to speak, a certain "world" within the compass of which it can take place, and the effect produced by it is also one of the elements of that world. Neither the one nor the other is something that could or would be outside the real world.⁵⁴ A *causal* connection is, then, *a certain relation within-the-world*.

ad. 5. My readers will no doubt consider as "trivial" and "self-evident" the reservation that cause and effect have to be real, although this is not always recognized in practice, and they will surely oppose it once they become aware of its essential meaning. In reality, it is a further essential *restriction* of the concept of cause and causality. For the result of this reservation is not only that a causal relation is a relation within-the-world which can occur only between *members* that exist in the same mode—and that as something real—but, in addition, it cannot occur in many cases to which we often refer in everyday life as those of "cause" and "effect." For example, in a case where the ostensible cause is a certain existentially autonomous object (e.g., a conscious act), the supposed effect has to be something that is existentially heteronomous (e.g., a purely intentional object).

After this digression, let us return in this paragraph to our proper subject: to the distinction between existential originality and existential derivation. As I have already said, this is a purely existential-ontological distinction, and does not have anything in common with the distinction between cause and effect. By this I mean that a certain existentially original object cannot *ipso fac-*

⁵³ According to a *different* conception of "possibility," it [the cause] is what ultimately "makes" *E* "possible."

⁵⁴ The concept of "world" signifies its particular structure, and as such is only a formal-ontological concept. This will be explained later.

to be regarded as the cause of an existentially derivative object issuing from it, as, analogically, this existentially derivative object cannot be considered, because it is existentially derivative, to be the effect of this existentially original object. Furthermore, from what I have said about causality, it becomes clear why this would not be admissible. For, in order for something to be a "cause," it must fulfill a number of conditions that an existentially original object does not have to fulfill. Thus, for example, it is not pertinent to the essence of an existentially original object that it would or should be an object existing in time, and, furthermore, that it should be a "temporal" object such as an event or a process, or that it would be "real." In the annals of philosophy, existentially original objects have also often been distinguished from the existentially derivative—in fact, although not always with an adequate conceptual grasp—without admitting, too, that there is a causal relation between them. And, from a purely factual point of view, this should not be done. Plato's opposition between an idea and an individual thing can serve us as an example here. Individual things were supposed to be derived from an idea. But Plato did not admit that there was a causal connection between them. Something of the same sort can be said about Aristotle's "form" and individual things. And finally, the relation between an existentially original God and the world he created—e.g., according to the Neoplatonic conception—does not have to be conceived as a causal relation. From this it now follows that neither God nor the world created by him is an event or a process within the world, and the connection between them is not a relation within-the-world. In any event, neither God nor the world were so conceived by those Scholastics who concerned themselves with these problems. If, in spite of this, Thomas Aquinas, for example, referred to God as the "cause" of the world, this was either because the concept of cause was too broad, or because a causal relation was inadequately differentiated from the relation which can occur between original being and being that is derivative (from it).

In order that this difference may be more clearly understood, we shall try to characterize existential originality more specifically.

An existentially original object is distinguished in its being

by *its own absolute status*—in other words, *by the absolute confirmation of its being in itself*. If it exists, it is an “archetype” in the etymological meaning of this term, and therefore something which can really be the source of the existence of other objects, but which itself has no source of being outside itself; but its existence—provided there is any such existent at all!—is confirmed in the fact that its *material essence is determined in such a way that it cannot not exist*. If this kind of material essence of an object were in general possible, then the object endowed with it would have in itself, in its own essence, the *absolute ground* of its being. Consequently, its being—once such an object were to exist—could not be annihilated or suspended, any more than it could be initiated by any *external causes* whatever. But this means that an existentially original object, if it were to exist at all, in its essence would have to be “eternal,” in the sense of existing “without a beginning” and “without an end.”⁵⁵

However, it is necessary to emphasize clearly that, within the sphere of existential ontology no statement can be made about the *factual* existence of any existentially original object. It also cannot be determined whether this kind of material essence is possible in anything whatever that intrinsically would require the existentially original existence of any individual object determined by it. Only investigations in material ontology could detect and clarify the idea of an object having such an essence. At this point, we are concerned only with what the existential character of an existentially original object is, and what its essence would have to be functionally if it were possible for it to exist in fact at all. But both material ontological and metaphysical determinations are entirely suspended.

The fact that an existentially original object is, according to the idea of it, “eternal” in the meaning noted, permits us to under-

⁵⁵ By this I want to point out that no temporal moment occurs in this concept of eternity that is associated with the concept of original being. An existentially original object that is “eternal” does not, by that fact, have to exist in time, or to fill any instants of time with its existence. We do not know at all whether temporality of existence (meaning the mode of existence which is that of an object existing in time) is congruent with existential originality of an object. These are questions about which it is difficult at this point to determine anything.

stand why nearly every religion which passed beyond the phase of anthropomorphizing God, and yet accepted an individual God, attributed eternity and existential primordially to his essence. Various metaphysical systems that also accept the existence of an individual God do the same, although they rarely arrive at a precise concept of original being. However, on the other hand, existential originality in itself neither requires—at least so it seems at the moment—material (qualitative) essence in a divinity, nor does it make a prejudgment as to the existence of God. Thus, for example, dialectical materialism, which, as is well known, categorically denies the existence of a spiritual God and of any God at all, acknowledging only “matter” that has not been created by anyone, basically attributes existential primordially and eternity to matter.

On the other hand, an existentially derivative object lacks this intrinsic absolute confirmation of its existence. Although, to be sure, it can be autonomous, once it has come into being or has been brought into existence by some other object—which means that it can be distinguished by that immanence of its own qualitative determinations to which I called attention in a preceding paragraph—but is an existentially derivative object, *it has the genesis of its being in some other object*. Immanence of qualitative determinations alone *does not suffice* for existential originality in an object. In this connection, it is necessary to draw attention to two moments: (1) The existential derivation of an object is closely connected with its material essence: it is such that inherently it does not compel an object possessing it to exist (if it may be said this way); this object *can, but need not, exist*, and if it does, the reasons for this are not to be sought in the object itself, but *outside* it. Or, to express this another way, in order for it to exist, it needs some factor external to it which would “create it.” (2) Existential derivation inherently has the kind of existential character that is distinguished by a peculiar *imperfection of being*: to be a derivative existent is equivalent to “being created,” being doomed to have the *source of its origination in something else*, for the very reason that an existentially derivative object *lacks* that *self-confirmation of being* that is characteristic of an existentially original object. This ex-

istential imperfection, however, is indicated by still another point—by a *peculiar defectiveness, a fragility of being: no existentially derivative object* has to exist, and although it has for some reason come into existence and exists, *it can always cease to exist*, because its own material essence does not maintain it in existence (if this may be so expressed). Once created, it exists, if it continues to exist at all, only because of its *existential inertia*. But this inertia is due neither to its existential derivation, nor to the material qualifications of its essence, but only to the immanence of its qualifications—provided it is characterized by this as well—and, therefore, eventually to its concomitant existential autonomy. But, as I have indicated, not every object that is existentially derivative has to be, or is, also autonomous. It can also be heteronomous. Then, not only the *source* of its being inheres in some other object, existing outside it, but—what is more—the *foundation* of its existence is found in some other object. Consequently, an object that is derivative and heteronomous exists, after its generation by some other object, only if this or some other object *maintains it in existence*.⁵⁶ Its own form and material endowment cannot do this; they cannot invest it with that existential “inertia” which I mentioned when discussing existentially autonomous objects, since they are not contained in it immanently, but are only “invested” in it by some outside agent—in particular, if it is a purely intentional object, they are “ascribed” to it intentionally. The “creation” of a purely intentional object depends, in this instance, on an intentional attribution, on its being “thought

⁵⁶ As we know, there are metaphysical theories which predicate necessity for the real world—the so-called *creatio continua* (e. g., of Descartes). It is not clear on what this kind of proposition is based—whether on a conviction of infinite divine power (which would seem to be limited by the very fact of the world’s existing even for an instant without the need of intervention by God’s will); or whether on the conviction that the “frailty” or defectiveness of the real world’s existence goes so far, notwithstanding its autonomy, as to require a continually repeated act of maintaining it in existence; or whether, finally, on the recognition of the real world’s existential heteronomy. But in both of these last two cases, this imperfection in the being of the real world also gives evidence of the *finiteness* of divine power—of a certain kind of impotence. But, whatever is the case, it is apparent that in this kind of discussion, an initial condition is to explain the meaning of the existence of the real world, and, therefore, to show what existential moments of real being can be discovered.

of"—in particular, the existence of this kind of object is contingent upon its "being perceived." *Esse = percipi*, as Berkeley formulated it. There is only a question whether he was right in attributing existence of this kind to material objects in the real world.

Both concepts, that of existential originality and that of existential derivation, refer to something absolute in the mode of existence of the given objects. However, the concept of existential derivation includes, in addition, a certain relational reference: an indicator of that object from which the given existentially derivative object springs. This reference can either be wholly and univocally determinate, so that we know with complete accuracy *from what* object the given existentially derivative object proceeds, or it is vague. If such indefiniteness is combined with *unlimited variability* of the reference to the matrix, we then designate this as the *absolute* relativity of the given object's existential derivation. The source of this or of other existential derivation of the object must be sought in its material essence. In this respect nothing is accidental. It is not even accidental that every existentially derivative object—if it actually exists—exists entirely "accidentally": i.e., the necessary source of its being is not in its own essence, as is the case with an existentially original object, but is in some "coincidence" independent of it.

Existential originality and (absolute) existential derivation mutually exclude each other completely. *Every* object is therefore *either* existentially original *or* existentially derivative. Nevertheless, there are questionable situations in which we must employ a third concept that is entirely negative and relativistic. Namely, it is necessary to introduce the concept of the *nonderivation* of something from a certain object *X*. *This is not to be equated with* the concept of existential originality. It has only the meaning that when a certain object is said to be nonderivative existentially from *X*, the question is wholly *undecided* whether it is existentially original or existentially derivative in an absolute sense, but it is certain that it *does not derive* from the certain determinate thing *X*.

As a result of these observations, whose inadequacy and lack of definitive completeness I do not overlook, the following assertions can be made:

1. The opposition between existential originality and existential derivation is dissimilar to that between existential autonomy and existential heteronomy.

2. Existential heteronomy excludes existential originality.

3. Existential autonomy does not exclude either existential originality or existential derivation.

4. The existential originality of an object of necessity requires that it be existentially autonomous (self-existent).

5. If it could be asserted that a certain object *X* exists, and that it is absolutely derivative existentially, then there also exists an existentially original object which is the source of the being of the object *X*.

EXISTENTIAL SEPARATENESS AND INSEPARATENESS

An object is existentially separate if, *for its existence, it does not in its essence require the existence of any other object with which it would have to coexist, because of its essence, within the compass of one and the same whole*. In other words, if, owing to its essence, *its existence is not a necessary coexistence with some other object within a single whole*.⁵⁷

On the other hand, something is existentially inseparate if its *existence, owing to its essence, is necessary coexistence with something else* (eventually quite specially determined as to its material essence) *within the compass of a single whole*.

⁵⁷ A basic examination of the independence and dependence* of an object was conducted for the first time, as far as I know, by Edmund Husserl in the Third Investigation of Volume II of his *Logische Untersuchungen*. However, Husserl treated this opposition as *formal-ontological*, whereas it actually is *existential-ontological*, and has a connection with certain details of the form of an object only in some cases. Furthermore, in contradistinction to Husserl, I am introducing *two* oppositions here: (1) of existential separateness to inseparateness, and (2) of existential self-dependence to contingency. "Object" has the same meaning here as "something." See p. 43, Note 16.

* ["Separateness" and "inseparateness" are types of independence and dependence, respectively, as are "self-dependence" and "contingency" (which are taken up on pp. 89ff.). In Polish there are two terms each for "independence" and "dependence," which the author employs to make these distinctions. The English terms used here as their counterparts have been chosen because they are readily identifiable with the author's definitions. And "contingent" *in this context* is not *identical* with "contingent" as Husserl uses it in opposition to his concept of "absolute" (Cf. *Ideas*, Sec. 44), although there is some congruence. —Tr.]

So, for example, the moment of "redness" in the whole, "red color," is existentially inseparable, because it must coexist with the moment of "coloration" in that whole.⁵⁸ *Not only* can no "red" object exist in which there would be "redness" but not "coloration"—i.e., such in which this redness would appear as something separate, discrete, in itself—but, in addition, where "redness" and "coloration" appear within the compass of a single whole, they coexist in especially strict unity. Some writers speak in this case of the "fusion" (*Verschmelzung*) of two such moments.⁵⁹ I shall not determine here whether there must be such particularly strict coexistential unity in every case of existential inseparateness. It must be emphasized, however, that in the case of existential inseparateness we are concerned with, not the *purely factual*, but the *necessary*, coexistence—prescribed by their essence—of these objects within the compass of a *single whole*: with the *essential impossibility* of their existing *separately* ("by themselves").

Another instance of existential inseparateness is that of the "color red" as a *property* of a certain individual "red" object (thing). And here the "color red" cannot exist by itself apart from the given thing of which it is a property, but can only coexist with it. It is at least probable that there cannot be such strict "fusion" of a "red color" and a red thing as there is of "redness" and "coloration" in a "red color." However, this does not diminish the inseparateness of the "color red" from a red thing, such as a red cloth.

The existential inseparateness of a certain *X* in relation to a certain *Y*, with which *X* must coexist within the compass of a single whole, does not predetermine anything respecting the mode of existence of that whole. The whole *W* can be either existentially separate or inseparable. Only the law holds that if the whole *C* (e.g., the "color red") is autonomous and inseparable existentially, then some other whole *C'* (e.g., a red cloth) must

⁵⁸ These *moments*, as the determinations of a certain *concrete* whole, must be strictly distinguished from the *pure* ideal qualities, "coloration" and "redness." As to the separateness or inseparateness of the latter, I shall not commit myself here.

⁵⁹ Cf. Jean Hering, "Über das Wesen, die Wesenheit, und die Idee," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 1921, Vol. IV, p. 512ff.

exist within which *W* must appear and coexist with some *Z* if the moment *X* (e.g., “redness,” taken as a moment of a concrete red color) is to exist at all as something individual.

Existential inseparateness can be of different types. This is important, for, in consequence of this, a certain *X*, which is not existentially inseparable in *one* sense, is not therefore existentially separate. In particular:

1. *Degrees* of existential inseparateness can be distinguished. For example, “red color,” as a property of an individual thing, is of a *lower* degree of existential inseparateness, which means that it is less inseparable existentially than the moments of “redness” and of “coloration” that appear in it. This moment of “redness” is more inseparable—if it may be expressed thus—than the “red color of something,” because it requires for its existence not only a certain substantial bearer (a subject of properties) such as the “color red” (as a property) requires for its existence, but also “coloration,” with which it must fuse and coexist in a single whole. On the other hand, although the “red color of something”—providing this something is existentially autonomous and individual—is indeed existentially inseparable, it needs for its existence only a certain subject of properties, but does not require any other qualitative individual moment that is different from it and that, at the same time, appears *apart from it*.⁶⁰ And it is quite another matter that this subject of properties must still somehow be qualified and requires *on its part* the concretion of corresponding ideal qualities. This question is connected with the *form* of an individual object as a subject of properties, and not with the inseparateness of the color red as one of the properties of a certain concrete thing. There will be further discussion of this.

2. The existential inseparateness of something is characterized by a special *relativity*: something which is existentially inseparable always is such *in relation to* something else. However, this relativity may be various. Thus, for example, taking the one and the other as individual moments, “redness” is not existentially

⁶⁰ Therefore, if someone should say that the color red *requires* a certain determinate extension with which to coexist, this is true, but this does not constitute an objection to the statement that has been made, since that extension—as, for that matter, many other moments, such as the determination of brightness—is one of the moments *within the compass* of the whole, “red color.”

inseparate in the same sense as "coloration." Namely, the moment of redness quite *univocally* requires a moment of coloration, while, on the other hand, a moment of coloration only requires *any quality of color whatever*—of "redness," of "yellowness," etc.—as its supplement, and therefore as something which, coexisting with it, makes its existence possible. *Both* of these moments are existentially inseparate, and in each instance their inseparateness is in its essence *materially* conditioned, and consequently grounded in a material-ontological state of affairs. The relativity of their inseparateness, however, is different in each of these cases: in the first, it is *univocal*, in the second, *multivocal*. *Univocally* relative existential inseparateness occurs when a certain *S*, in order to be able to exist as something individual, must find its complement in a certain *S'* whose *qualitative determination is entirely univocal*, and which, therefore, is *one* of a kind in its qualitative endowment (it can then appear in many copies!) On the other hand, *multivocally* relative existential inseparateness occurs where a certain *optional* moment *M*, of a certain *class* of mutually exclusive moments, can be the complement of the moment *M'*, but, at the same time, *one* of the elements of this class *must* be that complement. A limiting case of multivocally relative existential inseparateness—in reference to which I shall speak of *absolute* (or, more accurately, of "absolutely relative") inseparateness—occurs where that which is existentially inseparate does not require a *determinate* complement, but must coexist within the compass of a single whole with *anything* whatever of an entirely *unlimited* generality. It is not easy to give a concrete example of this kind of absolute existential inseparateness. For there is a problem, difficult to solve, whether *absolutely universal* necessary appurtenances and relations hold among qualities, or whether on the contrary, only *some* qualities are of the sort that they themselves designate a *strictly limited range* of other qualities with which they can or must coexist within the compass of a single whole.

3. By taking its *source* into account, we obtain other varieties of existential inseparateness. In such moments as "redness" and "coloration" this [source] can inhere only in the *material* (qualitative) specificity of these moments. More accurately, it inheres in

the particular properties of the pure ideal qualities whose concretions appear in the moments referred to, which qualitatively, *materialiter*, determine them. But not all existentially inseparate objects must be such only for *this* reason. The reason can inhere in *their pure form*.⁶¹ Thus, for example, every *property* (or characteristic) of *something* is, because of its essential *form*, existentially inseparate in relation to that of which it is a property (and, therefore, in relation to an individual object). On the other hand, every autonomous individual object, in the *narrow* and entirely determinate meaning of a subject of properties (characteristics), forms, *together with* all its properties, a whole which—again because of the essence of its form—is *formaliter* existentially separate. It is in this connection that we make a distinction between *formal* and *material* existential inseparateness.

4. In the case of univocal existential inseparateness, it is necessary to distinguish *unilateral* from *bilateral* (reciprocal) existential inseparateness. Namely, if a certain *S* is univocally inseparate existentially with respect to a certain *S'*, and likewise *S'* is to *S*, we are dealing with *reciprocal* existential inseparateness. Thus, for example, the form of a property of something and the form of the subject of this property are reciprocally—and that univocally—existentially inseparate. Unilateral existential inseparateness occurs between a certain *M* and a certain *M'* if *M* is inseparate existentially in relation to *M'*, and not the reverse. Whether *M'* in this case is generally separate existentially, or whether, perhaps, its existential separateness can only be multivocally or even absolutely relative, I do not want to determine here, for the clarification of this problem will require extensive investigation separately. So, for example, the moment of redness in a certain thing (e.g., of a red rose) is unilaterally inseparate existentially from the coloration of that rose.

5. Finally, it is necessary to differentiate between existential inseparateness in the sense established here and the solely *factual*

⁶¹ This is probably the reason why Husserl treated the difference between “independent” and “dependent” parts as a formal-ontological problem. Naturally, I have spoken of “form” here in a quite *special* meaning. This word is very ambiguous, as I show elsewhere.* One of its meanings denotes “analytical” form, which is what is involved here.

* [In Chap. viii of *The Controversy*, not included here.]

coexistence of certain objects within the compass of a single whole. For example, as long as a certain red rose is "red," so long "roseness" ("being a rose") will undoubtedly coexist *purely factually* in it with "redness," and similarly, all those qualities which constitute the qualification of a certain moment of the properties pertaining to the given rose also factually coexist in it. However, the given rose does not have to be "red," and is not so in the instant when it withers completely and changes color. But "redness" (in general) also is not existentially inseparable in relation to a (determinate) "rose," since it can be the redness of a sweater, for instance, as well as the redness of a rose. Therefore, no necessity of coexistence within one and the same whole arises from the material essence of a rose and "redness." Neither is redness existentially inseparable *in relation to* "roseness," nor the reverse, although both are *factually* within the compass of the same rose, and although redness and the color red are existentially inseparable, the first materially in relation to the second, and the second formally—as a property—in relation to the rose as a subject of properties. The "factual" coexistence of a certain *individual* "redness" (of the concrete moment of a given determinate rose) with a particular "red rose" is, however, indivisible in contrast with the "divisibility" of the parts of this rose—for example, of its petals, which can be detached either from each other or from the rose—and this in the respect that thereby the rose ultimately ceases to exist, but its petals exist separately—at least for a limited period of time. Nothing of this sort is possible in the relation of the redness or red color of an individual petal to the petal itself. Moreover, this "factual" coexistence is necessary and follows from the *absolute* inseparateness of *every* individual redness and of *every* color as a concrete moment of color in relation to *anything whatever* that is colored. Furthermore, absolute inseparateness of coloration is grounded *materially* in the moment of coloration, and *formally* in being only the *moment* that *more closely* determines the concrete color of something. The cases are therefore complicated, for *diverse varieties* of existential inseparateness are *intermingled*.

Finally, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish:

A. 1. Existential inseparateness of a higher or lower degree.

2. Univocal, multivocal, and absolutely relative existential inseparateness.
3. Formal and material existential inseparateness.
4. Unilateral and reciprocal existential inseparateness.
5. Essential (genuine) existential inseparateness and the merely factual coexistence of various elements within the compass of one and the same object.

B. With all of these should be contrasted existential separateness in the absolute meaning given above.

If we do not distinguish the various cases of existential inseparateness scrupulously, it is easy for us to make mistakes, because, as I have already indicated, denying existential inseparateness of a certain kind to a determinate *M* is not equivalent to asserting that *M* is existentially separate. It would be equivalent only when a given *M* is not inseparate existentially in *any* of the meanings of inseparateness that have been differentiated. But it is not necessary when *one* of these [types of] inseparateness is not involved. A determinate object can, of course, be existentially inseparate in *one* of these meanings, and at the same time be something that is not inseparate in *another* of them. For example, "redness" is not *formally* inseparate existentially with respect to coloration, but is so *materially*—and this in the sense of univocally relative existential inseparateness. It is also very probable that different kinds of existential inseparateness do or can intersect each other variously, and that here strict apriori laws are binding. They determine which of the varieties of existential inseparateness must or can be paired with others, and which are mutually exclusive. We cannot amplify this at this point. However, it should be emphasized that when we consider what uniformities occur between moments that are existentially inseparate in different meanings and existentially separate objects, we should take note whether or not the objects involved are concurrently autonomous. Yet, because the opposition of autonomy and heteronomy is quite different from that of existential separateness and inseparateness, and is independent of it, it is not entirely evident that exactly the same relations would have to hold between autonomous objects which are existentially separate and those that are inseparate, as obtain between heteronomous ob-

jects that are, at the same time, separate, and those which are simultaneously heteronomous and inseparable. On the contrary, a closer examination would show that this [the same relation] by no means holds [in both cases]. The opposition of autonomy and heteronomy is so radical that one cannot transfer anything from one sphere to the other without considering it individually. We cannot give this more attention here.

EXISTENTIAL SELF-DEPENDENCE AND EXISTENTIAL CONTINGENCY

Within the sphere of existentially separate objects, a further important distinction must be introduced. Namely, it is possible that a certain object is existentially separate, and *in spite of this* in its essence requires for its own *existence*⁶² that of some *other* existentially separate object. We then say of it that it is existentially *contingent upon it*.⁶³ In this connection, the second object, whose existence is required by the first, can have a specific, wholly determinate essence or it can be in this respect entirely optional [unspecified]. If the *first* of these cases occurs, we are dealing with *relative* existential contingency, but if the second occurs, the existential contingency of the object is *absolute*.

Mutual existential contingency of two or more objects is also possible. However, in all these cases, the existentially contingent objects are *two separate* wholes.⁶⁴ On the other hand, if a certain existentially separate object in its essence does not require *any* existentially separate object for its existence, and, therefore, any other object at all, then it is existentially *self-dependent*

⁶² And this in the sense of *continued* existence, of *remaining* in existence, not in the sense of *coming into being*. This reservation is necessary, since otherwise there is a danger that the concepts of existential derivation and existential contingency will be confused.

⁶³ [As employed here, "contingent" means only "dependent, conditioned," and does not include the implication of chance or probability.—Tr.]

⁶⁴ Naturally, it can be said that a pair of existentially contingent objects constitute a *new* whole. However, in this case, the new whole is actually a whole of a *higher* order (it is, as I shall describe it later, an object that is *derivatively* individual), which, to be sure, has its own special properties, but at the same time is a manifold of existentially separate objects. This manifold is relative in its being to its "elements" in the sense of being existentially derivative, and is so entirely independent of whether its elements are existentially derivative or not.

in an *absolute* sense. Absolute existential self-dependence cannot be ascribed to any object whose existential contingency is relative. Absolute existential self-dependence seems to stand for something more, existentially, than existential separateness (it is "stronger" existentially).

All existentially separate objects, whose constitutive nature⁶⁵ contains an essential relativity in respect to other objects, are existentially dependent upon them. Such, for example, are father-son, husband-wife. Perhaps someone will raise the objection that a son can die although his father continues to live, or the reverse, and that therefore there is no existential contingency here. How-

⁶⁵ [The concept of the "constitutive nature" of an object is one of the most important in the author's philosophy. It is developed in Secs. 37 and 38 of *The Controversy*. The main points of his definition are summarized in the following:

Two concepts are required for the definition of an autonomous individual object: (1) properties, and (2) a subject of properties. Each is the *complement* of the other, and they should be seized together in intuition without neglecting their diversity. Their *complementarity* constitutes *the single basic form* of an autonomous individual object.

In such an object, the moment "a subject of properties" is the single point of reference (or of support) of all the properties serving it. In the structure of an object, it is expressed not only *formally*, in that properties and their forms pertain to it, but also *materialiter*, in that it possesses a *direct* qualitative (material) determination of *its own*, which is not merely that which it receives *indirectly* from the properties serving it. The form of a "subject of properties" is thus not a single form of a property, but the complex form of a *number* of properties coalescing and uniting in the same object.

The function of the "subject of properties" in an object is to spread this qualitative determination throughout the object, thus encompassing its being and its endowment uniformly. "This direct qualitative determination of the subject of *characteristics*, and therefore of the *object* itself, I call . . . the 'constitutive nature' of the object, in contrast with the generality of its properties as well as with these properties individually" (*The Controversy over the Existence of the World*, Sec. 38, p. 373).

It will thus be seen that an individual object is not merely an aggregate of properties or characteristics capable of being identified by them alone. For example, we do not "name" something by enumerating its properties: we do not say that something is "red, round, hard, smooth," and so forth; we simply call the object "a red ball." But an object's constitutive nature is frequently hidden and difficult to discern, and it is only when we do not know with "what" we are dealing that we substitute the expressions, "round, red, hard, etc." for its name (for "what" it is), as, for example, when a physician is attempting to diagnose an ailment, and is dealing with a number of symptoms which have not yet "joined together" to form a recognizable clinical entity.—Tr.]

ever, strictly speaking, this is not the question. Only the *man*, who, until his son's death, was his father, continued to live. And similarly in other instances. Thus, for example, a "husband" becomes a "widower" upon the death of his wife, and only a given man continues to live without change. Obviously, instances of existentially contingent objects are not limited to the kind of "relative" objects that have been mentioned. But it is not easy to find infallible examples, since we may not cite bare facts, and it requires extensive analysis to show "genuine" ("true") existential contingency arising from the *essence* of the given objects. However, in order to give at least some illustration of what I have in mind, as an example let us assume at this point that it is of the essence of the human organism that a human being can live only in temperatures whose range of fluctuations is very limited (several score degrees Celsius). In this case, other conditions being equal, the human organism would be relatively contingent existentially upon a source of heat capable of producing just such temperatures. Something of the same sort may be said about the human organism with respect to oxygen. We should have another instance of existential contingency if we could succeed in showing that a purely intentional—and, therefore, a heteronomous—object (1) requires the performance of certain conscious acts, not only to come into, but also to remain in, existence, and (2) that in relation to these acts it is existentially contingent formally, and is therefore "transcendent." However, all these examples have to be considered individually in this regard within the frame of material-ontological studies.

Whether different types of existential contingency are possible (such as various constitutional strata, degrees of contingency, etc.) is a question to which I shall not give more attention here, but it is one of the topics of existential ontology.

Another opposition should be differentiated from this one of existential contingency to self-dependence we have just discussed: that of an object's being *conditioned* with respect to its *properties* by other objects or states of affairs, to its being wholly unconditioned in this regard. This opposition cannot be taken up until complicated formal-ontological problems have been clarified. With other oppositions of existential moments I shall deal

also only at a later time; now I shall proceed to an attempt to construct, by means of the moments already considered, a number of concepts of being which we shall need in our subsequent investigations.

ABSOLUTE BEING — RELATIVE BEING

“Absolute being” has long been discussed [by philosophers] in opposition to “relative being.” But they have always treated it in a *metaphysical sense*, admitting or denying the actual existence of absolute being. However, in this [discussion], the concepts of absolute and of relative being have neither been elucidated nor their contents established. On the basis of the existential analyses we have made so far, we can now define, provisionally at this point, both of these concepts—obviously, in an ontological sense only. Namely, if an object is at once autonomous, existentially original, separate, and self-dependent in an absolute sense, then we say that it exists absolutely.⁶⁶ But, if in its mode of being, an object displays even one opposition to any of these existential moments, then its being is *relative*. Naturally, the concept of relativity is differentiated according to which “negative” existential moments appear together in the given “relative” mode of being. In setting up different concepts of “relative” being, all the laws of the mutual exclusion of existential moments must be observed. And the following are mutually exclusive:

1. Autonomy and heteronomy;
2. Existential separateness and inseparateness;
3. Existential originality and derivation;
4. Existential self-dependence and contingency;
5. Existential originality and heteronomy;
6. Existential self-dependence in an absolute sense and existential inseparateness;
7. Existential inseparateness and existential contingency;

⁶⁶Of course, I do not deny that there can be other concepts of absolute being. For example, Husserl’s concept of the absolute existence of pure consciousness differs from the concept I have described in the text, but this cannot be asserted with complete assurance, for Husserl never elucidated the contents of his concept. The concept of absolute being will have to be made more precise by taking additional existential moments into consideration.

8. Heteronomy and existential self-dependence in an absolute sense.

When we limit ourselves to only the four pairs of existential moments described, the number of noncontradictory concepts of "relative" being is comparatively large, especially if we further take into account the different varieties of inseparateness and existential contingency. Consequently, it is not surprising that the various treatments with which we are historically familiar, which utilized the concept of "relative being," always became involved in a variety of conceptual confusions and in the resultant difficulties—unresolvable problems and the like.

Leaving out of consideration the complications that arise from taking different [kinds of] existential inseparateness and contingency into account, and having regard for the laws of exclusion, on the basis of the differentiations made we obtain in all the eight following admissible concepts of being:

A. *Absolute Being*

I

Autonomy
Originality
Separateness
Self-dependence

B. *Relative Being*

II

Autonomy
Derivation
Separateness
Self-Dependence

III

Autonomy
Originality
Inseparateness

IV

Autonomy
Originality
Separateness
Contingency

V

Autonomy
Derivation
Separateness
Contingency

VI

Autonomy
Derivation
Inseparateness

VII

Heteronomy
Derivation
Separateness
Contingency

VIII

Heteronomy
Derivation
Inseparateness

Other combinations of the existential moments considered have been disregarded as contradictory. Also, I am not presenting any proof that the specific concepts are, or are not, contradictory. With respect to the concepts particularized, the following observations should be made:

1. As I noted in the introduction to these existential analyses, it should not be supposed that the individual modes of being distinguished here are "composed of" the existential moments specified in each case. We obtained these concepts at first view by *construction*—that is, by combining the several moments, not by analyzing *presented* modes of being. Hence, they are "real" only in so far as, on returning from the abstract to the concrete, we come upon concrete modes of being in which the existential moments listed can be intuitively distinguished in direct analysis as if they were "sunk" in the whole of the given mode of being. I shall not make this intuitive analysis. However, it should not be assumed that *only* these three or four existential moments can be discerned in concrete modes of being, and that the combinations we have made would, therefore, be sufficient in themselves to produce a concrete mode of being. On the contrary, what all these together produce are also still only certain abstractions, and we may not arrive at concrete modes of being until we take other existential moments into account. For example, in the concepts above, there are no existential moments at all that are strictly connected with the existence of objects in time. Only a separate analysis of concrete time will supply these. Hence, the concepts given here are purely tentative, and it would be premature at this point to attempt to attain to a visual apprehension of concrete modes of being. In presenting these eight concepts of "being" as purely logical possibilities, I am also not making any pre-judgment that these concepts would be realizable in the sense that it would be possible to give, for each of them, *concrete examples* of objects existing in the mode designated by the given concept. Even less am I raising the metaphysical question whether *all* the modes of being I have listed—and eventually only these—are represented in the generality of *actually* existing objects (of entities in the most general meaning of the word.) It may be that the *actual* "world," in the sense of such a generality.

of objects, is existentially *poorer* than that described by purely logical possibility. It may also be that it is considerably richer in varieties of modes of being and contains objects that have an entirely different mode of being—one not anticipated here. And finally, it may be that, on one hand, it contains only some of the modes of being given here, but, on the other, also contains some that are not here. This is possible, because, so far, we have not exhausted all the possible moments of existence. These are all only pure possibilities that could be determined only by metaphysical analysis if, at the same time, we could make substantial advances in our existential-ontological investigations. But we are in fact only at the beginning of these. In connection with this, it should not be forgotten that I am not writing this as a systematic presentation of existential ontology, but that I am selecting only the existential problems of significance in the controversy between idealism and realism.

2. The concept of “absolute being” given here represents a certain kind of existential *optimum* of the existential moments taken into consideration to this point. According to the concepts discussed so far, something existing in that mode would be the *most independent* of all entities: it could exist in this mode even if nothing else existed. Yet this still does not mean that it would not be possible for an entity to be more complete or more perfect in its being. Such a prospect opens up before us when we make an analysis of a mode of being in time. Obviously, mention of the “perfection” or of an *optimum* of being should not introduce the evaluation of an entity or of being itself into existential considerations. All the same, it seems that it would be possible to arrange different modes of being in a certain order in consideration of the positive existential moments appearing in them, and that absolute being in the meaning given above would have to stand at the head of the others, but would then contain still other “positive” existential moments that we shall bring up later.

3. Five of the seven relative modes of being are characterized by autonomy. But only two relative modes of being are possible in which the moment of existential heteronomy appears. Applied to purely intentional objects which constitute, as we know, a special case of heteronomous objects, these two modes

of being could refer primarily to the complex of their traits that characterize them *as intentional*. On the other hand, the most diverse modes of being (from absolute to heteronomous being) can appear in their *contents*, but, *nota bene*, always as intended, attributed. This will be better understood when, later, in our formal-ontological investigations, we define the contents of purely intentional objects. At the moment, it will perhaps suffice to cite as an example Hamlet, who, as one of the *characters* presented in a Shakespearian drama—that is, as an object presented in a literary work—is a purely intentional object denoted directly by the complex of meanings of the sentences in the given work, and indirectly by the creative acts of the author. However, although Hamlet is an invention, as the Danish prince performing various deeds in the court, he is represented as a *real* person. But the ghost of his father—also existentially heteronomous as an element in the stratum of represented objects—is at the same time existentially heteronomous as an apparition, a delusion (more precisely, the object of a delusion) of his son, Hamlet. In this example we see that the *content* of an intentional object can appear in various *modi existentiae*, which, moreover, are always ascribed or conferred, while on the other hand, intentional objects are always heteronomous in their intentionality. Their existential heteronomy is not affected in any way by whether or not they are denoted directly by an act of consciousness, or whether in a certain meaning-product, or, finally, whether they are denoted by an act of consciousness which itself is only heteronomous existentially in its structure qua intentional object—that is, for example, as when the ghost of Hamlet's father is the product of Hamlet's phantasy.

4. Individual modes of being are generally closely connected—as will be seen—with the form of the objects that exist in that mode. This means that there are definite a priori laws which prescribe the mode in which something that has one or another form must exist, and conversely, what forms are admitted by a determinate mode of being. I cannot discuss these questions now, because I have not yet made the pertinent formal-ontological analyses. Further, after I have done so, within the scope designated by the controversy about idealism, I shall be able to supply

only some of the laws of this kind. Nonetheless, a field of extensive systematic research opens up before us here.

Perhaps the connections between the mode of being and the form of an object seem at this time to be rather unexpected, because when we elaborated the several concepts of existential moments, we always spoke only of the object's "essence" that has to be associated with one or another existential moment. But the term "essence" of the object is being used here in a fairly loose meaning, because I have not yet had the opportunity of clarifying this formal-ontological concept. Consequently, it should not be supposed that it refers exclusively to the purely "material" ("qualitative") moments in an object, as if the form of the object did not belong to its essence. Later, we shall ascertain that in this regard the case can be various in different types of objects, and, in this connection, it will be necessary to distinguish diverse concepts of the essence of an object—among others, those in which its form also belongs to its essence. Therefore, the manner of speaking which I have employed while elaborating the concepts of individual existential moments, does not preclude that form can have significance for the mode in which an object that has a certain form exists. And further investigation will show us that actually we here come upon a series of a priori laws of connection between the form and the mode of being of an object, as I have already noted.

To avoid possible objections, it must be emphasized in advance that the laws regarding the a priori connections between the form and the mode of being of an existent are quite various, depending on whether we are dealing with a *single object* or with a whole *manifold*, a whole *domain* of objects. Thus, for instance, although the *entirety* of an objective domain is characterized by only *one* mode of existence, objects having *diverse* modes of being can appear in it. Later, I shall discuss this matter further.

5. As I have already noted, the concepts of modes of being listed above do not exhaust all the possibilities. In particular, the contrast between *individual existence* and *nonindividual existence* (ideas) is of great importance in our controversy, because the conflict between idealism and realism is concerned primarily

—and perhaps even exclusively—with individual objects. However, in order to penetrate to an individual (unitary) mode of being, it will still be necessary to elaborate other, quite different, existential moments in addition to those already described. Here we shall meet the enormous difficulties that, in the annals of philosophy, no one has known how to cope with.

6. In the case of the existential relativity of a certain object, the question always arises: To which and to what kind of object is the given object relative? To answer this question, it is generally necessary to examine *both* of the objects involved. Then, not only their modes of being but also their forms must be examined. Consequently, it is essential that we carry out our existential-ontological investigations in close connection with the remaining ontological problems, and that we concurrently proceed from the concrete objective cases in which the object of interest to us participates in a given instance. These circumstances will make the course of our investigation considerably more difficult.

Chapter IV

TIME AND MODES OF BEING

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING CONCRETE TIME

MY EXISTENTIAL-ONTOLOGICAL inquiries have been so general to this point that the concepts of existence obtained go considerably beyond the realm that is of especial interest to us here—that is, beyond the real world. The result has been that so far I have not discussed some existential moments at all, and, when I set up the eight concepts of being presented above, I could not grasp their modes of existence fully. Up to this time, I have treated questions of existence, among others, in such a way as if time had no bearing at all on the mode of being of an object, and so as if “being in time” or “temporality,” on the one hand, and “timelessness” on the other, had nothing in common with the *existence* of an object, but determined the object in some material or formal way only.¹ However, the question arises whether the case is not completely the reverse, and whether, consequently, “being in time” does not belong to the innermost core of the mode of being of temporal objects.² We are not concerned here with a question which would belong to a *general* theory of time or to a *general* theory of being. I am concerned with a special problem which is of the liveliest interest to us in an investigation of the mode of being of the real world. For the real world, taken as we grasp it

¹ It is significant that with Kant time is a *form*, albeit only of “intuition,” but it appears within the domain of the world of “phenomena” (*Erscheinungen*) as the form of the intuited appearance of a thing-in-itself. This treatment of time as a certain form long had repercussions on philosophical reflections on the nature of time.

² It is impossible to predict in advance whether there is only one temporally determined mode of being or whether there are several. This problem can be resolved only through an investigation of the essence of time and its possible variants.

in everyday, prephilosophical experience, seems to be—irrespective of whether or not this view is true—organized in such a way that everything whatever that appears in its domain is in some way temporal or somehow connected with time. It may be that this is only some sort of “transcendental illusion”—for example, in the Kantian sense. But, in any event, it is impossible to ignore the problem of time in an examination of this controversy. And all the more so, since, on the contrary, the problem of time, arising from different experiences of time itself, leads to a variety of conceptions of reality and to the conflict between idealism and realism.³ Obviously, I am treating the problem of time here only as it bears on the relation of time to modes of being—to real being particularly.

I am speaking of “time” here only as *concrete* time *in contrast with* (1) *abstract* time defined by means of mathematical symbols, and physical time in particular, and (2) *ordinary* time—that is, the kind of time by which the many concrete times of individual objects are *compared*. Concrete time is likewise *filled* time, in contrast with the *empty* time of mathematical designations. That is, concrete time is “filled” with what happens, takes effect, or endures “in it.”⁴ Whether this time is homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether it is propertyless or qualitatively determined—these are questions which can be properly formulated and solved only with the framework of a general theory of time. Yet, it can be said that concrete time—to which I intend to devote my attention—is *absolute* in the sense that it is the time of the object *itself* which exists in it, if the object exists at all; and it is not somehow only subjectively conditioned, as if it were imposed on the object from without as a temporal form that, in its essence, is

³I *attempted* to demonstrate this in a lecture entitled “Man and Time,” presented at the Ninth International Philosophical Congress in Paris in 1937,* and particularly in a somewhat expanded Polish version of that paper, published in the *Przegląd Filozoficzny* (*The Philosophical Review*), Vol. XLI. After the War, I published this work, supplemented by new observations, in *Twórczość* (*Creativity*), Cracow, 1946, Vol. II.

* [See “Der Mensch und die Zeit,” *Congrès Descartes*, 1937, Vol. VIII, pp. 129-136.—Tr.]

⁴What this “in” signifies in the phrase, “to exist in time,” is a separate problem which—so it seems to me—no one has properly understood, and, by the same token, solved.

foreign to it—as, for example, time in the Kantian sense.⁵ In this connection, the frequently discussed opposition between time that is “experienced” and that which is “not experienced” is of no especial importance to us. Concrete time, under consideration here, is “experienced” when it is the time of a certain experiencing subject; but it is “not experienced” if it is the time of an object alien to any consciousness. For it is always the time of a given, temporally determined object, belonging in its essence to it, and is in a certain sense immanent in the object, although the object somehow is naturally present in time, extending through it or being in it, and not the opposite. At this point I cannot consider more fully what the relation is between concrete time and other “times.”

All individual objects can be divided into two main classes: (1) temporally determined objects, and (2) extratemporal objects (specifically, ideal). It is difficult to state definitely on what timelessness depends. And an attempt to explain it fully would take us considerably beyond the range of our problems. Therefore, I shall limit myself here to an attempt to explain the role of temporal determination in the mode of being of objects that are temporally determined; for the time being, I shall treat timelessness in a purely negative way as the opposite that excludes all temporal determination. Of course, various concepts of ideal being or of ideas underlie this. I shall return to this matter in my formal-ontological investigations.

But, among temporally determined objects, there are several basic *types*, according to which their modes of being are differentiated, along with the kind of temporal determination as well as its form. These are: (1) objects enduring in time, (2) processes, and (3) events.⁶ I shall examine these more closely.

⁵ Whether things (and processes) that *really exist*, do exist in such absolute time, is another question I shall not solve here. I am speaking only of a determinate *idea* of absolute time, in the meaning indicated.

⁶ I have already discussed these distinctions in my paper, “Von formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes” (“The Formal Structure of Individual Objects”), *Studia Philosophica*, Vol I, Lemberg, 1935. In the present work, I am attempting to penetrate several points more deeply and to grasp the diversity of the contrasted types of objects. I shall take up these questions again in formal-ontological studies.

THE MODE OF BEING OF EVENTS

The occurrence of a certain state of affairs or of a certain objective situation constitutes an event. For example, the collision of two bodies, the arrival of a train at a station, the lighting of a lamp, the death of a man: these are events. It is true that in colloquial speech we use the word "event" in a much broader and freer meaning. For example, we speak of a battle as a certain historical event, as we do of the victory of a particular army in a specific military campaign against another army, and the like. We then actually have in mind relatively short-lived *incidents*, which are distinguished by internal cohesion and the mutual appurtenance of their phases, and we contrast these with sequences (processes) of longer duration. If the former are conceived as "events," this is done, not because of the character of these so-called events as "processes," but rather because of the state of affairs ultimately realized through them, which either is of special importance or is taken to be. Not the *winning through* to victory, which often takes fairly long and is achieved through many long-continued battles, but the victory itself—the final result of these struggles—is what we have in view. But, because it is regarded as the conclusion of a particular composite process, an "event" [in this meaning] also encompasses the entire process leading to the given result, and, therefore, a certain whole which *de facto* consists of many events accessory to each other. Strictly speaking, however, these sequences, even though they are of short duration, nevertheless *last* through a certain time, and for this very reason should not be classed as events. For the characteristic of events is that they have no duration. They take place and thereby cease to exist. They are the end, the result, of processes, or their beginning. A process somehow leads to events and they, concluding the process, are then something entirely new in relation to it. However, an event is not the state of affairs produced by a certain development, since this state of affairs can itself be of longer or shorter duration. For example, if after the termination of a war between two countries, a peace is made, which, consistent with the treaty signed, produces a certain political situation between the two countries, it is not the situation which, after the conclusion of the peace, can last many years, that is an event,

but it is the occurrence itself of a state of peace between the two countries under determinate conditions, or the fact that this political situation *has come into existence*, that is an event. The occurrence of something, its *coming into being*, the actualization of a certain state of affairs: this is what constitutes an event. And this occurrence, this incident, this emergence into existence of a certain state of affairs, can be effected only *in one instant*. This naturally does not preclude that an event may be *in preparation* in a development (process) taking place through a certain period of time (frequently even fairly long), or that what is realized through the event be a situation that is a state of longer duration. On the contrary, both the first and the second are usually associated with an event. In general, there can be no events which would take place without any preparation in processes, and which would not have any after-effects⁷ (even though brief and insignificant) in the form of a certain lasting condition, or of some new process, or even of a number of processes. In this lies the peculiar *existential dependence* of events, to which I shall return when I discuss their form. At the moment, we are concerned only with elucidating their *mode of being*. This hinges upon their "coming into being" and on their "passing" immediately—both the first and the second occur in *one instant*. Yet, in saying this, I am not maintaining that the existence of an event is "punctual."⁸ Whether it actually is depends on the answer to the question whether instants are only "positions" in a one-dimensional temporal continuum, such as would be required by a mathematico-geometrical concept of time, or whether, on the contrary, they are individual units of time which stand out distinctly in a time sequence. Now the latter, on the basis of a phenomenological analysis of time, appears to be the more probable. In any case, an event does not ex-

⁷Colloquially, the word "event" is often used to denote an occurrence having exceptionally important or significant consequences, or which itself is somehow valuable. But I am using this word in a very broad meaning, and, therefore, without regard for any value or significance an event might have.

⁸In general, this word, taken in its exact meaning in geometry, should not be applied to an instant of time, as time is foreign to spatiality, and especially to spatial extension. Its application to time is an unwarranted *geometrization of time*, against which Bergson took a decided stand in his day.

tend beyond the span of a *single concrete now*. Perhaps some would prefer to express this as the "cessation" of an event's existence, instead of its "passing." However, here again it is necessary to proceed cautiously, because there are different concepts and experiences of time, which lead to diverse conceptions of an event's "ceasing" to exist. As I have noted elsewhere,⁹ according to *one* experience of time, everything that exists temporally is limited to only one "now," conceived as nondimensional, and beyond which there are, as it were, two abysses of absolute nonbeing. According to the *second* experience, however, the past exists in its own way, as does the future. Time is not a force that destroys being. In considering events, it is not especially important which of these conceptions of time we affirm, since events in their very nature cannot *endure*. Nevertheless, consistent with the first experience of time, they would absolutely cease to exist as soon as the present, in which they took place, passed; on the other hand, consistent with the second experience, it would be necessary to take into account some sort of existence of events after they have taken place. Once they have come into being, events, it is true, do not endure, because other events dislodge them, so to speak, from being (actual). But, once having taken place, events nevertheless belong in some way to the world in which they occurred. The world to which they belong and which is indispensable to their occurrence contains not only other events with which these are more or less closely connected, but also objects enduring through a certain period of time, and processes developing in time, which, although also transient, are "linked" with these events in one way or another. This world *persists longer* than the individual events. However, they belong to its "history." They have a determinate place not only in a given present, but, in addition, after their occurrence, within the realm of all that which was "then" when they were taking place. But, after they occur, events—in contrast with objects enduring in time—do not continue to exist with these objects, but as past are connected with them only *through their after-effects*. They can be detected *ex post* only by taking the actual present as our point

⁹ See my paper, "Man and Time," already mentioned.

of departure and seeking their consequences or the objects that are connected with them. Through their after-effects—especially their results—they contribute to the determination of the later state of the world, and, through this, give evidence of their at one time consummated existence. Because they are limited to *one* instant of effective existence, the essence of time is only partially revealed in their mode of being, namely, only in *actuality*,¹⁰ which distinguishes the present. This “actuality,” which permeates not only events, but also everything whatever that is *now*, is something which transcends the autonomy of an object. This means that self-existence is indeed the indispensable *condition* for actuality, but does not suffice to make something present, or, by itself, to constitute actuality. There are no events in the realm of *ideal* individual objects (timeless), not only because nothing happens there, nothing changes, but also because this peculiar actuality of the present is not possible in that realm. Actuality is also one of the moments of existence. Consequently, it is difficult to grasp and to describe it. Only by means of comprehensive analyses of concrete time will it be possible to make it perceivable and to contrast it clearly with other moments. At this point, I am confining myself to the statement that events are actual throughout, and that for this very reason they exist only within the compass of a *single* present; hence, they bear the imprint of the *unity* of that present in which they take effect. After they occur, they reveal their former existence only through their belonging to the world that endures longer than they, and which contains their after-effects. This is the *second*, the derivative, and now the nonactual mode of their existence.

Yet, does not the instantaneousness of events, and therefore the circumstance that they are deprived of duration, exclude

¹⁰ I use this term in order to refer to the long-standing traditional term for expressing *in actu esse*. However, in using it, I do not want to burden it with the various metaphysical theories that have been associated with this concept. As far as possible, I shall try to explain what it depends on. Duns Scotus employed the concept of “actuality” (*actualitas*) in the meaning, as I understand it, of equivalence to “reality.” Special research would be required, however, to establish accurately the relation of the concept which I am trying to develop here, to the concept used by Duns Scotus. I cannot undertake this here.

them from temporality?¹¹ How is it possible to regard something that has no duration as nevertheless temporal? Or conversely: if events are indeed temporal, then must they not by that fact endure through some, even very short, time?

It appears that the instantaneousness of events cannot be validly questioned. For instantaneousness (deprivation of duration) does not preclude temporal determination in any way. However, for this to be comprehensible, time and that which fills it cannot be regarded as two *separate* entities, and as if they were *external to each other*, with time as a certain kind of *empty* tunnel, for example, which can be filled by any object *whatever*,¹² and that which fills it—i.e., an event in particular—as something which in itself is timeless and indifferent to time, and as something which being itself a “plenum” can be inserted into an “empty” space in this “tunnel.” Consequently, events cannot be conceived as entities which only *secondarily* become loosely and accidentally connected with each other. This way of conceiving concrete time and that which fills it is not consonant with the essence of concrete time. Moreover, it is of the peculiar essence of time that it is not something that would be *imposed* upon an entity *from outside*, or as something which could be separated from that which happens or takes place in it (unfolds, extends, as does a process), or which endures in it. If only we hold to this, it is not so difficult to understand how events, despite their momentariness, can be temporal or temporally determined. An event is closely bound (fused) in two ways with the instant in which it occurs, and to a certain extent bears the stamp of that moment’s unity and specificity. This is because, first, it is always connected with a certain system of contemporaneous events. For no events are strictly isolated. This is inherent in the form of the world as a domain of being of a special kind. Second, it is because a given instant distinguishes itself by a peculiarity, a uniqueness, which

¹¹ Dr. I. Dąmbska posed this question to me after reading these observations in manuscript in the winter of 1941-42. Her question was intended as doubting the instantaneousness of events.

¹² Using this analogy, K. Ajdukiewicz once attempted to describe “absolute” time. See *Księga pamiątkowa dla K. Twardowskiego (Essays in Honor of K. Twardowski)*, Lemberg, 1922.

can neither be more fully elucidated nor further reduced (it is "unique of its kind"), and this singularity permeates everything whatever that in general exists in it.¹³

However, the essence of concrete time without doubt is expressed much more fully in the mode of being of other types of temporally determined objects, chiefly in processes.

THE MODE OF BEING OF PROCESSES

As an example of a process, we can take a determinate, concrete motion of a body in space, such as a 100-meter dash by some athlete in a sporting contest, the development of an organism, the life of a certain person, and all acts and activities of a physical as also of a psychophysical nature, and the like.

In every process (e.g., in a determinate movement) it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, a continuous manifold of phases which unceasingly expands as long as the process is in operation, and, on the other hand, the object which, with the passage of time, is being constituted in these phases as the specific subject of the properties constituting the given process. The first and the second, however, are the same entity, forming, as it were, its different "sides."

The general constituent property of a process as an object is

¹³ The concept of "event" is used in contemporary philosophy by A. N. Whitehead. Unfortunately, his works were not available to me during the war. After the war, I had the use of his book, *Process and Reality*, for a certain time. In so far as I was able to orient myself, my concept of "event," which derives rather from the usual understanding of this word, is not congruent with Whitehead's concept of an "event," although undoubtedly there is some relation between the two. Whitehead defines it thus: "I shall use the term 'event' in the more general sense of a nexus of actual occasions inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum. An actual occasion is a limiting type of event with only one member" (*op. cit.*, p. 113). And: "It is sufficient to say that a molecule in the sense of a moving body, with a history of local change, is not an actual occasion: it must therefore be some kind of nexus of actual occasions. In this sense it is an event, but not an actual occasion" (*ibid.*, p. 114). Having regard for Whitehead's definition of an "actual entity" ("occasion"), it is difficult to orient myself as to what he had in view when he spoke of an "event." But it may be assumed that only some very complex events or, eventually, processes, as I define them, would come under his term "event." In any case, as far as I have been able to ascertain, Whitehead does not touch upon the existential dissimilarity of "events," "processes," and "enduring objects," as I conceive them. I shall return to this matter in Vol. II of *The Controversy*.

that it is a temporally extensive aggregate of phases. This means that (1) phase after phase, from the initial one to the final one, takes place in *continually new* periods of time, and (2) the aggregation of phases *constantly increases* until the process comes to an end, and in its essence—in contrast with an event—cannot be contained in *one instant*, in *one “now.”* Further, it transcends every segment that is a portion of the time through which the whole process runs. A process, expanding in time, unfolds. The aggregate of phases, *complete* after the whole process has unfolded, is *composed of* phases that are its *potential parts*. Thus, there are simple processes and complex ones. In a *simple* process, all the parts of the system of its phases are potential, which means that there are no sharp demarcations between them: they melt into each other continuously. But in a complex process, there are at least two discrete, “true” (effective) parts of the totality of the phases. There are intervals in it (at least one). In this case, time filled by a process contains empty intervals in which no phase of the given aggregate of phases is found. It can also be said that a process is composed in this case of many *discrete* processes, but here there is always some reason (eventually a cause, e.g., the operation of some force) which permits these individual processes to be regarded as parts of a *single* composite system.

Second, every determinate process being constituted in the succession of phases as a *subject* of properties has this property essential to it, that the phases of which it is composed *are continuously transient*. *This continuous transience of the phases constitutes their particular mode of being.* This [mode] is essentially connected with the temporality of a process, and is characterized by the following moments: (1) *One and only* phase is always¹⁴ actual; (2) *one new phase after another is always becoming actual*; (3) an actual phase is continually *losing* its actuality and a new phase, just then oncoming, is *becoming* actual; (4) in the instant that the then actual phase occurs, the phases antecedent to it are already extinct (more accurately, they are no longer actual), but have *existed* previously, while the phases subsequent to it are *not yet* in existence, but *are going to*

¹⁴ “Always” means during the entire development of the process.

exist (will be actual); (5) in that instant when the *last* phase attains actuality, the process has already passed. But not every process has to have a final phase.

The essence of time is revealed to a substantially higher degree in the mode of being of an aggregate of the phases of a process (particularly in the transience of the phases) than in the mode of being of an event. The totality of the phases of a process transcends every present and the phase contained in that present, and encompasses a certain segment of the past and also of the future—naturally as long as the process is still unfolding. Once it has taken place, *all its phases belong to the past and none of them are actual any more*. This also means that the process is finished.

The mode of being of an aggregate of the phases of a process should be defined according to that experience of time, of those I have differentiated, which reveals the true essence of time. Namely, if we come to the conclusion, on [the basis of] a general theory of time, that *nothing* exists—in the strict meaning of the word—except that which is contained in the *present*, and both the past and the future are merely two abysses of absolute nonbeing (nothingness),¹⁵ it will then be necessary, applying this to the totality of the phases of a system, to say that it is limited to each actual phase, with the consequence—according to the geometric-point concept of time—that even a phase would have to contract, as it were, to a *dividing point* between the nothingness of the past phases and the nothingness of the phases which are yet to come. Then, obviously, nothing could be said either about the *increase* in the aggregation of phases during the course of the process or about the magnitude it would ultimately attain. The process would then, through its phases, change into a multiplicity of events. It would be difficult, however, to conceive this multiplicity as collocated without discontinuity in a certain period of time, and therefore as a manifold everywhere compact and continuous. For this implies the existence of a “period of time” (a so-called “interval” of time). Meanwhile, the conception of time under consideration at this point allows actually for the existence of always only *one single point in time*—just that one which is

¹⁵ One is reminded here of Plato's saying that individual things are between being and nonbeing.

now. On what, then, would depend the "passing" of the phases or of the whole process? For then there would also be no "phases," but at most only individual events, which, owing to their peculiar properties, would, so to speak, order themselves in potential manifolds or sets. "Transience" would be nothing but the "coming into being" of certain events in a determinate *order* of succession. Strictly speaking, there would be, not a continuous series, but merely a determinate (potential) manifold¹⁶ of separate ("discrete") *events* which, under appropriate conditions would *imitate* or simulate the course of a process, although it would be essentially different from it.¹⁷ Similarly, for example, a series of lamps appropriately arranged in space, when lighted one after another in succession, can produce the *appearance* of the *continuous* motion of a *single* lamp shining for a certain period of time, but can never be *identified* with it. Moreover, the appearance of a continuous motion is successfully produced, as we know, only because a continuous process, both physiological and psychological, is taking place. It depends—especially psychologically—on the "picture" of a previously lighted lamp's remaining preserved through a certain period of time after its lighting as a so-called after-picture that blends with the "picture" of the lamp just being lighted. An illusion of the existence of a continuous process in the objective occurrence of a number of events in succession is successfully produced only when the very thing is realized that we have to *exclude* from the conception of time now being considered: namely, that something past, although it has ceased to be strictly actual, has not been completely annihilated, but retains, in spite of everything, some distinct, special mode of existence; it does not break off with each new instant of time, but extends into the continuation of that same process.

In other words, an exact grasp of the essence of a process as

¹⁶ "Potential" aggregate or group, since then, out of the entire process, there would be *one and only one* event in the actuality of each present. Only for someone who could somehow look back in imagination on what has passed, and ahead to what will exist, could there be constituted a potential aggregate or group—and that only as something thought of, but not existing concretely.

¹⁷ Incidentally, it should be noted that Dedekind's conception of the continuum as punctual, which prevails in contemporary mathematics, is itself influenced by the conception of time we are examining at this point, and is not capable of representing the true nature of continuity.

a continuously increasing aggregation of the passing phases of an occurrence of a certain determinate kind (e.g., a motion, the qualitative change of one color of some object into another, and the like), is possible only when the concept of time is based on the *second* of the experiences of time distinguished here, and, therefore, on that one according to which it is indeed actuality that distinguishes the present (or something in the present) from the past (from something past), and from the future (from something in the future), and according to which neither the past nor the future is an absolute void. Of course, it is extremely difficult—even from the position of existential pluralism—to grasp the specific moment of the mode of being of the future. That which is past has already “passed” through the phase of actuality, and is that which at one time *was* the present. But that which is future has not yet arrived at the phase of actuality, and therefore has not yet become a *fact*. Furthermore, it is of the essence of what is future that it *does not have to be actualized* in a present,¹⁸ while, on the other hand, the past cannot in general be conceived as something which would not have been actualized in some present. Then it would not be the past. It is only this actualization, realization, in a *certain entirely specific way*, which makes it *become* the past.¹⁹ Transience as a mode of being is contingent not only upon something else’s becoming present and actual in the place of something which was just present, but above all on the *perpetual transformation* of the actuality of something present into that enigmatic “no-longer-being-present-any-more,” while, at the same time, it *subsists in some mode of being* in the past as something of the past. This transformation—the ultimate essence of temporality, or better, of existence in time—naturally is not acci-

¹⁸ Nicolai Hartmann expresses a different opinion regarding this question in his article, “Zeitlichkeit und Substantialität,” *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*, Vol. XII, 1938.

¹⁹ At this point, the thought strikes us for the first time that not every actualization, or not every actual being, involves transience, but only an entirely *special* mode of actualization which has the closest connection with reality and effects the creation of the present and its transformation into the past—and thereby leads to temporality. It will be necessary to clarify this special mode of actualization in contrast with actuality that does not involve time (as, eventually, a more perfect mode of being) if we are to comprehend the kernel of the essence of reality as a mode of existence. This will have to be explored in further existential research.

dental, but is a certain kind of imperfection in something that exists in this mode—an imperfection which is closely connected with the *impossibility of its persisting in actuality (of maintaining actuality) without sinking into the past*. It occurs to us to conceive this continuous transience as a passing from autonomy to heteronomy. Although this notion at first glance appears to be very probably the case, it is erroneous. Certainly, what is strictly in the present is concurrently self-existent, since, as we have seen, its actuality implies existential autonomy. However, it still does not follow from this that what is no longer present should *eo ipso* have to be heteronomous. Perhaps this idea is more applicable to something in the future and to the future itself. We should thus obtain a new case of heteronomous objects: what is future is predetermined and prefigured by what is present, but not always by it—sometimes also by something already past. Often that something in the future also determines something else which is to occur in the future, but itself takes its determination from a certain present. At any rate, however, it has its existential foundation in something “prior” to it.²⁰ Naturally, heteronomy does not exhaust the mode of being of the future and is by no means characteristic of it. Yet, if something is to be realized in a present, it must lose its heteronomy. On the other hand, something past, which was autonomous in a certain previous present before it became past, does not lose and cannot lose its existential autonomy, but only its actuality. Otherwise, it would prove to be “illusory”—that is, something which never really existed. We can try to bring to light in this connection at least one moment of actuality, although it may be that it does not constitute its whole essence: The actual is characterized by being *directly active*, or, expressed differently, by *action (operancy)*.²¹ It exists on account of the fact (by the

²⁰ We are speaking here of exact determination in advance by *facts* which belong to *the same realm of being*, and not of the *intentional* determination of the future in an *act of anticipation*. This sort of thing indubitably exists also; but not everything in the future must be anticipated by someone and therefore designated intentionally. And not everything we anticipate is in the future (this means unfulfilled hopes). An intentional determination, moreover, does not produce a basically new case of existential heteronomy.

²¹ [“Operancy” is used here to reproduce the meaning of a neologism in the Polish original. For this purpose it should be understood as meaning the *quality* of being operative—that is, of acting, producing an effect.—Tr.]

fact) that it is active (efficient?); consequently, it is also creative to a certain extent: it can call another entity into being, although it does not always do this.²² Only because actuality contains this "operancy" can a causal connection occur within the compass of the present, although not everything that appears in the present is or can be a cause or an effect.

At this point the objection could be raised that while it is true that every actual entity is distinguished by activity (operancy), this activity is not an existential moment, but something that pertains to the *material* essence of the entity. Now, it must be admitted that the *particular varieties* of activity (operancy) which lead to diverse kinds of action, do belong to the material determination of real existents; yet "operancy" itself, distinguishing that which is present from that which is past, constitutes a primary moment of present existence itself. The particular modes of the activity of a present object are closely connected with it, since only this [operancy] is what permits all of them *to be realized*. It is as if it were the condition that makes their occurrence possible and at the same time reaches out beyond action alone, since it pervades *everything* that is actual—regardless of its form or material determination—and that as the actual in the present. As a genuine moment of existence, it is not an endowing or attributive moment of an existent, but pertains to the manner in which everything real, in shaping and filling the present, consummates its existence and at the same time loses it.

When I speak of the "consummation" of the real in the actuality of the present, I am not misusing this word. On the contrary, I am referring to a particular term in living language which we frequently use when we have in mind that specific contrast between the present (something present) and something which is only adumbrated in the future—it will be fulfilled in a future present. What was only foreshadowed in the future is "consum-

²² This new entity in this case can have a different form. If the actual is an event, then what issues from it can be an event or the beginning of a process. But if it [the actual] is a phase of a process (of a development), the entity brought into existence (engendered) by it is, as a rule, only another phase of the same system. It is "different" only in that it is completely *new* in relation to the generating phase, but emerges from it continuously, and thus is a phase of the same development.

mated" in the present. For one reason, this is because what was heteronomous in the future acquires autonomy in the present, and thereby immanence of the qualities determining it. But this autonomy is only a condition of actuality. Now it appears that in addition to the moment of activity (operancy), actuality also contains a moment of a certain peculiar "plenitude" of being, of *efficiency*, in what it is as well as of what it is.²³ At one time, when the phrase *in actu esse* was used, it undoubtedly contemplated this fullness, this efficiency, and the fact that the reality of the present is a certain kind of "attainment"—one would like to say a "realization." This plenitude, this efficiency, may not be complete or perfect, and may be *lost* forthwith in passing, as [is the case] with all temporal entities; nonetheless, it is for temporal existence a certain culmination, a summit, unattainable in any other form.²⁴ Therefore, *carpe diem* [enjoy the present] (in the *positive* meaning of this saying), rejoice in what you have, in what is actually incarnated, and grieve that it will never be again, that it will not return. This irreversibility is likewise something that characterizes every event and every process. Even though a completely identical event or processes were to take place (which is doubtful), it would be a completely *new* event or a *new process*—not the same one!

I have said that the actual is distinguished by *immediate* activity (operancy). By using this more exact definition of activity, I have sought to avoid a particular objection. Namely, it seems that not only the actual in the present is distinguished by activity, for the past also can act. This happens in the human domain especially, and in a more general way in the sphere of organic life: How many and how important are the acts we perform under the pressure of the past. Actually, we are constantly bound by it, often through facts that occurred in a comparatively remote past. If we had not had certain experiences at one time, we should not be ashamed today to conduct ourselves in one way and not in a different one. We feel the constraint of the

²³ ["In what it is" refers to the *nature* of the object (e.g., "it" is a table); "of what it is," to its *qualities* (e.g., it is "round").—Tr.]

²⁴ The very expressive Latin "consummatum est" corresponds to the Polish "dopełniło się" ("is fulfilled").

past on ourselves in changing, troubled times especially. And if we free ourselves from it, we sometimes experience this as a deliverance, as an act of emancipation (as Bergson conceived it), but, at other times, as a betrayal to the extent that we have not succeeded in satisfying the requirements established for us by our own pasts. In these requirements, in these restrictions, the activity of the past is evidenced. Either the past, therefore, is distinguished by activity, in which case activity—which, according to the foregoing analysis, is a certain feature of reality—would not be a characteristic of the present along with actuality; or, activity reaches beyond actuality, and therefore would be its characteristic feature. In either case, we have a contradiction of the statements previously made.

Consequently, a certain caution is imperative if we ascribe activity to something past. It is also difficult to concede that something past acts, *sensu stricto*. It appears that two questions should be differentiated here. Either it is the case that it is not the past alone that affects us and our current decisions, or it is the case that it does not do so directly. Above all, something past should be distinguished from something that presents itself to us as past, and which frequently is even given in recollection and makes its appearance in it. In the latter case, recollection is the intermediary between something in the past and a new present to which the recollection (recalling to oneself) belongs as something actual itself. In some measure, recollection reactualizes the past and by its *own* activity invests what is remembered, if not with genuine actuality, at least with the external appearance of it. But something past, through the very fact that it has become “past,” is itself *excluded* from every new present, and can never be [in a] present (*gegenwärtig*) again—which has the meaning, among others, of [being] present.²⁵ It is condemned to absence from every new present forever. And no recollection, not even the most vivid and accurate, can succeed in extracting it from that absence and in making it present again.

²⁵ [In the original, the two Polish words for “present”—for which there is but the one counterpart in English—make the distinction intended here between “present” as a reference to time, and “present” meaning here, in view, at hand, in fact or person.—Tr.]

It is true that recollection "makes it present," although it can never make it effectively present. For something made present in recollection never attains that being *given in itself* that is characteristic of perception. On the other hand, however, appearance in a materialization through recollection is something essentially more than an appearance (visualization) in simple imagination, even the most vivid and graphic. It is as if we attempt through recollection to draw what has passed out of the past, and to bring it nearer to a new present; and although we can never *realiter* succeed in doing so—because this would be in principle a negation of the essence of the past, of what has already taken place, been consummated (the unconquerable power of time is also revealed in this fact!)—recollection does extract at least a semblance of animation, a revivification, of what is recalled. And as a "recollection," as the *concrete correlate* of the recollection *now here* (present now), something past can develop new activity in a new present *indirectly*. Yet, this is not the past itself, but only its *visualization in recollection*—that which is recollected *as such*. It acquires activity and thereby a certain determinate effect on what takes place in the present; however, it does not do this directly, but only through the *medium* of recollection.

Yet the past, in the strict meaning of this word, can, of course, influence the contents of a new present in still another, indirect, way, in which it does not assume the quasi-actuality of the recollected; namely, through the *intermediary* of a fissureless multiplicity of present phases, which simultaneously separate it from a new present and connect it with it. For the past was at one time actual as something present at that time; it could generate a new existent from itself, which in turn generated another new existent, and so on. Thus it is the *source* of a fact which occurs in a present that is remote from it and radically *separated* from it. In this case, too, one cannot speak of the *direct* action or activity of the past itself, since it possesses the capacity to act indirectly only because it was at one time something *present*, and, just on this account, something actual.

From various approaches we have arrived at certain conclusions in this analysis. On the one hand, the peculiar *activity* of the present, which the past loses irretrievably, has been revealed, while, on the other hand, we have become more clearly

aware of the past's *radical transcendence* of (absence from) every new present—a transcendence which nothing can surmount, not even the most faithful and vivid recollection. Something that has passed is *gone irrevocably* and sinks *deeper and deeper* into the past—that is, through the continually new presents which have changed into the past, it becomes farther and farther removed from each actual present. It has lost forever its own primordial activity that it had when it was still not past, but was present, or has left it to other presents. Something past *exists in its own special, essentially—one might say—faded way, only because some other actual object, derived from it is now present, that in actu est*. Here a peculiar *reversal of the original existential relationship* comes about between something past and something that is present at this very moment. When that past something was at one time actual, it was the source of the existence of something else which was then only approaching, and later became actual and present. And now, when the latter becomes actual, although it is existentially *derived* from that past something, it becomes its existential support: it keeps that something in the past in existence, in nonactual, although self-existent, being—and this as a condition of its own existence. The past, being radically transcendent in relation to an actual existent capable of acting in the present, remains in the realm of being because it conditioned and generated the present existent. But the past something remains in existence only as—so to speak—a *retrogressively derivative* entity—namely, as secondarily derivative, proceeding “backwards” from a certain actual existent subsequent to it. Since this existential derivation becomes, in the course of time, more and more indirect in relation to what is actually existing now, the range—if it may be so described—of the past existent consequently diminishes. Gradually, the deeper it sinks into the unfathomable depths of the “*dead*” past, the fewer its traces in the present.

As is evident from what we have said, the connection of the past with the present is not, it appears, equally close (strict) in all cases. It seems to be considerably looser between events than it is between separate phases of one and the same process. And because events exist only within the compass of *one* present, their identity is split between the past and the present.

When some event appears in the past and the present, we are

then always dealing with two events which, even if the first event is the condition or indirect cause of the second, do not create the primary unity of a *single* whole. In the case of different phases of a single simple process, of which one belongs to the past and the second is now occurring, these are also, to be sure, two different phases, but, in the effective unfolding of a simple process, they are only *potential* phases (parts), and belong to a *single* whole. This connection is still closer in the case of objects that endure in time, and in things particularly. Here the identity of the object is preserved intact, and depends, as will later appear, upon a different factor than does that of a process.²⁶ On the other hand, there are cases in which something past has *no* existential connection with anything in the present, namely, if that which is present is not existentially derivative from a given past object, and especially if it is causally independent of it. Some lines of development are snapped off, so to speak, or die out; a certain present subsequent to them cannot be traced back to them.

All these are cases which will have to be discussed further when the various *formal* relations that are possible between objects belonging to a certain manifold are considered. We mentioned this only to point out that there are certain *existential* distinctions among various objects belonging to the past. Namely, if something past is always a retrogressively derivative entity in relation to the present, and if that derivation can be close and strict in varying degrees, then, within the frame of the past, there are particular *existential gradations*, or if one prefers, *degrees of intensity* of being.²⁷ From what is by comparison the highest

²⁶ It should therefore be remembered that the assertions made here about the past apply either to past events, to past phases of processes, or to previous states of objects that endure in time, and do not refer to enduring objects themselves, and to any of these that have lasted through the passage of time up until the present moment. Cf. my deductions regarding objects enduring in time (pp. 124ff.). [The problem of the identity of objects is analyzed in Chap. xv of *The Controversy*.]

²⁷ I am employing the expression "intensity of being" only for the lack of a better one. In any event, we are not concerned here with the view which has often made its appearance in the annals of philosophy, that the "degrees" of being are related to the number of properties (attributes) an entity has. Spinoza wrote in his *Ethics* (Part I, Prop. 9): "The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes belong to it."

intensity of being of something which has just passed and is connected by thousands of threads with the present, through the gradually fading intensity of the being of something of whose existence fewer and fewer traces are found in a certain present, we come to the imperceptible intensity (and perhaps even to none at all) of the completely dead past,²⁸ which, as of a certain present, leaves no further traces of its previous existence and consequently cannot even be indirectly deciphered from them (at least at this time). These distinctions relating to existential intensity are difficult to grasp in their peculiar essence. For this reason, this conception of the past's intensity of being may meet with substantial resistance on the part of readers, chiefly because this "intensity" is something which does not appear in the frame of the *present*, in which there is nothing that corresponds to it. An analogue to it is found, however, in the sphere of the *possible* and of the *future*, although we are then no longer in the domain of existentially autonomous objects.²⁹ And perhaps it is considerably easier to grasp the corresponding distinctions here, because we are generally accustomed to speak of "faint" or "strong" possibilities, to "weigh" possibilities, and so on.

However, let us return for a time to the definition of the mode of being of an aggregate of the phases of a process that is unfolding. This can be described as follows: From the first moment of the process in progress, *one* of its phases is found in the *actuality* of the present, but passes with it and "sinks" into the past. This means, among other things, that its [the phase's] actuality is ceaselessly turning into always another determinate degree of intensity of being in the past in conformance with the way in which the given process develops and with what its effects

²⁸ I do not intend to determine how this matter will stand in its final resolution. For there is still a question whether something which was present at one time and is now past can ever completely vanish, or whether its past actuality, even in a limited case in which there are no more traces of its existence in the present, does not assure it a certain minimum intensity of being after all, and consequently, [a minimum] of existence. Here are needed the separate analyses that are especially fundamental to the clarification of the essence of history and of historical science. The pursuit of these problems, however, would take us too far afield from our main subject.

²⁹ For this reason, it is only a certain kind of analogue, not the same case.

are. This perpetual passing of the phases respectively actual and the continuous formation (unfolding) at the same time of the phases that are just being actualized—this is the peculiar character of the mode of being of all the phases of a developing process. The aggregate of the phases not only increases continually, but likewise increases in such a way that an actual phase is always found to the fore of the process, and therefore is continually extending into a constantly new actual phase. If the process has run its course, come to an end, the aggregate of its phases has attained its full magnitude which cannot be further altered. Constantly advancing, “shining”—so to speak—through its actuality, the end, which is an actual phase, slips away or ceases “to shine”: *all* the phases have now passed, none of them are actual any more, and they all belong to the past. The aggregate of the phases *recedes* now as one whole, farther and farther into the past,³⁰ upon which nothing changes in it either formally or materially, and there can be no change unless the perspective of time draws some new *relative* moments from it.³¹ But the degree of its intensity of being changes existentially, in accordance with what occurs in the presents subsequent to the given process.

But, as I have already noted, the aggregate of the phases of a process is not all that can be singled out in it. This is only *one* of its sides. Another is the particular *temporal object* which becomes constituted as the subject of separate properties only as the process develops. The mode of being of this object is different in its essence from that of the aggregate of its phases, although its connection with that is the closest. Its existence is, namely, *its coming into being, grounded in the continuous tran-*

³⁰ Perhaps some would prefer to say that we, with our constantly new present, continually *move farther away* from completed processes or past events. Especially since we often say that time “passes” or “goes by” fast, and the like. Certainly, it can be experienced in this way too. But the *primordial* phenomenon actually is congruent with what I have said in the text: Something past, together with the period of time in which it took place, “sinks” ever more deeply into the past, and the present—although continually new—seems always as if it were the same one, staying, immobile. It would appear that there are deeper ontological foundations for this, to which we can hardly give more attention here.

³¹ With regard to the phenomenon of time perspective, cf. my book, *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego (The Cognition of the Literary Work)*, 1937, Chap. ii, and also the lecture previously mentioned, “Man and Time.”

science of all its phases, and emerging as a fully determined subject of properties. The most outstanding property of the process as a temporal *object* is that, while it is constituted as a separate subject of properties from the very *first moment* that these phases begin, it becomes invested, as time passes, with *more and more new* properties. And this is so, not only *during* the completion of the separate phases, but also on the *basis of these*, because this is just how they developed. The process acquires other properties contingent upon and *corresponding* to which of the phases of the aggregate of the phases develop and how they do so until, in the *terminal* phase of its development, it becomes *fully* constituted. Indeed, from the very inception of the development of its phases, it *exists* in a certain measure as a naked *subject* of properties, so to speak; yet, from that beginning, it bears the stamp of the properties that are characteristic of it *in general* as a process. Being formed in the transition of its phases, it becomes an *individual* process, endowed with such and such properties (as an example, let us take a 100-meter race, which takes place in a certain way). Each of the phases belonging to the aggregate of the phases of the process contributes something, on its part, to these properties. Taking this 100-meter race as an example of a certain athletic contest, it eventuates in such a way that a given athlete attains a relatively higher speed immediately at the start; then, however, giving way to a temporary weakness, he allows his opponents to catch up with him; this again stimulates him to renewed effort, so that in the last twenty meters he runs the fastest, and—contrary to expectations—wins a victory over his competitors. Thus, on the basis of this particular development of its phases, this race acquires a corresponding series of properties, completely determined, but not always easy to describe, of which some are constituted at the very beginning of the race, others only subsequently, and still others, finally, in the *terminal* moment of the whole process. A thorough study of the concrete course of an individual race (e.g., on the basis of accurate motion pictures) would be required to make possible a detailed description of its specific properties and of the way in which they were constituted. Fortunately, it is not a matter here of a particular individual case, but of the *general* structure of the process. For we want to grasp

its mode of being in general as a process. In this case, it is true that there can be nothing which takes effect in the developing aggregation of the phases of the process that does not have an unambiguous influence on the constituting of the object we call a process. Furthermore, the circumstance that the aggregation of phases continually increases *during* the course of the process must make its mark upon the complex of attributes of the process as a subject of characteristics. For this is the source of the characteristic and essential *incompleteness*³² of the process as an object *during* the course of the process.³³ A process becomes *completely* endowed with properties only in the moment when all its phases except the last one have occurred, and when the final one is in the very act of taking place. It is just in the very moment in which the process acquires its full complement of properties, and thereby becomes fully constituted, that it *ceases to be actual*. As a fully constituted, "finished" object, it can no longer *endure*. Thus, when it has all its properties, it appears only as already belonging to the past, as effected, as past.³⁴ As the process runs its course, its constitution becomes as if *stratiform* in conformance with the way in which the several phases develop. The individual

³²But this "incompleteness" should not be identified with the "indeterminate spaces" that appear in the contents of purely intentional objects.* As an object that is existentially self-existent, a process does not have this kind of indeterminate spaces (*laeunae*).

* This is discussed in Sec. 45 of *The Controversy*.

³³This is the *formal*, but not the existential, character of a process. The adumbration of this moment appears to have been seen by the most outstanding investigators of temporal activity from Heraclitus down to Bergson in our own time; yet no one has ever succeeded in grasping it clearly or in explicating its ontic foundation. Instead, far-reaching, but on the whole questionable, conclusions have been inferred from its presence in all temporal objects—among others, the rejection of the ontological law of contradiction (Hegel). Regardless of how this matter will be resolved ultimately, a certain caution is indicated here. *Nota bene*: It seems that Bergson recognized only the swelling aggregation of the phases, but he regards the individual subject of characteristics that is being constituted in them as a certain deformation of reality by the intellect, not taking into consideration its formation during the passage of time and its supplementation by more and more new properties. Consequently, he believes this subject of properties to be the "stabilization" of something out of a continuous flux and becoming.

³⁴Hence, the various epistemological difficulties with regard to the method of cognizing processes. However, this is not the place to consider these.

constitutive strata thereby bear the temporal *stamp* of the corresponding present in which the phases that determined a given constituent phase took place. In this way, a period of time is as if enmeshed in the constitution of a given temporal object, and, for this reason, every temporal object, becomes *absolutely non-recurrent*. As itself, it can never be repeated. Only a certain other process, identical in some respects, can occur after it as its "repetition." Then, however, certain disparities are always involved. The constituting of an object-process, taking effect on the basis of a succession of phases, also shows in what way the past "is" in one sense in the present: through the fact that after the separate stages of the process have occurred, its properties, which have their constitutive bases in these stages, are constituted in the present, and thus are themselves in that present.

The essence of the mode of being of a process, which is not found in *any* other types of objects that are temporarily determined, hinges upon the *close connection of the two modes of being* that have been distinguished by abstraction: on the one hand, the mode of being of the aggregate of its phases, and, on the other, the mode of being of the process-object. The characteristic peculiar to the mode of being of a process inheres in the fact that the transience of its phases and their unfolding are the basis for the emergence of a process-object.

It is this characteristic which best demonstrates that the disparity between a process and an event is not of degree, but of essence. Consequently, the idea that events are nothing but very short-lived processes is fallacious. But equally misleading is the view that a process is nothing but a number of successive events. Undoubtedly, there is a very close existential relation between both types of objects: events are indispensable if processes are to take place at all. But processes always lead up to events. All this, however, does not suffice for the *reduction* of one to the other. In their formal structure and in their mode of being as well, they are, along with the type of object that endures in time, ultimate, discrete, and original types of temporally determined entities. Every process not only develops through its phases in time, but also requires time in order to constitute itself. This does not apply to an event. It appears in being *at once* as a *ready*

creation, coming into existence and vanishing from it as if *in one sweep*. An event does not take place in a succession of phases. Even the briefest process is an entity in transition, in change, in flux. The phases of a process form a *continuous* whole that is neither a fragmented manifold nor a *Gestalt* of a higher order, composed of separate, stationary elements that are disjunct and merely contiguous. Yet, a (simple) process would have to be such an aggregate if it were nothing but a series of successive events. And in such a case there would be *no coming into being*, no *change*, in the exact meaning of this word. It would also be incomprehensible how events could be brought about if they were not linked together by processes. The phases of a (simple) process are, as I have already noted, only *potential*. This means that they are not *disjunct* in fact, and that it is only *in the abstract* that we single them out. There are no breaks in the aggregate of the phases of a simple process: one phase *extends* into the next, *passing* into it without any jump or interruption. Strictly, one also should not speak of a *multiplicity* [aggregate, manifold] of phases, for a multiplicity is composed of mutually delimited elements. If a process could be identified with a multiplicity of events, it would then be necessary to regard them as its phases. This cannot be done, because, first, events actually are disjunct while phases are not; and second, because a phase, no matter how brief its run, certainly has a definite, temporally extensive course—which is out of the question for an event. And these formal differences between a multiplicity of events and a simple process are linked with the existential difference between them presented above.

THE MODE OF BEING OF OBJECTS ENDURING IN TIME³⁵

As an example of this type of object, we can take, at our option, a thing such as a stone, a house, or a mountain. However, living entities also belong here, such as a particular tree, a certain animal (e.g., my dog Jock), or, finally, any particular person

³⁵ [The phrase, "objects enduring in time," will, as a rule, be translated as "enduring objects" hereafter, but, in keeping with the author's emphasis on their temporality, the substitute phrase should be taken as representing the original.—Tr.]

(Napoleon, Adam Mickiewicz), and the like. To be sure, living entities cause some theoretical difficulties—as I shall shortly show—when we want to contrast them with other temporally determined objects. But, on closer examination, it will be seen that it is they who permit us to grasp the radical dissimilarity of enduring objects, events, and processes.

Objects that endure in time differ from events in that they are capable of *lasting beyond* the individual instants in which events, in a way, are locked, and they therefore *endure longer* than events. This is also true, however, of processes; hence, this does seem to be something [that is peculiarly] characteristic of the objects presently under consideration. Yet it is just in the way in which an enduring object *outlasts* individual instants that is shown its profound dissimilarity to processes. A process does this, namely, in this way: that the phase now actual passes into an entirely *new*, although not *disjunct*, phase, and *extends into it continuously*. But an enduring object *remains identically the same* through the constantly new instants in which it exists. If there is anything new in the newly occurring instants, these are either processes which, existentially connected with it, sometimes take place in its “interior,” or they are events which take effect in it. The first and the second can produce new properties in it [the enduring object], or even whole complexes of them. However, although it often serves as the existential base of diverse kinds of objects coexisting with it, it [the enduring object] itself *remains*—at least through a certain period of time—as it already was earlier, in previous instants.

The objection could be made that here I am taking into consideration only one aspect of the mode of being of processes, namely, their aggregate of phases; and this is why I have come to the conclusion that there is an existential difference between them and enduring objects. But, if we were to compare these objects with a process, as a particular subject of properties that is constituted in a manifold of phases, then perhaps the difference between the modes of being of both types of objects might disappear. However, this is not the case. A process, taken as an object of a special type, is also different existentially from an object enduring in time. For the latter does not *emerge* with time,

as do process-objects, but *exists* from the very first moment of its existence as a *fully* constituted object. Furthermore, it exists to the *full* extent of its being in every subsequent instant of its existence, and, therefore, with all the properties that pertain to it in particular instants, and with its nature *fully* determined as already constituted—not just being constituted, becoming, with the passage of time. Mont Blanc is just Mont Blanc in every stage of its existence, with *all* the properties that pertain to it in a given moment (or in a given period of time). This does not prevent it from eventually possessing *diverse* combinations of properties in various stages of its existence, and, consequently, from *changing* in the course of its existence. This means only that it either *participates* in certain processes, or that it *contains* certain processes within the scope of its existential boundaries, or, finally, that certain events take place in it. However, while, in the case of a process, the developing phases are the stratum (side) constituting the process, and the process as an object has its existential basis in them, there is nothing of this sort in an enduring object. It does not have the peculiar bilaterality of structure and mode of being that appears in a process. An enduring object also does not require an aggregate of phases as its existential ground. On the contrary, it is itself this kind of basis for processes, provided they are connected with it existentially. If this is the case, then it contains, in formal as in material respects, part of the conditions for the unfolding of the phases of the process. In a formal respect, as I shall yet show, because the aggregate of the latter's phases requires an object that endures in time in order to be able to take place at all; and in a material respect, because the kind of process it is and the various characteristics of its development depend upon the properties of this object (although usually not upon them alone!) In other words, a *process*, in its essence, *could not exist at all without an object enduring in time*; but processes, provided they occur at all, only *modify* the properties of enduring objects, and at times even *destroy* them or cause new enduring objects *to come into existence*, but *they are not themselves a condition of their* [the objects'] *existence* while they endure.

This is a problem that goes back to the very beginnings of Greek philosophy, but is still actual today: Which is ultimately

the separate or self-dependent factor—an enduring object or a process? Many an attempt has been made to treat processes as primary and as constituting the existential basis of every other kind of being. This was so as early as Heraclitus; in our time, this was the case with Bergson, and again, in modern physics at the end of the nineteenth century when the whole existence of “matter” was finally reduced to waves.³⁶ Yet, at the same time, there has been no lack of attempts in the opposite direction—to regard enduring objects as fundamental to being, as “substance.” This is the case with the atomic theory not only of antiquity, but also of modern times, both in philosophy and in physics, up until the corpuscular theory of light inclusively. To be sure, there is a constant tendency to *reduce* one of these types of objects to the other, and, therefore, somehow to degrade it existentially in favor of the second type, and, in many instances, to deny its existence altogether. However, this solution seems to be premature. In any event, there is no doubt that the issue here is, which type of object is the basis for the object of the other type, and, in connection with this, the problem of the existential inseparateness or contingency of one in relation to the other. As a rule, however, investigators do not realize that there are diversiform problems here which—notwithstanding their close relationship—must be differentiated. And this is not to mention the fact that the ontological problems should be separated from the metaphysical ones, since this is obvious. More important, however, in view of the dissimilarity of enduring objects and processes, is the necessity of considering the existential-ontological differences between them, and, on the other hand, the formal-ontological. At this moment, I am concerned only with the former. Consequently the statement that enduring objects have a certain sort of priority or superiority over processes should be understood primarily in an existential sense. Processes are characterized by their essential existential contingency upon, or even perhaps by inseparateness

³⁶ It is very significant that the most recent research in contemporary physics, as is generally known, attempts to take the position that processes and enduring objects *mutually* require each other and are constantly coexistent (L. de Broglie). The final interpretation of these undertakings will require further consideration separately.

from, the pertinent enduring objects.³⁷ In order to take place, they must have some enduring object as their basis. This follows from their formal structure; it is, however, a moment of their mode of being. And this for the reason that, as objects of a special type, constituted on the basis of developing phases that are pure activity, they are transitory and pass into continually new phases; as such, they require a bearer that remains identical notwithstanding the passage of time, and which, therefore, surmounts the diversity of constantly new moments and, by virtue of this, is "enduring." It is evidence of a sound scientific instinct that in deliberations having nothing directly to do with existential ontology, it is constantly emphasized that motion requires something that moves, that change requires something that changes, etc. And even if, as we sometimes say, "everything" were to change in a certain process, there is always a residual something which is what *undergoes* change—in *which* it is made. Otherwise, we should not be dealing with change at all, but only with certain succession of many diverse, discrete states. A continuum of phases passing into one another would not alone be sufficient to constitute a *change* in something. Only the identity of the bearer in which the process takes place makes it possible for *changes* to take place uniformly. To exist, enduring objects do not require a bearer of this kind, different from themselves. But they do not require the occurrence of processes either. In principle, they could persist perfectly invariant and survive the mutability of time. If they do change, and are thus connected with processes, the source of this inheres, not in their mode of being or in their form, but in some other factor—mainly in their *material endowment*. Persistence in time and surviving the changefulness of time in themselves are still neither change nor process. This is the simple, ordinary existence of an object of a special kind.

Our only concern here is to characterize the mode of being of enduring objects. How it is possible that they come to survive the mutability of time, to remain the same in time, is quite an-

³⁷ It will be necessary to consider which of these is the case within the frame of formal ontological problems. It is not precluded, however, that in some cases only contingency occurs, and in others, existential inseparateness. If this is so, the source of this kind of difference would lie in the material endowment of the given process.

other problem. In any event, the condition of the possibility of this mode of existence of enduring objects does not inhere in their form (even though their form also differs from that of processes). For there are objects that have the same general objective form as enduring objects, but which are extratemporal and, to exist, do not require time. I have in mind here individual ideal objects (so-called), such as particular geometrical triangles. Hence, the condition of the possibility of enduring objects must be sought chiefly in their material endowment and perhaps also in some third factor, outside them. Actuality, which is proper to objects enduring in time, is inaccessible to ideal objects. It is just because the former acquire the actuality of the present in which they exist that their mode of being is so peculiar and their persistence in time so strange. For through this, they participate, on one hand, in time's transformations, and, on the other, they succeed in surmounting them.

But what do we mean when we speak about the "change" or the "mutability" of time? With respect to events, the mutability of time came into consideration only to the extent that it was shown that they, which in their essence are actual only within the compass of a *single* present, do not entirely disappear after they have occurred, but attain a special retrogressively derivative being relative to a certain present, which [being] is characterized by a certain "intensity." In spite of this, events succumb completely to the mutability of time: when the instant in which they occur passes, then, in the new *presents* which succeed it, nothing remains of *the events themselves*. At the most, after they have occurred, there are *certain after-effects* of their once having existed. Or, stated differently, once they have taken place, on this account events themselves quit the sphere of *actual* being forever and assume the mode of being of the past completely. It is otherwise with processes to the extent that in the course of the development of a process, after *one* present there are *other* presents, so there is as if a whole strand of presents—a period of time, in the exact meaning of the word, in which the given process is constantly actual. Always, however, only a *new phase* attains actuality in passing. There is no process that is actual—and this pertains to its essence—in *all its phases at once* (as if simul-

taneously) and *throughout* the scope of its being. It only unfolds—always a *new* part of its entirety of phases through the actuality of the present into always *new* instants. But all of these are *its* parts—of *the same process* as an emerging aggregate of phases. On the other hand, an enduring object remains *absolutely the same* in the ever new instants of a certain period of time, although nothing further remains of the actuality of the presents through which it has passed or of the events or processes which eventually took place in it and were in a close existential relation to it. It remains the same, just as if the uninterrupted and irreversible succession of continually new presents could not affect it in any way. Certainly, an enduring object also only *passes through* the actuality of continually *new* moments, but does not make it some *part* of itself (as does a process); it is *itself* actual and present in fact to the full extent of its being in each present. However, as with processes, there is now, too, a whole period of time, a whole strand of presents, in one after another of which it actually exists. When a process unfolds, the passage of time itself causes the *earlier* phases, which preceded those now actual, to lose their actuality, and the fund of phases yet to be actual in a given process, to diminish, and finally, to be exhausted. In a completed process, there is always a time in which *all* the phases of the process—and therefore the process itself—have come to an end, and consequently have passed. A process gradually and continually undergoes the mutability of time. This gradual and inevitable transformation of the mode of being of all its phases and of the process itself from actuality into nonactuality, and into the ever-changing retrogressively derivative being of the past, pertains to the profoundest essence of a process as a *temporal* object. But this kind of *gradual* transformation, though it develops continuously rather than according to a differential order, does not appear in enduring objects.

Yet, is this really true? Is an enduring object free from the kind of transformation of its mode of being just described? Have time and the appearance of always new presents actually no import for it? Can it avoid the mutability of time? In its case also, is there not always one period of time in which it did not yet exist, then another in which it is effectively existent, and finally one

more in which it no longer exists and belongs entirely to the past? Did it not in its *entirety* then, too, assume the mode of being of the past? Consequently, can it not be said that it is transitory in the same way as it a process?

Yet, although we must agree that when it has completed its period of existence, it is gone, we are reluctant to say of an enduring object that it has "passed," "gone by" ("that it has taken place"), even though these expressions seem to be appropriate when applied to a process. Of it [the former], we say that it exists or did exist, that it has ceased to exist or that it came into existence in a certain moment. And this is not merely a matter of linguistic custom. There is no doubt that an enduring object exists through a certain period of time and does not exist any more in another, but this does not happen the way it does with a process, where some of its *parts gradually* pass from the present actuality into the nonactuality and nonpresence of the past. It seems as if the *whole* object comes into being and into the present *at one time*, and likewise, quits the actuality of the present and of being as a *whole at once*. If we concentrate our attention on its enduring (persisting) in time, we receive the impression that, as something enduring, it is also *stable*—as if it were capable of never losing its actuality, of never passing out of actual being and sinking into the past; but if it does [lose its actuality], the source of this is not in its being an enduring object, but is some imperfection, some latent but pertinent *defect* of its material *essence*.

But is not this impression deceptive? For, once an enduring object is in a certain present, and therefore in actual existence, is it not necessarily bound to that present, is it not involved with the mutability of time, and then, with time, must it not *in toto* belong to the past? It is not of the essence of the present that it does not last, that it ceases to exist as the present, and constantly changes into the past? Through this does it [the present] not of necessity leave a certain ineradicable trace on an enduring object that has once attained the actuality of the present? Does not the actuality of the present *deplete* an enduring object to some extent? Does not the transformation of the actuality of the present into the nonactuality of the past take at least something—some

side or property—from an enduring object in the course of this change, *even though* it (the object) remains the same throughout that change, even though it escapes it through the simple fact that it appears the same in a new present?

It is, perhaps, difficult to give an entirely general answer to all these questions which, in the final analysis, are all directed toward the same end. Consequently, although only such a general answer would bring to light the mode of being specific to enduring objects and their relation to time, in order to expedite the problem at this point, let us turn our attention to the fact that, in principle, various types of enduring objects are possible, from the absolutely unchanging through those which change in some respect to those which change many times in a definite rhythm, tempo, and system of changes, which can vary as to their depth and extent. Despite appearances, it is perhaps the most difficult to gauge the influence of time on enduring objects that are absolutely unchanging. For in this case, more than in any other, when we try to form an opinion in the matter we are sensible of the two experiences of time I have mentioned. According to the type of this experience which limits the existence of an object to the present alone, the passage of something that is strictly in one present, to another, seems incomprehensible; the destructive power of time converts everything that we should be prone to regard as an object enduring in time into a multiplicity of discrete events. On the other hand, according to our second experience of time, an enduring object's remaining invariably the same in time appears to be a triviality. Then, again, it would be difficult to maintain that there is a difference between this kind of object and an absolutely extratemporal object—as, for example, a mathematical one. On what, then, would temporal determination have to depend? When considering the mode of being of process, it is true that I affirmed the validity of the second experience of time, but this was the result, not of a positive critical analysis of our experience of time (which would break over the limits of our inquiry), but of an understanding of the basic formal, existential difference between processes and events. If something like a process is to exist at all within the framework of a temporally determined world, then in a temporal respect this world must be

the kind that results from the *second* experience of time. In other words, time so conceived is the condition of the possibility of the existence of a process, and, as I shall shortly show, also of objects enduring in time. A comprehension of the essential connection between temporality and types of objective entities—an understanding which can be attained only within the scope of existential-ontological analysis—is still not tantamount either to an acknowledgment of a determinate type of temporality or to a positive demonstration that time has the structure required by the second experience of time. Consequently, a final clarification has not yet been made on the basis of the second experience of time, of the mode of being of the past and of the future. It will be necessary, in any event, to carry out this elucidation to the point where the temporal determination of an immutable enduring object will be comprehensible. Until this is done, its dissimilarity to processes and events, radical in this regard, will not be clear.

But, with respect to objects that do change, it seems relatively easy to understand that even though they endure in time, they undergo transition through the appearance of always new presents. For change in an enduring object cannot be conceived except as the occurrence of events and processes—i.e., of objects temporal in their essence—that are connected with it within the compass of a single whole, or as its [the object's] participation in certain processes which may, it is true, extend beyond its existential range, but are connected with it to the extent that they reach into its "interior." In either case, some of its properties are subject to destruction, and again, others take their place. Through this, the existence of an enduring object becomes interwoven with the mutability of time in two ways: First, in that the processes and events taking place within its compass are subject to the mutability of time in the manner described above, and thus introduce the imprint of time into its existential compass—in particular, the mark of that present in which they themselves occurred; second, through the fact that the properties pertaining to it in a certain period of time and then lost with time, pass from the actuality of the present into the nonactuality of the past. Changes that take place in an enduring object permit us to make a distinction between a changing *object* and its *state*. Namely, the totality of the

properties produced by a certain process in a given object in the course of its existence, and which pertain to it in a determinate present (or in a definite period of time), is contrasted with the object as its "state." This state can be more or less stable. For some reasons inside or outside the object, this state becomes displaced in a certain instant and another takes its place. For there is an *incompatibility*, variously determined in different cases, between states in the same object: they cannot appear simultaneously in the same object. It is true that the object remains the same while the changes are taking place, but it admits different states in turn during its existence. It continually remains actual—that is, in the always new presents—while its states pass from the actuality of a given present into the mode of being of the past. In consequence of this, the object cannot possess all the properties it has altogether throughout its existence, but loses successively all those belonging to its past states, and retains only those that are indispensable to the occurrence of variant states. It thereby acquires yet another property: that it *had* such and such a property at one time, or, in more general terms, that it went through a certain history (it had such and such a history). With the passage of time is therefore associated, on the one hand, the conversion of the always new events occurring within the compass of the changing object, and, on the other, the passing of the always new phases of the processes arising in it, and finally, the conversion of the states through which the object passes during the time it exists.

At this point in our examination, it appears that we are in danger of giving up the existential distinction already made between processes and enduring objects. The first step towards this seems to be the acknowledgment that processes occur in at least some enduring objects, and produce changes in their properties. The second can come through the concept of a state, with respect to the *broadening* of this concept that suggests itself, to include all the properties that pertain to an object, either in a certain instant or in a certain period of time, and therefore, not only those which were produced by a certain process during the object's existence, but *all* the others that were contemporaneous with the first as well. With this broadened concept of a state, the

existence of an enduring object changes into the existence of a multiplicity of states or into a passing from one state to another. But this passage then is only—so it seems—a composite process developing from the processes taking place in the given object. In this case, however, this object is converted into the aggregate of the phases of a certain, perhaps very multifarious, process, and its mode of being is transience. Then how can we speak of the object as *enduring* in time? In the changefulness of time, what of it [the object] still *endures*? Its every state is then a new one—new in the same way as are the phases of the aggregate of the phases of a process, and there is nothing in it but just such states. If, under these conditions, the geometrization of time is introduced—as is done almost universally in the natural sciences—according to which the time continuum is assumed to be a multiplicity of points, then it is easy to reduce an enduring object to a manifold of “segments” (instantaneous states) which, on the basis of the assumptions made, are taken to be nothing but a complex of events that somehow pertain to each other.³⁸

Naturally, I do not want to decide here as to the *factual* existence of enduring objects (eventually, within the domain of the real world). Indeed, it may be that only combinations of events or systems of processes exist and that, as something different from them, enduring objects do not exist at all.³⁹ The question of how it is in fact in the world in which we live is a *metaphysical* problem. But, for the present, I am concerned here with establishing or disclosing the *idea* of an enduring object. And from this point of view, it is necessary to maintain that the various types of temporally determined objects differentiated here are dissimilar. A multiplicity of successive events or of whole combinations of them does not produce anything but a certain manifold, and does not constitute *one* simple object that remains identical in time. Obviously, every manifold is also a certain kind of object, but—as we shall see—it is an object of a *higher order*, the

³⁸ This is a conception which has been frequently advanced in the twentieth century. In Poland, K. Ajdukiewicz often expounded it before the war.

³⁹ Although, considering the question from a purely ontological point of view, it does not seem possible [that they would not exist], on account of its acceptance of a basic existential connection between a process and the enduring object that is its existential ground.

totality of whose properties cannot, it is true, be identified with the totality of the *elements* of that manifold, but does *imply* the existence of those elements. The elements of a manifold can, for their part, be manifolds themselves, which, as an object, rest on new elements. However, if this is so, then such elements of a certain manifold must finally exist which, in themselves, are no longer manifolds, but take the form of *ultimate* elements—objects that are *primordially* individual. Let us set aside here the problem of how the matter stands with respect to persistence in time by objects of a higher order, and therefore, among others, by manifolds. For it is clear that if persistence in time were impossible for objects that are *primordially* individual—which only eventually might constitute the elements of a manifold—then it would also be precluded in the case of objects of a higher order, and especially of a manifold. We can therefore limit ourselves here to the problem of persistence in time by an object that is *primordially* individual. It would be a basic error if we sought to reduce this object to a manifold also, especially of events. If the essence of time required that something which exists in time be necessarily discontinuous, then only events could exist, but never enduring objects. But, when we examined processes, we came to the conclusion that time does not preclude true continuity in any way. Therefore, it does not preclude the continuity of enduring objects. Hence, it will be sufficient merely to find appropriate arguments that will prohibit the reduction of enduring objects that are *primordially* individual objects, to processes. From this point of view, the following circumstances will not be without significance:

In the case of a simple process, the phases belonging to the aggregate of phases unfolding in time form potential *parts* of which the totality of the phases is composed. But an enduring object does not have the *kind* of parts which are distributed over *various* periods of its existence, and of which it would be “composed.” In general, if an object can be considered from the point of view of the categorial pair, whole—part, *all* the parts comprising the object are, in any event, always in the *same* present (or in the same period of time). What meaning would it have to say that the *whole* of an object forms a part in a certain period of its

existence—a part of what? Would it be justifiable under any pretext to say, for instance, that Napoleon is composed of Napoleon-the-child, Napoleon-the-youth, Napoleon-the-man, and the like? If there is a Napoleon at all, then he is one person, who was first a child, then a youth, then a man in his prime, etc. “Being-a-child,” “being-a-youth,” etc., are only states—developmental phases of *one and the same man*, Napoleon I.

The source of error in the position which reduces an enduring object (a thing, especially) to a complicated process, inheres in the *excessive broadness* of the conception of a “state.” If not only the new properties of an object which it acquires through a certain process, but *all* the properties generally attributable to it in a determinate present, are classed as the state of the object, then the object itself becomes *identified* in this present with its state, instead of being *contrasted* with it. Then the only possibility of contrasting an object with its individual states lies in conceiving it as the *totality* of these *states*, or as a *process of passing* from one state into another. But if we discard this excessively broad concept of a state, then another possibility of making this contrast opens up—that which I outlined above (p. 133f.). A mistaken conception of a state likewise leads to an unfounded increase in the constant, *persisting* complex of the properties of an object: that which is one and the same, which persists as something *identical* through the mutability of time and the variable-ness of the processes taking place in the given object, becomes, from the point of view of the concept I am opposing, converted into a manifold of “segments” ordered according to their succession in time, as if the contemporaneity of stable properties with transient processes, together with the presence of ever new presents, would by themselves destroy the identity of that complex of properties. However, this is not how it is. This complex *persists* through the passage of time as the unchanged core of the enduring object. In other words, time, or the appearance of ever *new* presents, is powerless with respect to an enduring object, and with respect to what persists in it. Only when the “object” in its essential form is an event or a process, does the passage of time involve entirely new events or phases of the process.

Correspondingly, this statement also defines the case of an

object that is immutable or unchanging in time, which, as we previously noted, is difficult to determine. The ever new presents and their ceaseless transformation into the past leave the unchanging enduring object intact if other circumstances permit it to exist at all. It remains absolutely the same in the always new presents, and maintains the actuality of its existence in these ever new presents as long as it exists. It does not "pass on" in any sense. As unchanging, it can be annihilated only from outside and *at one fell swoop*, provided it is ever to cease to exist. And only then does it become past, lose its actuality, and assume the mode of being of the past. However, until this happens, it does not participate in any processes, no events take place in it, and it does not possess any states. It forms an individuum that is entirely closed in relation to other objects (it is a closed system). It is temporally conditioned and determined in two ways: (1) through its existence in a certain *determinate* time, which means that it persists through the actuality of the presents belonging to a given period to time; and (2) in that as it *passes* through these presents, it is *actual* in always only *one* of them.

On the other hand, if an enduring object is subject to any changes in the course of its existence, then its temporal determination and conditioning refer—the same as with a completely unchanging object—only to its constant, persisting core; but this determination undergoes an essential modification with respect to other sides of the object as a result of the occurrence of events and processes in its interior, through which a certain multiplicity of states arises there. Temporal conditioning—that is, the degree of the object's dependence on the mutability of time—markedly increases. In this case, the object participates in the passage of time through the changes in its states. It has its own history and is involved in the history of its envioning world. In the moment when it is, as identical, actual in a new present and is in a new actual state, the states through which it has already passed and which it has outgrown, belong to it in its past, nonactual modification and are maintained through this in retrogressively derivative being as long as it still exists—that is, as long as the object remains in some present the same as it was before. Here, the bounds of its persisting core need not remain the

same throughout the entire period of its actual existence. On the contrary, they usually vary, and it is just in this fact that is shown there is no boundary separating the core from the rest of the object, and that it is in no way isolated from the world around it as is an absolutely immutable object. Yet, for all the variability of the limits of the zone of invariability in an enduring object, it cannot impair the consistency of the object-core itself. In the instant when this is disrupted, and when, therefore, this absolutely immutable core is drawn in its entirety into a process of change, the *destruction of the object* is effected. It loses the actuality of its being and its last present changes into the past. The final phase of its actual existence then also belongs to its history, but everything in it is already transformed; its very identity has been breached, broken off—in so far as we relate it to some later actual entity. If it leaves any traces or after-effects of its existence in subsequent presents, these maintain it or its history in retrogressively derivative being. This derivation can have different degrees of existential intensity, which depend on various circumstances and can alter it.

Obviously, if we are to demonstrate the possibility of a changing enduring object, it will be necessary to show in what circumstances and within what limits its core can persist unchanged notwithstanding the changes that take place in the interior of the object. The condition of the possibility of its [having an] identity, which is quite different from the condition of the possibility of identity in a process, is very closely connected with this. However, all these are problems that transcend the limits of existential ontology and belong partly to formal, and partly to material, ontology. I shall also examine them in these [contexts]. Here, however, I want to consider yet a special kind of object that changes and endures in time, in order to refute one further objection that is raised against differentiating processes from enduring objects.

Those who object to this distinction will perhaps cite the example of Napoleon and attempt to turn it to account against my position. I said above that an enduring object is distinguished from a process by the fact, among other things, that while the latter is constituted in the *course* of time, and *becomes*, the former

does not become, but simply *is* fully constituted throughout its existence. Is this true of Napoleon or of any other man or living entity in general? Are we not speaking of the phases of Napoleon's *development*? May we not, quite justifiably, speak of his *rise*, as well as of the history of his downfall and his passing? Did he not, therefore, become constituted in the *course* of his life—that is, in the course of a certain composite and very complicated process? If Napoleon (or any other living entity) were really an enduring object, then there would seem to be no essential difference between this kind of object and a process—at least with respect to their mode of being. If, on the other hand, we ought to hold to the distinction we have made between the types of objects under consideration, it would seem necessary to exclude Napoleon and all living entities generally from the class of objects that endure in time, and to classify them with process-objects (*all* living entities, for this same objection could be raised with regard to animals and plants). When we speak of Napoleon, we chiefly have in mind, of course, a definite person as a psychic entity. But he is obviously a *mind-body* entity, whose body, in the course of his life, goes through a process of change similar to that of his purely psychic properties and structural characteristics—changes closely connected with the transformations in Napoleon himself as a determinate person. When a living entity lacks a concomitant, purely psychic, conscious element, as is probably the case with plants, profound changes in their purely physical properties give rise to the same question as in the case of a determinate human being: Are we dealing with enduring objects or composite processes? But when this question is raised with respect to living entities and human beings, it gives rise to another question: Which of the various kinds of things that we encounter—so we believe—in the real world is such that we may regard it as an enduring object whose mode of being differs from that of a complex of processes?

In reply to this, it should be said:

The problems that have been raised cannot be finally resolved at this juncture, because, for this purpose, it would be necessary to have at our disposal an understanding of the material essence (or idea) of a person and of a living entity in

general. Hence, the final consideration of this problem must be shifted to the material-ontological portion of this investigation. I shall have to take up the problem of the existence of the person there also, because this problem is connected with the controversy between idealism and realism in a special way, as will be shown. Consequently, at this point, we are able to deal with the problem of the mode of being of a living entity and of a person in only a purely preliminary way.

It is necessary to maintain the thesis that living entities are objects enduring in time. However, there is a certain circumstance which causes the question whether they exist in a different way from processes to become particularly acute. The changes taking place in them in the course of their existence produce, so it seems, a *special* system in which there appears a certain relation among the several changes that prevails over accidentalness in the case of living entities, and also a certain irreversible order in their [the changes'] sequence—at least, of the succession of a certain selection of them. Consequently, living individua are entities whose structure seems to be much more cohesive than that of objects in “inanimate” nature. Likewise, the individual phases of their lives and the occurrence of characteristic *developmental* processes in them have, it seems, a much closer connection with their states and their essential properties than is the case in “inanimate” things. Hence, they seem to be doomed by their innermost essence to temporal existence and to a necessary transience in time. Likewise because of their essence, a certain fixed period of time to live, appropriate to their species, appears to have been foreordained for them. This period fluctuates within certain limits, but does not exceed a certain span established for a given species, provided factors in the environment in which it is the particular lot of these animate beings to live do not shorten this period in a special way. Considering that they have to develop and maintain themselves through a certain limited period of time, since the initial period of their existence and of their lives falls in a determinate moment, and, for human beings, also in a certain moment of history, they are susceptible to a considerably higher degree than are “inanimate” material things to the action of time's mutability and historical changes. It is entirely im-

material to things when and how long they exist (if this may be said thus), because they do not have to pass within a certain limited time through such a system of changes as a man, for example, is subject to in the cycle of his personal life (and, similarly, other living entities). But for man, this is not a matter of indifference at all. Yet, does it follow from this that no distinction should be made between the mode of being of living entities—of man particularly—and that of processes?

A second substantial reason for doubting that I have correctly contrasted here the modes of being of the types of objects under consideration lies in the circumstance that in living entities, *all* their properties appear to undergo change in the course of their lives. It is almost impossible to give a concrete case of what constitutes the immutable factor in a living entity whose properties are constantly changing. Even that which is peculiar to a determinate person—his constitutive nature—appears to undergo change in the course of his life. This is why we are inclined to distinguish Napoleon as a youth from Napoleon in the prime of life. And if we do this in the case of such an eminent and outstanding individuality as Napoleon, it seems that we should be even more prone to do so with respect to the average man. Moreover, the *gradual* constituting of the living individuum (person) through the course of his life seems to be due to this—and this is the very thing that is characteristic of a process as a particular kind of object.

But is this really how the matter stands?

In general, we must agree that there is a factual basis for questioning this view, but it does not seem sufficient to warrant its rejection. Although it is true that the close connection and irreversible order of the changes that take effect in every living individuum, and in human beings especially, make this object temporally determined in a special sense, particularly a historical one, nevertheless it is just this connection and this order, this system of *typical changes*, that point to the existence of a constant, and therefore enduring, and for a given individuum, *characteristic essence*, which constitutes the *ground* for the processes taking place in it. We are not concerned here merely with the processes

of development and dissolution that are characteristic of a given *biological species*, and which are constantly repeated. A much greater role is played here by a certain *typical* trait of all vitally important—and, for a given personal individuum, *essential*—modes of behavior. It is in this trait that a determinate personality, *the same throughout a lifetime*, and the *manner*, always *one and the same over and over*, in which the given individual resolves the great variety of problems in his life (often in quite antithetic situations), come to expression and to prevail despite all obstacles and catastrophes. This is the best evidence that a living individuum, man and the human person in particular, is something *more than* and something *different* from the sum of the events and processes taking place in it. And this “more” is not the kind of *derivative* product that a process as an *object* is in relation to the phases constituting its ground, on which its individual endowment *wholly* depends, but is, on the contrary, the *basis* and in part the only source of both the generically determined developmental processes and the characteristic individual way in which the vital discourse between the living individuum (a human being especially) and its environing world is conducted. This “more,” this basis of behavior, forms not only the *essential core* of the individuum, but also what persists in it that *survives* in spite of all the vicissitudes of time and the destructive power of history. This kind of essential core of a living individuum, and particularly of man, precludes neither the appearance in the individuum of systems, properties and states that are produced as a result of the processes that occur in it, nor the constitution of the respective processes as objects peculiar to it, with it as their ground. On the contrary, both the one and the other have their source in the existence of that core and are essentially under its influence. In this way, a certain kind of *stratiform* structure is produced in the individual, the upper layers of which, formed only in the course of his life, are conditioned by this basic core of the individual and by the circumstances of his life, and at the same time are subject to more or less rapid dissolution while, on the other hand, the core of the person which underlies them persists throughout his whole life, and depending on the case, is generally dominant

in the individual. Only when this core, too, suffers decay and annihilation does the given individual succumb to disintegration and destruction.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ After the publication of the first edition of this book [*The Controversy*] in 1947, I heard and read many times that these initial reflections on man and the human person are "existentialist" and allegedly were written under Sartre's influence. But when I wrote these chapters of the first volume of *The Controversy* in 1941 (in the autumn), I knew nothing either of Sartre or of French Existentialism. Obviously I had read, as early as 1927, Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*), but it can hardly be said that Heidegger's views have affected my thinking. At the most, to be taken into account here would be Max Scheler's investigations. But my guiding principle in these [present] considerations is also very different from his conception of the "person" (*Person*). *Nota bene*: I was already interested in the problem of the human person in my early youth—that is, in 1913. At that time I read a number of authors (Dilthey, Simmel, and others), for I intended to write my doctoral dissertation on this subject. And it was only due to decisive ancillary considerations that finally, in the autumn of 1913, I made an agreement with Husserl to write about Bergson's [concept of] intuition. But I never lost sight of the problem of the human person. So far as its relation to Sartre is concerned, the conception I have outlined here is, rather, a contradiction of his views. According to Sartre, man is *deprived of* just that core of personality about which I speak in the text. With Sartre, there is a basic emptiness in man from which, as it were, man has to be delivered, and which continually fills him with dread, for he is never able to fill it with anything. The Sartrean conception (similar, after all, to Heidegger's) is the result of a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the assertion which can be summed up in Heidegger's statement, "Das Sein des Daseins is seine Möglichkeit" ("The existence of Being [in-the-world] is its potentiality"), and which is perhaps better expressed by saying that man, as a human being, is a being who molds and in a certain sense creates himself. This is indeed true. Man is not an absolutely passive creature submissive to fate, but an active being who has an influence on what he becomes. Choosing one mode of life or another, deciding on a definite course of action in the situations imposed on him by life, taking one or another position in matters of importance to him, he resolves in his own way the problems life puts before him, and he not only copes with the world about him in one way or another, but also transforms and shapes himself. And he does this fully aware that he desires to mold himself in a certain fashion, not another, and with a sense of being fully responsible for what he does and for what he makes of himself. But all this is hardly evidence that he does all this, emerging, as it were, from a complete *emptiness*, being deprived in his essence as a man of an ultimate core of personality of his own. Of course, this matter should not be presented too extremely or too generally. There are people who from the beginning carry in themselves this curse of their lives—an internal emptiness. There are also others in whom this core is very negligible and insignificant. But there are also people in whom this core is very strong and distinct, and leads to the crystallization of an outstanding personality even under the most inauspicious circumstances. This can therefore be various. But of importance at this point is only the fact that it is possible for man to have the

Thus, the second reason for questioning the correctness of our view would be partially eliminated. Because, notwithstanding the far-reaching changes that take place in a living individual (in the person), *not everything* in the individual changes or is part of the stream of processes. The main point of the second objection—namely, that a living individuum, the same as a process, becomes constituted only in the course of its actual existence—must still be answered. The correct solution to our difficulty is to be reached by differentiating the *static* from the *dynamic* identity (constant) of a certain factor that makes its appearance within the existential scope of the object. The static identity appears in a certain objective moment whose *qualitative* determination is *perfectly immutable* and is constantly apparent in the object. On the other hand, the dynamic identity appears in the *qualitative determination* of a certain objective moment that is subject, it is true, to change, but this change affects only the *mode and degree of the consummation of its existential and phenomenal aspects*, or, if one prefers, the *incarnation of this moment in its entirety*. In particular, what is specific in this determination may initially be contained in embryo, as if in outline, and then, growing increasingly clear and distinct, it comes to be more and more fully developed and embodied in the given moment. The development, the consummated embodiment, and eventually the slow recession and atrophy of *this same* qualita-

type of personality which possesses a certain nucleus, and which, though developing, is permanent—and it is by virtue of this that he differs from a simple stream of complicated processes.

The conception which I have brought out here, and which I shall supplement by further consideration of the identity of an object that endures in time and of the various types of essences of objects, is also fundamentally different from Wilhelm Schapp's, described in his excellent book, *In Geschichten verstrickt* (*Involved in Histories*). Without doubt, every man—and every real object in the world—is involved in various "histories" that life imposes on him. And this involvement is not without significance for his personality and for his essence that he carries within himself, and which ultimately develops and crystallizes in him and in his life. But again, all this does not show that man is altogether deprived of an essence and is only a stream of changes in various complexes of processes. These matters are obviously not so simple that they can be settled by such a brief observation. My concern at this juncture is only that it be understood that the view I have outlined here is fundamentally different from both Sartre's position and Schapp's conception. The justification of my view will be presented later. (1959)

tive factor through many transformations of varying distinctness and states of incarnation—this is indeed the special and also the classical case of the “dynamic” identity of objective moments. A higher degree of embodiment of the qualitative determination of an object can entail that what at first is blurred, and as if not crystallized, becomes increasingly differentiated and describes its internal structure more distinctly; yet, it is not anything new, but strictly the same—except that it is in a more developed, more expanded, or more mature state. The whole development of the given animate entity, and particularly of man, is directed in these cases toward the consummated incarnation and distinctness of a given quality or complex of qualities in the object. But when this state is reached, we are dealing with absolutely the same thing as was contained in embryo at the beginning of the whole process.

Let us apply this distinction between the two types of identity to our problem. It can then be said that a living entity, and a human being especially, persists exactly the same throughout the various transformations through which he passes in his life if his individual constitutive nature preserves at least the *dynamic identity* of its qualitative determination notwithstanding all the changes to which he is subjected.⁴¹ This dynamically the same individual constitutive nature of a living entity is the qualitative determination of what, above, I called the essential core of the object. Remaining the same throughout the entire life of a given individuum, this core does not undergo a constitutive process itself, since it appears in the object from the very beginning of its existence. In an object, it is what determines the constitution of the given animate entity’s *essential* properties, and which at the same time, together with the internal developmental force and the processes that are shaped according to the circumstances of its life, contributes to the emergence of its nonessential properties. Some of the essential properties of an object, especially of a living entity—namely, those properties which are designated by the qualitative moment of its individual nature alone, but not by the mode and degree of its embodiment and development in each phase of its [the individuum’s] life—likewise

⁴¹ [Regarding “individual constitutive nature,” see Note 65, Chap. iii.]

are not constituted in the course of its life, but are the basis of all constitution. They are not limited here, as are processes, to the general or the generic, but as the equivalent in properties to the *individual* nature of the living entity (of the person), also contain what is characteristic of and peculiar to the given *individuum* as such. Constitutions formed in the course of the *individuum*'s life, it must be admitted, are subject to: (1) the mode and degree of the development and embodiment of its individual nature, characteristic of a given *phase* of its life; (2) the essential properties of the living *individuum*—that is, those which are dependent upon the stage of embodiment and the development of that nature; and (3) the properties not essential to the given individual, which, however, of necessity belong (in their general type) to its plenary qualitative endowment. The constitutive process and everything that is subordinate to it depend upon *various factors*. These factors are comprised in part of what is constant in a living *individuum*, in part of what is changing (its states), in part of the events and processes taking place in it, and of a final part of what does not make its appearance in the *individuum* at all, but creates the *conditions* of life indigenous to the world surrounding it. These conditions of life are themselves partly stable and partly changeable; they have their ultimate source in the various kinds of determinate objects that comprise the environment of the given *individuum*. Consequently, it is certainly necessary to admit that a living *individuum*, as a special kind of enduring object, is partly constituted in the course of its actual existence. But its constitution differs essentially from that of a process (as an *object* of a particular type) in that (1) it covers only a *portion* of the *individual* qualitative endowment of the object, and (2) its basis inheres, not, as with processes, exclusively in the phases of the *processes*, but in *persisting* factors ("factual")—that is, on one hand, in the essential core (in the individual nature) of a given animate entity, and on the other, in enduring objects that belong to the world surrounding the given *individuum*. Only because living individua are such *enduring* objects, whose essence requires an internally consistent system of changes, and because these individua are present in a world which contains *enduring* objects, can determinate processes op-

erate in and upon them—processes which, within their limits and in their way, lead to the constitution just described. These (constitutional) processes prove on this account to be *existentially* inseparable from enduring objects, and from living individua especially. The “condition of their possibility” lies at least partially in these [individua]. But this it not the constant, the persisting, in the living individuum, itself existentially relative in respect to that constitution and to the processes conditioning it. Within the scope of what is absolutely constant (persistent) in it,⁴² the living individuum is consequently separate (or self-dependent) in relation to the existential processes that come into consideration, although it is not so throughout the *entire range* of its qualitative endowment. For, in everything that is subject to constitution in the course of its life, it is partially contingent existentially upon the processes which operate on it (eventually, it is separate with respect to them).⁴³ On this account also, a living individuum, although it is capable of surviving the mutability of time, is not, however, entirely independent of it, since *it comes into being* partly only with time, and eventually—to use Bergson’s words but not his concept—“falls back” (atrophies). And because the processes in question have part of their existential basis in enduring objects *outside* the given living individuum, the latter is thus existentially contingent in part on some enduring objects belonging to its envioning world. Its *mode of being is characterized* by [the object’s] independent persistence that is limited in the way noted *to its* [the individuum’s] *nature and individual essence*, and *by its partial dependence upon the surrounding world and its fortunes*, and, therefore, *by its partially prevailing over time and partially succumbing to it* as well; or, to put it another

⁴² I am speaking here of what is *absolutely* constant—meaning that it remains, in its essence, immutable throughout the individuum’s *entire* life—in contrast with the relatively constant and enduring, and therefore with that which either endures unchanging through a certain *period* of the individuum’s life, or arose only in the course of that life and passed away again after a certain time, or even persisted thereafter unchanging through its whole life, but does not belong to the essence of the given individuum.

⁴³ Later, in formal-ontological investigations,* I shall thoroughly consider the problem whether a living individuum, together with the processes that take place in it, does not form a *single* existential sphere, limited formally to itself.

* [In Chap. viii of *The Controversy*, not included in this edition.—Tr.]

way, it is characterized by a special combination of *persistence and transience* (the persistence of the object's essential core and the transience of its states and processes).

The whole existential system of a particular living individuum is thus an *unsteady* equilibrium (if it may be described thus): Both "sides" of the individuum—its enduring basis (essential core) and its surface stratum of assorted properties that are constituted only in the course of its life (and, therefore, that in it which is subject to transition and is coconditioned by its environment)—reciprocally maintain this equilibrium in such a way—although always only for a certain time—that the essential core constantly remains predominant, but is constantly *jeopardized* by the surface stratum.⁴⁴ The magnitude of this threat, and, correlatively, the measure of the essential core's ascendancy, are thereby continually subject to certain fluctuations. But a moment can *always* arrive when the danger exceeds the permissible margin, the equilibrium of the system is upset, and a process of disintegration, of longer or shorter duration, begins in which the individuum suffers extinction. In this is revealed an essential *defect in its being*, and, therefore, a *new* moment in the *mode of existence of living individua*. Even their existential separateness and their partial independence of, as well as their ascendancy over, time *are not guaranteed* by the (general and particular) *essence* of living individua. As long as such an individuum remains alive, and therefore in actual existence, it does so because it temporarily succeeds—for reasons partly independent of its essence—in maintaining the predominance of its essential core (and, therefore, of the constant factor in it). If this ascendancy is of a relatively high degree and is maintained at this level throughout the greater part of the individuum's life, then its life is characterized by what we call "organic development." Disturbances proceeding from the external circumstances of its life are then not capable of destroying its life course that is shaped in a certain characteristic way. This life course—which I have called "organic

⁴⁴ I wrote this in December of 1941, when I was not yet acquainted with Ludwig von Bertalanffy's book, *Theoretische Biologie*. I did not read it until late in the autumn of 1943. The conception of a living individuum that I have presented here is in agreement with von Bertalanffy's view of an organism.

development"—is contingent upon *the preservation of a strict order*—variously determined according to the species and the peculiar individuality of the given living entity—in *the succession of the individuum's transformation*. Namely, from the stage in which the qualitative determination of its individual constitutive nature is present in an embryonic incarnation, through its always increasing expansion and greater accentuation in the given entity (accompanied by the appearance of corresponding properties), up until its full maturation, upon which the entire being of this entity becomes permeated with it.

This defect in the being of a living individuum inheres both in its [own] *basic* and its *universal essence*, in which its source is the *possibility* not only of the *annihilation* of the given entity, but also of the *interruption* or even the *disruption* of its normal *organic development* by external factors. Then the individual nature of the given individuum does not reach full maturity and completion, and [the entity] either passes into a state of general stagnation or premature dissolution. It does not mature or it dies.

However, this defect in being can become more pronounced in an *essential* way. This occurs in the *special* type of living entities with which we probably deal in our world. In this case, the universal, and, it may be, the individual, essence of the living entity is as if disposed toward the individuum's "organic development," but, at the same time, *of its own accord sets in motion the regressive process of decline that normally follows the attainment of maturity*. This process consists of the gradual *recession* of the qualities of the individuum's individual nature that permeate the given entity's entire being at the culmination of its development, the *decay* of its essence (with the accompanying processes of atrophy), and, finally, the individuum's self-dissolution (death), even under so-called favorable conditions of life, which are not capable of preventing the individuum's extinction. In this case we are dealing with an entity that is, *in its essence, mortal*. Its bond with time and subordination to it are substantially greater than in the case of those living individua whose existence may, it is true, be interrupted or whose development may be arrested by *external* circumstances, but which transcend time and its de-

structive power—at least in principle. For the “mortal” individuum must “die,” and therefore depart actual existence, since its own essence demands this; it dies because the *internal regularity*⁴⁵ of its life fixes a definite period of time for its existence (for living). Because it has existed for just that length of time, it has already passed through the determinate phases of its existence and has entered upon the phase of its dissolution. Its ability to persist is limited both by its universal (general) essence and by its individual essence. The individuum’s basic mortality does not except the defect in its being, but contains it: the mortal individuum can die before it has developed organically, and before it has attained the complete fulfillment of its nature, but then the actual occurrence of death has its source in the external circumstances of the individuum’s life, and the given entity is only *susceptible* to it.⁴⁶

A description of the mode of being of a living entity would not be complete, however, without emphasizing one further characteristic feature. There are also living individua whose being, like that of all enduring objects—as I have already noted—*transcends* (to a certain time) the sphere of the actuality of a *continually new* present. Indeed, they exist thus throughout their lives, but, consistent with the essence of time, each actual existence is always *confined* to a *single* present beyond whose limits none can reach in any specific instant of their existence. The actuality of

⁴⁵ [The term “regularity” is used by the author to denote a certain relationship of parts or processes. A certain selected (not arbitrary) system of relations is essential to produce “internal regularity” in an entity, and, eventually, a certain “unification” that is essential to its form. With respect to living entities, this might be more readily grasped if it were described as the object’s “internal economy,” in the meaning of the certain principles of a thing’s arrangement or organization. This subject is fully explored in *The Controversy* (Chap. ix), and a brief exposition of the meaning of “regularity” and “unification” is available to English readers in “The General Question of the Essence of Form and Content,” *The Journal of Philosophy*, LVII, No. 7, March 31, 1960, pp. 226-233 (see pp. 230-231 especially).—Tr.]

⁴⁶ The question repeatedly arises *why* a living entity has such a nature and such an essence that it is defective and even mortal in its being. This is a question, however, which goes beyond the sphere of our present problems and leads to basic metaphysical questions.

their existence is always like a narrow fissure. Beyond its compass there lies, on one hand, the retrogressively derivative existence of their past, and, on the other, their future existence that is only foreshadowed. But, in living entities, a certain essential modification appears on the ground of this "fissured" mode of being, which permits the living individuum to *transcend* the sphere of the actuality of each present in a particular way: what took place in the living individuum in the past is recorded in the configuration of what exists in it "now" in a different and more significant way than occurs in "inanimate" things. Indeed, *all* enduring objects that alter with time have in common the fact that *not everything* in their present endowment derives from the phase of actuality that *immediately* preceded [the present one]. Only a phase of a *change* in the process just taking place in it issues from that. Everything in it that is temporally enduring is derived from *various former* instants of its past existence, some even very remote, corresponding to the events which took effect or occurred in it. On this common ground, however, the significant differences between "inorganic" things and living entities stand out. In an "inorganic" thing, the residue from the past constitutes a certain multiplicity of properties which indeed can be explained only as the chance result of actions⁴⁷ effected on the given thing and by the ways, peculiar to it, in which it reacts, all of which, however, unintelligible in themselves, comprise a *meaningless confusion* of details. On the other hand, in a living individuum, the residue from the past constitutes a *meaningful* whole, which *can be understood in itself*, in its "organic" structure (as we say), without regard for the fact that the living entity carries traces of actions effected on it during its existence by various factors *unconnected with each other* and *accidental* for it, which counteracted its meaningful unity and thus threatened its existence. In the contents of what is now actual in a living entity can be discerned at least some of the struggles it has had with its environment, and also the meaningful *way in which it reacted* to attacks directed against it—a mode of reaction which, characteristic of it, helps keep it alive and often rebuilds its internal struc-

⁴⁷ Obviously, this result is *accidental* from the point of view of the *given* inanimate thing.

ture, and thus to a certain extent is creative.⁴⁸ The *connection*, which I have already pointed out, between a living entity's separate developmental phases as well as that between its defensive actions against the actions of the external world (that are "accidental" from the point of view of its internal regularity) is expressed, as if synthetically, in the actual state of the living individuum and creates an *internal unity* not only of the total contents of its present state, but also of its *whole temporally extensive being*.⁴⁹ It is precisely this unity which connects the living entity's past more closely with what is actual in it, and invests the retrogressively derivative being of that past with a higher degree of intensity. A higher degree of intensity reduces to a certain limit, but never completely eliminates, the difference between the past's retrogressively derivative being and each actuality of the living entity's presents, and thus produces at least the appearance of an *extension* of its phases of *actuality* in the direction of the past. Of course, the generality of what is in the past life and states of a living entity is no longer here in the present. This is precluded by the very essence of time, or of existence in time. Whatever is once condemned to exist in time inevitably and forever loses any actuality it once possessed. But a living entity's phases of actuality seem, nevertheless, to be extended in that what, in its essence, is existing in the present, is *identical* (in the strict meaning of this term) in its whole essential core with what existed as the constant or the relatively constant in it throughout its life from the beginning, or came into and remained in existence.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of the constant in a living individuum over the changes in its states that are coconditioned externally is evidenced in this same meaningful unity of what is actual in a living entity and its whole temporally extensive being, in its creatively resourceful defense against threats from

⁴⁸ Among others, the phenomenon of regeneration belongs here, as well as the living entity's positive, creative adaptation to the external conditions of its life, which at first were a threat to it.

⁴⁹ There is a possibility here that this unity may have various degrees of internal cohesion, which opens up the prospect of [the entity's] possibly surmounting time. I shall take up this question again.

changing states and processes in the external world. The defect (fragility) in the living individuum's being is not eliminated or diminished by this, but proves to be the frangibility of something which is *in itself autonomous*, the *basis and the source of active resistance*, and the *center of strength* from which it constructively struggles against being overcome by externally conditioned disturbances of its existence and the threat to that existence from time itself. Only where there is *autonomy* of this kind, this sort of center of strength, does the *independent conduct* of life and, therefore, *subjectivity* in a quite *special* meaning, reveal to us the essence peculiar to fragility of being; only there, where something of this sort exists, can its being be *broken, shattered, destroyed*. And if something is, in its essence, susceptible to anything of this kind, then it is "fragile" (defective) in its being. There is nothing like this in an "inanimate thing." *Unresisting, it submits* to the changes produced in it by the external world as long as any trace of the complex of its primary properties remains, and these do not need to play any special part in this. A "whole"—in the strict meaning of the word—such as that of a living entity does not appear here at all. In these, there is always only a certain residue of properties that have not yet changed, which, together with the properties that have newly come into being and attached themselves to the first, form the objects' whole being and entail that mode of *passive* resistance, peculiar to them all, to the effects of the external world,⁵⁰ and produce at the most only the *appearance* of an autonomous center of strength. Strictly, one also cannot speak of a "defect" (fragility) in their being. An "inanimate" thing slowly *wastes away* until some external action finally destroys it completely. Hence, the "fissured" character of its actuality is much more radical than that of animate individua, and lacks the strict unity of a temporally extensive entity.

However, at least one category of living individua exists (meaning that it "exists" only as a pure possibility denoted by an

⁵⁰ In this way, the essence of a given "inanimate" thing also changes *gradually*—if one can even speak of "essence" here. Cf. my "Essentiale Fragen, ein Beitrag zum Problem des Wesens," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. VII, 1925, pp. 125-304, and the conclusions presented in Chap. xiv of *The Controversy* concerning the essence of an object.

idea), the fissuration of whose actual being seems to be surmounted to a remarkable extent and in a special way: living *conscious* individua. They are not less defective in their being than other living individua, but they can see, as it were, at least in acts of recollection, retention, protention,⁵¹ and anticipation, beyond each circumscribed present, and are able, in principle, to survey the entire course of their lives; and on the other hand, they can penetrate the movement of time and the synthesis of temporal changes. They do this only "intentionally," but this purely intentional (intending)⁵² "seeing" and "grasping" of that which transcends each phase of actuality produces a certain kind of projection above the ceaseless flow of time, of rising above the changes connected with the passage of time, and opens up the prospect of such unification of the individual and of such reinforcement of his internal structure as is not possible to living individua that are not conscious—if any such exist at all. It would lead me too far afield were I to attempt to describe this in detail (and I shall take this up again), but, as a special, limited case of "existence in time," it was necessary at least to mention it here. Only an insight into the material essence of a conscious living individual can reveal to us the specific modifications of its mode of being which take effect on the ground of the mode of being of every living individuum. But in this case also, these do not lead to a genuine conquest of the mutability of time, or to the elimination of fragility of being, although undoubtedly they decrease it to a certain extent.

Now, after these analyses—certainly inadequate, but at least

⁵¹ [Phenomenologically, "retention" refers to our consciousness of the past as peripheral to our primary consciousness of the present, or as "on the horizon" of that consciousness. Husserl differentiated retention from active recollection. "Protention" is our corresponding awareness of the future as on the horizon of the present, and is distinguished from active expectation.—Tr.]

⁵² [The author uses "intending" to discriminate between the conscious act directed toward ("intending") an object and the "intentional" object itself, which can be either only "accidentally" intentional, as in the case of an autonomous object, or "purely" intentional, as in the case of objects that are the products or creations of intending acts of consciousness. Cf. *Das literarische Kunstwerk*, Sec. 20, and "Bemerkungen zum Problem Idealismus-Realismus," *Festschrift für E. Husserl*, 1929. He devotes much attention to intentionality in *The Controversy* (esp. Chap. x, to purely intentional objects).—Tr.]

affording us a preliminary orientation with respect to the problem of "time and modes of being"⁵³—we must return to our main theme and give consideration to what the consequences will be for the main possible solutions of the controversy over the existence of the world when time and existence in time are taken into account.

⁵³ The literature on the subject of time is inexhaustible, especially since the time of Bergson and Einstein's *Theory of Relativity*. It would be out of the question to list it here. I have read many of the works on the subject, and it would be difficult for me to say in what respects this reading has affected the views I have enunciated here. At all events, not without importance in this connection would be the views of the following authors: Aristotle and St. Augustine, of older ones, and Bergson, Husserl, and Conrad-Martius, of more recent ones. Despite these influences, I have the impression that the nucleus of the conception I have presented here is not found in the works of these other writers. So far as Polish philosophical literature dealing with the problem of time is concerned, the works of Wartenberg, Zawirski, and Mehlberg should be mentioned here.

Chapter V

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS OF THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD WHEN TIME IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

NEW CONCEPTS OF MODES OF BEING

IT IS NOW necessary to form new, more complete concepts of modes of being.¹ These are the following:

A. I (Absolute, Timeless Being)?²

This mode of being would be defined by the following existential moments: self-existence, originality, actuality, nonfissuration, persistence, separateness, and self-dependence. However, a variant [in the form of] imperfect "absolute" being appears possible:

Ia. Self-existence, originality, actuality, fissuration, persistence, separateness, and self-dependence.

Whether either of these varieties of "absolute" being really occurs anywhere, whether both of them are possible or only one—these are all questions which must still be clarified. In particular, we are concerned with the question whether the "fissuration" of the existence of an actual existent can be overcome in some way

¹ However, one should not come to the premature conclusion that the modes of being we have differentiated are now *fully* defined by the moments described. I am not seeking to determine here whether or not this actually is the case, because still further investigations will be necessary, which would divert me from our main theme.

² The several modes of being enclosed in parentheses express a tentative assumption, not yet established, that the concepts of modes of being we have constructed correspond faithfully to the modes of being of the several types of objects (being), given in direct experience, with which we have to do. Certain formal-ontological preliminaries must be taken up before this [can be] determined. Nevertheless, we seem to be nearer a solution than we were before making our study of the temporal determination of objects.

through an unlimited extension (if it may be said in this way) of the span of the present. That the span of the present varies to some slight extent is known to us at least purely phenomenally on the basis of our everyday experience, as Bergson observed. The facts of so-called physiological time—different for different types or organisms—also seem to be evidence of this. But whether these relatively narrow limits can be transcended, and being thus be activated, so that *actuality would encompass the whole past and future*, with the consequence that everything would be “one instant,” as it were, or whether, on the contrary, this idea is completely absurd, is one of the most basic questions of existential ontology. If it were possible to answer this question affirmatively, we should gain a victory over time, and temporal, “fissurated” existence would only be a manifestation of a being whose activity and capacity³ were so impaired that various (noncontradictory) qualifications of the existent had spread themselves over different instants that follow each other in succession. But, if we reject this possibility and say that all being having the mode of existence of actuality must also be fissurated, then, in that event, for “enduring” being—which is only the temporal manifestation of original being—there would remain only one possible mode of existence: that which is denoted [above] under Ia. This question is connected with the basic problem whether everything whatever that exists individually must also exist temporally, and whether time is one and the same for all types of individual entities; or whether different times of different types of individual objects are possible (different “tensities” of “enduring”), as Bergson suggested. These are all questions to be considered, but it will be useful, nonetheless, to have at our disposal certain precise, limited concepts, even if only for the purpose of being able to show that a being corresponding to these concepts does not exist, and further, that it is not possible.

When we take the existential moments obtained in our analysis of time into account, a second basic mode of being suggests itself, which contains no moment of actuality at all. We could then assume that either this mode of being generally lacks this moment or that some opposite [moment], such as pure potential-

³ [Meaning “extent.”—Tr.]

ity, occupies its place. Again, however, the question is not so easy to resolve. It will certainly be necessary to find some mode of being that would be appropriate for timeless, ideal entities that are either of the type of the objects of mathematical research, or of the type that ideas are. And certainly it will be impossible to discover in this [ideal] world anything similar to the actuality of being characteristic of the presents of objects existing in time. Equally, however, one cannot assume without reservation that in ideal being pure potentiality (possibility) simply takes the place of actuality. For, although an analysis of the contents of an idea showed that so-called "variables" appear in it, which are, as I attempted to show, concretions of possibility, "constants" appear along with them which seem to be, existentially, something considerably more than pure possibility. On the other hand, it seems doubtful that the existence of mathematical objects—e.g., of univocally determined triangles—can be reduced, as some think, merely to noncontradiction. However, we do not need to analyze this problem further, because it is of rather incidental [importance] to the problem of the existence of the real world what the *modus existentiae* of ideal objects or ideas is.⁴ Hence, only as a certain kind of hypothetical concept do I propose the mode of being which would be defined by the following existential moments:

B. (Extratemporal Being, Ideal?)

IIa	IIb	III
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
originality	originality	originality
nonactuality	nonactuality	nonactuality
(potentiality?)	(potentiality?)	(potentiality?)
separateness	separateness	inseparateness
self-dependence	contingency	

It is necessary to add two more observations about the mode of being, B. First, there may seem to be a question whether existential originality should be retained in this mode of being, or whether existential derivation should be substituted for it. For it seems doubtful that we could succeed in proving that everything we encounter in ideal being exists in its essence [in this

⁴ But it does have significance for us for methodological reasons.

way] of necessity, so that it could not *not* be. On the other hand, it also does not seem probable that all ideal objects (especially mathematical objects, logical relations, ideas, ideal qualities) could be regarded as existentially derivative, as created by some original being (if I am not mistaken, Christian philosophy holds that all these entities were created by God). Could this be said of extratemporal objects? There is also the possibility of acknowledging *two* different varieties of an extratemporal mode of being: one, in which existential originality would appear and in which there would be *primary* elements of the realm of ideal objects of a certain type, and a second, which would contain existential derivation. However, these are only suppositions with respect to which it would be difficult as yet to commit oneself, and which I mention here only for the purpose of making myself aware, along with the reader, of the variety of existential problems which pose themselves with reference to the mode of extratemporal, ideal being.

The second observation, which suggests itself with regard to the mode of being under B, is connected with the fact that, as is evident, there are three different possible varieties of this mode of being (IIa, IIb, and III), depending on the appearance of self-dependence or dependence, or of separateness or inseparateness. Thus, as will be seen in later formal-ontological discussions, the appearance of these varieties has an essential significance in connection with certain details of the *form* of individual objects or of ideas, as well as with the formal connections which can occur between ideal objects of the same region (e.g., among the objects of mathematical investigations). For example, the idea can be advanced that the mode of being B IIa fits individual ideal *objects* (e.g., individual squares), that the mode of being B IIb would fit *relations* between ideal objects (e.g., the surface of a circle is larger than the surface of a square inscribed in that circle), and finally, that B III would be suitable for states of affairs occurring in ideal objects or for their properties. However, these are only certain suppositions that occur to us when we try to apply the modes of being we have differentiated to ideal entities. But no final decisions should be made at this point. For the moment, it

may only be asserted that such variations in the mode of being of type B are possible.

The next mode of being that suggests itself is the one which is characteristic of objects existing in time—eventually, real objects.

C (Temporal Being, Real?, in Three Mutually Appurtenant Varieties)

<i>(a) Present</i>		
IVa	Va	VIa
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
derivation	derivation	derivation
actuality	actuality	actuality
fissuration	fissuration	fissuration
fragility	fragility	fragility
separateness	separateness	inseparateness
self-dependence	contingency	
<i>(b) Past</i>		
IVb	Vb	VIb
autonomy	autonomy	autonomy
derivation	derivation	derivation
postactuality	postactuality	postactuality
(retrogressive derivation)	(retrogressive derivation)	(retrogressive derivation)
separateness	separateness	inseparateness
self-dependence	contingency	
<i>(c) Future</i>		
VIIc	VIIIc	
heteronomy	heteronomy	
derivation	derivation	
empirical possibility	empirical possibility	
separateness	inseparateness	
contingency		

It appears that the three sets of possible modes of being are mutually appurtenant and that it is just in their appurtenance that the specific essence of temporal or real being is contained. That which is present cannot in a moment not be past, and could not an instant ago not be future. And that which is past must first have been present, and, before that, future. And that which is future cannot be future without being present at some time, and then past. In other words, what exists in time (is real?) *must pass* through these three different modes of being (c, a, b), and

it appears that only this existence, which is a passage from the future into the present and the past, is that specific *modus existentiae* that we call reality. At this juncture, we seem at least to be closer to seizing the ultimate mode of being of reality. Nevertheless, these are still only assumptions which will have to be confirmed by formal, and eventually by material, ontological deductions. In other words, if everything has to be in agreement, then both the form and the matter of the objects involved as candidates, so to speak, for real existence, must be of a kind that these modes of being that have been signalized will inevitably unite with them. If we can succeed in showing that such forms and such essential material endowments "exist" as require this, only then can it be claimed that the problem of real existence has been adequately clarified. Finally, it must be noted that we obtained *three* different varieties of modes of being for both the present (IVa, Va, and VIa) and the past (IVb, Vb, and VIb). It is also significant that within the sphere of temporal being it is evident that some three types of basic objects can be distinguished, whose form is connected with the fact that their modes of being are somewhat dissimilar. And now the supposition can be put forward that the modes of being IV (a, b) are appropriate for objects enduring in time, that V (a, b) are appropriate for processes, and finally, VI (a, b), for events, although perhaps not only for them, but in general for everything which is inseparable (for example, as we shall see, the properties of things) within the compass of the temporal (real) world.

There is one other mode of being, which appears in two variations, and which we can assume is the existence peculiar to purely intentional objects.

D (Purely Intentional Being)

VII

heteronomy
derivation
nonactuality
separateness
contingency

VIII

heteronomy
derivation
nonactuality
inseparateness

In this way, possible conceptions of four modes of being and of four regions of *being* as well begin to take shape before our eyes: (1) absolute, (2) temporal (real?), (3) ideal (extra-

temporal), and (4) purely intentional; and there are still the two variants of absolute being.⁵ We cannot as yet decide which of them would ultimately be compatible with the mode of being of the world that is given to us in consentient experience as "real," or with the mode of being of pure consciousness. Especially, we cannot decide in advance that the mode of being designated above under Ia excludes the appearance of a "real" entity in it. For only formal-ontological and material-ontological investigations can lead to decisive conclusions regarding this question. For the present, we must also consider the possibility that there is a "real" entity which would fulfill the existential conditions listed under Ia. But then, the real could not *change* in any respect.

In other words, if one could succeed in showing that the real world, or *everything* whatever that is encompassed by it, is in its essence absolutely immutable, although concomitantly temporally determined, and which, therefore, would not in any event include any living or conscious individuals, then the cases of existentially possible solutions of our controversy which acknowledge the real world to be *existentially original* would be admissible, in which case pure consciousness *could not* appear *within the compass* of such a world. Consequently, it could not be existentially inseparable in relation to the real world (or its components). It would itself have to be *outside the world*.⁶

⁵ While correcting proofs for this book, at the time when twelve of its folios had already been printed, Étienne Souriau's book, *Les différents modes d'existence*, Paris, 1943, came into my hands. It was then too late to study it and to take it into consideration. I mention it only as evidence that the problems which moved me to write this book were also vital in French philosophy, and were discussed well-nigh contemporaneously.

⁶ And this just because changes are ceaselessly taking place within its compass. It is probably not an accident also that extreme materialism betrays a tendency to ascribe existential originality to matter, although it is not cognizant of all the consequences of this.

NAME INDEX

- Ajdukiewicz, K., 106 n. 12, 135 n. 38
 Aquinas, Thomas, 77
 Aristotle, 46, 77, 156 n. 53
- Bergson, Henri, 36 n. 9, 67, 103 n. 8, 115, 122 n. 33, 127, 144 n. 40, 148
 Berkeley, 4, 5, 6, 81
 Bochenski, I. M., vii n. 1
 Bunge, Mario, 57 n. 34
- Carnap, Rudolf, 7 n. 2
 Conrad-Martius, H., 13 n. 9, 43-45, 50 n. 29, 156 n. 53
- Dąmbska, 63 n. 39, 106 n. 11
 De Broglie, L., 127 n. 36
 Dedekind, R., 110 n. 17
 Descartes, 4, 5, 6, 15, 80 n. 56
 Dilthey, W., 144 n. 40
 Duns Scotus, 105 n. 10
 Dupréel, E., 68 n. 45
- Einstein, A., 156 n. 53
- Farber, Marvin, 13 n. 8
 Frege, G., 49 n. 27
- Gawecki, 57 n. 35
- Hartmann, Nicolai, 22 n. 1, 111 n. 18
 Heidegger, Martin, 22 n. 1, 144 n. 40
 Hegel, 122 n. 33
 Heraclitus, 59, 67, 122 n. 33, 127
- Hering, Jean, 83 n. 59
 Hume, David, 4, 5, 6, 25 n. 4, 33 n. 6, 35, 56, 58 n. 36, 63, 66 n. 43, 72 n. 50
 Husserl, E., 9-16, 18, 23, 25 n. 4, 28 n. 1, 45, 49, 82 n. 57, 86 n. 61, 92 n. 66, 144 n. 40, 155 n. 51, 156 n. 53
- Ingarden, Roman, vii n. 2, 42 n. 15, 47 n. 26, 49 n. 27, 100 n. 3, 101 n. 6, 120 n. 31, 151 n. 45, 154 n. 50, 155 n. 52
- Kant, 13 n. 9, 24-26, 35, 65 n. 42, 99 n. 1
 Kreutz, 57 n. 35
- Locke, John, 4, 5, 6
 Lukasiewicz, 57 n. 35
- Mehlberg, 156 n. 53
 Metallmann, 57 n. 35
- Pfänder, A., 30 n. 3, 4.
 Plato, 3, 47, 77, 109 n. 15
- Russell, Bertrand, 30, 70 n. 47
- St. Augustine, 156 n. 53
 Sartre, J-P., 144 n. 40
 Schapp, Wilhelm, 144 n. 40
 Scheler, Max, 20, 144 n. 40
 Selz, Otto, 26 n. 5

- Sextus Empiricus, 63 n. 39
Shakespeare, 96
Sigwart, Chr., 65 n. 42
Simmel, Georg, 144 n. 40
Spinoza, 52 n. 32, 53, 55, 57, 58
118 n. 27
Souriau, Étienne, 163 n. 5
- Von Bertalanffy, L. 149 n. 44
- Wartenberg, 57 n. 55, 65 n. 42, 156
n. 53
Whitehead, A. N., 107 n. 13
Wundt, Wilhelm, 58 n. 36
- Twadowski, K., 36 n. 9
- Zawirski, 57 n. 35, 156 n. 53

SUBJECT INDEX

- Absolute being, *v.* being
Actio in distans, 68 n.
 Action (activity), 59
 Actuality: 105, 111, 119, 129, 153;
 quasi-, 116
 Ambiguity of verb "to be," 30-32
 Appearances (phenomena), 17, 99 n.,
 154
 A priori: connections, 97; laws, 96
 Assertion (sign), 30
 Attitude, natural, *v.* natural attitude
 Autonomy: 42, 43-52, 88f., 112; def.
 of, 46
- Being: absolute, 92-98, 157; concepts
 of, 93, 157-63; intensity of, 118;
 relative, 92-98
- Causa efficiens*, 64 n.
Causa sui, 52 n.
 Cause and effect: 55-76; def. of, 56,
 71; direct and indirect, 63, 65,
 68, 72f.; reality of, 56, 76; simul-
 taneity of, 63-67; temporality of,
 58
 Certainty, 6, 15
 Change, 34f., 128-33
 Cognition: 15, 17, 24; empirical, 18
 Concretion, 45, 46
 Consciousness: 4, 11; stream of, 12;
 v. also pure consciousness
 Constitution: of living individuum,
 147-148; of process-object, 120
 Constitutive nature, 90
 Construction, 94
 Consummation, 113-14
 Contingency: 89-92; def. of, 89; mu-
 tual 89; *v.* also dependence
- Continuum, 66, 67, 110 n. 128, 135,
 136
 Corporeality, 17, 44-45
Creatio continua, 80 n.
- Dependence, 20, 28f., 71, 82 n.; *v.*
 also contingency, inseparateness
 Derivation: existential, 52-5, 77-82;
 relativity of, 81; retrogressive,
 117-18
 Discontinuity, 71, 73-75, 136
 Doubt, 6, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21
 Duration, 102ff.
- Ego, 5, 12
Eigenwesen, *v.* essence
 Empirical possibility, *v.* possibility
 Enduring object: 101, 124-56; change
 in, 128-33; essential core of, 138-
 39, 143; essential properties of,
 147; fissuration of, 154; of
 higher order, 135-36; history of,
 134, 144 n., 40; identity of, 118,
 125, 130, 137, 139, 145; mode
 of being of, 148; nonessential
 properties of, 147; primordially
 individual, 136; and processes,
 126-28; psychophysical, *v.* living
 individua; and its state, 133-35,
 137; stratiform structure of, 143,
 149; and time, 138; unchanging,
 132, 138
 Epoché, 10 n. 6, 16, 18 n.
 Equilibrium, 70, 149
Esse: ab alio, a se, 53
 Essence: 49, 91, 97, 143, 150, 154
 n.; of process, 123; of time, 104,
 109

Eternal, *v.* timelessness

Event: 102-107, 125; after-effects of, 104, 129; def. of, 192; dependence of, 103, 106; instantaneousness of, 66-67, 106; mode of being of, 102-107; nonactual mode of, 105f.; and processes, 102

Existence: idea of, 24-26, 42; moments of, *v.* moments of existence

Existential: moments, *v.* moments of existence; ontology, *v.* ontology

Existentialism, 22, 41 n., 144 n.

Experience: 11-15, 19; of time, 100f., 132-33; sense, 13, 17

Fissuration, 116, 152, 158f.

Form, 22-23, 77, 96, 160

Formal ontology, *v.* ontology

Fragility, 79, 80, 149, 154

Free will, 57

Fusion, 83; *v.* also inseparateness

Geometrization (of time), *v.* time

Givenness ("originarily"), 13, 17; *v.* also corporeality

God, 4, 54-55, 58, 77, 79, 160

Hallucination, 50 n.

Heteronomy, 43-52, 88f., 112

Idea: 3, 77; complex, 4; as conscious experience, 5; contents of, 159; of existence, 24-26, 42; of reality, 25f., 28, 33

Idealism: 3-8; axiological, 5; epistemological, 5-6; metaphysical, 7; transcendental, 6-7, 9-14, 28

Ideality (ideal objects, qualities), 3, 41, 46, 101, 129, 159f.

Identity: 37, 118, 128, 135, 139; dynamic and static, 145-46

In actu esse, 114

Intentional objects: 10 n. 6; accidentally, 47-48; heteronomy of,

49ff., 96; purely, 47-52, 80f., 96, 162f.

Immanence, 43; *v.* also perception, immanent

Independence, 4, 20, 28, 42, 82 n.; *v.* also self-dependence, separate-ness

Inertia, 69-70; 80

Inseparateness: 82-89; bilateral, 86-88; def. of, 82; degrees of, 84; of properties, 86; relativity of (absolute, multivocal, univocal), 84-86; unilateral, 86-88

Intending, 155

Intensity of being, *v.* being

Intuition: 18, 32; of time, 99 n.

"Irreal," 11

Living individua: autonomy of, 154; conscious, 155f.; consummation of, 145-46; as enduring objects, 141, 147; equilibrium of, 149; essence of, 147, 149, 150; essential core of, 143, 144 n., 153; fissuration of, 152, 154, 155; fragility of, 149, 154; identity of, *v.* identity; internal unity of, 153; mode of being of, 148f.; organic structure of, 152; and processes, 141, 143, 145, 148; properties of, 142, 146, 147; regularity of, 151, 153; self-dissolution of, 150; stratiform structure of, 143, 149; subjectivity of, 154; and time, 141

Materialism: 3; dialectical, 79

Material ontology, *v.* ontology

Metaphysics, 20, 23, 24, 67, 92, 135

Microphysics, 20, 23, 24, 67, 92, 135

Microphysics, 59

Mode of being: 3, 33f.; absolute, 157; def. of, 35; of enduring objects, 148f.; of events, 102-107; extratemporal, 159; and form, 96f.; idea of, 26; of processes, 107-24; of a process-object, 120; of pure-

- ly intentional objects, 162; of temporal objects, 161
- Modes of being, concepts of, 40-42, 92-98, 157-62
- Moments of existence, 24f., 29f., 33f., 37, 41-42
- Monism, 48

- Name, 25 n.
- Natural attitude, 13, 16
- Natura naturans (naturata)*, 53
- Necessity, 56
- Nonactuality, *v.* postactuality
- Nonbeing, 33, 34, 35, 36n., 109
- Noncontradiction, 159
- Nonderivation, 52, 81

- Object: 43 n. 16; enduring, 101, 124-56; individual, 97; non-individual, 97; real, 13; sides of, 17; temporally determined, 101; *v.* also enduring object, purely intentional object
- Ontology, 20, 22f., 32, 163
- Operancy, 112, 114; *v.* also action
- Organism, 149f., 152; *v.* also living individua
- Originality: 52-55, 77-82, 163; and autonomy, 83; and causality, 57; essence of, 77f.; and self-confirmation, 79

- Perception: 17, 45; immanent, 9ff., 15, 18n., 45f., 79; inner, 10f., 17f.; sense, 13, 17-18
- Persistence, 69
- Phenomenological reduction, 16
- Plentitude, 114; *v.* also corporeality
- Position*, 25 n.
- Possibility: 24, 33, 119; empirical, 38ff., 40-41, 52, 63; pure, 38 n., 159
- Postactuality, 105f.
- Present, 40, 115-16, 161
- Primordial: individual, 136; *v.* also givenness, inertia, originality

- Process: 10, 74, 101, 125; and activity, 113-14; and actuality, 111, 130; bilaterality of, 126; continuity of, 108, 124-25; def. of, 107; and enduring object, 126-28; essence of, 123; and event, 102; mode of being of, 107-124; potential parts of, 108, 110; simple, 108; stratiform structure of, 122; transience of, 108, 120f.
- Process-object, 120-23
- Property, 18, 24, 86
- Protention, 155
- Psychologizing, 48
- Punctuality (of time), 67
- Pure consciousness, 5, 9f., 12f., 19, 28, 92 n., 163
- Purely intentional object, *v.* intentional object

- Quantum theory, 74

- Realism, 3-8, 18
- Reality, 19, 24, 26, 28f., 33, 38, 40f., 43-44, 76
- Real world, 4, 9, 12ff., 19
- Recollection, 115f.
- Regions, 9, 10 n. 6, 12, 15, 19, 20
- Regularity, 151
- Relativity, *v.* inseparateness
- Retention, 155
- Retrogressive derivation, *v.* derivation

- Scholastics, 31, 53f., 58
- Self-dependence, 89-92, 148; absolute, 90; def. of, 89
- Self-dissolution, 150
- Self-existence, *v.* autonomy
- Self-presentation, 17; *v.* also corporeality, givenness
- Separateness, 82-89
- Setzung*, *v.* *Position*
- Sides (of object), 17, 24, 42
- Simultaneity, 63f., 70; *v.* also cause and effect

"Something," 43 n. 16

Spiritualism, 5

Structure: bilateral, 126; organic,
152; stratiform, 122, 143, 149

Substance, 52 n., 59, 127

Sufficient condition, 64, 68, 72-73

Temporal: being, 161; conditioning,
138; determination, 101; objects,
58

Time: 100; and discontinuity, 136;
essence of, 104, 109, 136; and

existential moments, 94; exper-
ience of, 100f., as form, 99 n.;
geometrization of, 103 n. 8, 135;
v. also temporal, timelessness

Timelessness, 78, 99

Transcendence, 13, 17, 117

Transcendental idealism, *v.* idealism

Transcendental method, 6, 15-16

Transience, 36, 108f.

Transition, 69-71, 74

Universals, *v.* ideality

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
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